

Not used

THE LANAY INCIDENT IS CLOSED

December 26, 1937

This was an eminently happy day and it showed that wisdom and good sense of two Governments which refused to be stampeded into potential war in spite of the tendency of the one side to "save face" at almost all costs, and in spite of an outrageous affront offered to the other. The Japanese Government had expressed the most abject apologies for the sinking of the Lanay and we, without a moment's delay, accepted those apologies. I thought that our Government's note was a masterpiece; we had observed with satisfaction the promptness with which the Japanese Government had admitted responsibility, expressed regret, and offered amends; we accept the Japanese action as responsive to our requests and expectations; we each rely on our own evidence and conclusions as to the details; we express the earnest hope that the steps taken by the Japanese Government will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests, or property in China.

Equally masterly was the Japanese arrangement that its note should get to Washington on Christmas Eve and should be dealt with by our Government on Christmas Day (our reply was dispatched from Washington at 3 o'clock on Christmas afternoon). The Japanese could hardly have failed to realize that the Christmas spirit is strong in our country and that the thought "Peace on earth, good will toward men" must inevitably color and influence our decision. Anyway, I was so profoundly happy at the outcome that when I called on Hirota at noon I entered his room wreathed in smiles (a very different attitude from my call on him on December 17) and told him that I brought good news. When I had finished reading our note to him, his eyes were really filled with tears and he showed as much emotion as any Japanese is capable of showing; he said: "I heartily thank your Government and you yourself for this decision. I am very, very happy. You have brought me a splendid Christmas present." I think his relief must have been tremendous, as was mine. We have, for the moment, safely passed a difficult, a very difficult, hurdle.

Yet I cannot look into the future with any feeling of serenity. Other hurdles, perhaps even more difficult ones, are almost certain to present themselves, and the patience of the American people is not inexhaustible. War between Japan and the United States will not come through mere interference with or even destruction of our tangible interests in China, or yet from the breach of treaty rights, or the breaking down of principles for which we stand, but war may very easily come from some further act in derogation of American sovereignty or from an accumulation of open affronts. Therein lies the danger, and it is a real danger which no one with knowledge of the irresponsibility of the Japanese military as distinguished from the Japanese Government can eliminate from the future picture. I left the Minister's house realizing only too clearly that our satisfaction at the settlement of the Panay incident may be but temporary and that the rock upon which for five years I have been trying to build a substantial edifice of Japanese-American relations has broken down into treacherous sand.

Excerpt from "Ten Years in Japan"
Diary of Former Ambassador Crow
Pages 239 and 240

辯証圖書類二〇六(二〇)號

服部 靜

パネー號事件落着

一九三七年十二月二十六日

今日こそは眞に佳日と云ふべきである。本日、此處に日米兩國政府は其の敏智と良識とを發揮し、何はともあれ、面子を傷つけないとする前者側の趨勢及び後者側に於ては之に對し加へられたる不法外な侮辱の何れにもとらはれることなく、恰までも、起り得べき戦争への突入を阻止したのである。日本政府はパネー號撃沈に關しては最も謙虛なる謝罪の意を表し、我方亦一瞬の遲疑遂巡する事もなく、右謝罪を受容れた。私は是に對する我政府の覺悟は正に傑出した出來であると思つた。即ち右覺悟中に於て吾々は、日本政府が迅速に、責任の所在を容認し、遺憾の意を表し且賠償を申出たことに就き満足なる旨述べ、日本側の右措置は、我方の要求及期待に應へるものなるを認め、細目に關しては双方共其の有する證據及判定に基づき返答し、且、日本政府により執られたる措置が將來に亘り日本側當局者乃至軍隊により支那に於ける米國人、米國權益、亦は財産に對し攻撃又は不法なる干涉の加へられるを阻止するのに有效ならんことを切に希望する旨等述べた。

又、日本側に於いて、其の覺悟が華府にクリスマス前夜に到着し從つ

辯証國書類二〇六(二〇)號

服部 輝

パネー號事件落着

一九三七年十二月二十六日

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又、日本側に於いて、其の覺悟が華府にクリスマス前夜に到着し從つ

て我政府がクリスマス當日夫を取り扱ふことになる様に手配したことは同様、眞に時宜を得た措置と云はねばなるまい。(我方回答はクリスマス午後三時に華府より發せられた)日本側は、我國に於ける「クリスマス」の精神が根強く、従つて、地上の平和、万人友愛の思想は必ずや我方決定に良い影響を、齎らすに相違なからん旨見逃す筈はあり得なかつたのである。兎に角、私はかゝる結末を見たことに對し喜びを抑へ切れず、正午に廣田を訪れる際の如きは、滿面に微笑を凝へて(十二月十七日に彼を訪れた際にくらべると天地の差程の態度であつた)部屋に入り、良い報せを持つて來たと告げた程であつた。私が我方の覺悟を讀み終へるや、彼は眞實兩眼に涙を凝へ、日本人の表し得る最大限の感情を露してゐた。そして、私はこんな喜びしいことはない。全く素晴らしい「クリスマス」プレゼントを齎らして下さつたと述べたが、彼がどの様に安堵したか、全く私と同様に計り知れない程であつたに違ひないと思ふ。之で我々は、ここ菅原の間、困難な、極めて超え難い障害物を一つ無事に通過したといふ譯である。

然しながらさればとて、私は將來を思ふときは必ずしも安閑としては居れない氣がする。他の障害物、然もより困難なる障害物が必ずや出現することと思はれるし、其際に於いても米國民の忍耐力にも亦限度があるといふものである。日米間の戦争は中國に於ける吾々の明白なる利益に對する單なる干涉乃至は更に其の侵害があつたとしても、夫を契機と

して惹起されるところは思はれないし、亦、條約上の信利の破棄、乃至は吾々の主張する諸原理が蹂躪される様なことがあつても容易には惹起されるところは思はれない。然しなから米國の主權を此の上毀損する様な行爲、又は公然たる侮辱の度重る様な事があるれば、直ぐにも戦争は起り得るのである。危険は正に此點に存するのであり、然かも其危険たるや、日本政府に比し無責任極まりない日本軍部に就いて多少でも知つてゐる者ならば將來を予見するに當り決して除去して考へられない切實さを伴ふものである。私は大臣官邸を辭去するに當り、パネー號事件の解決に對する吾々の満足も一時的に過ぎないものかも知れず、又五年間營々として日米關係を堅牢なるものに築き上げんとした其の基礎岩石が今や崩り去つて頼りない砂地と化した事實を一人まさまざと思ひ知らされるのであつた。

前大使グルー氏 日記

・ 滯日十年、よりの抜粹

二三九——二四〇頁

Not Used

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENERAL UGAKI

May 31, 1938

General Ugaki,* the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, received the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually today. Apparently without knowledge of English, he spoke through an interpreter.

He said that he desired to do his utmost to develop good relations with the United States, adding that having had no experience in diplomacy he is unused to the intricacies of that profession and that therefore he will always speak frankly. I replied that with thirty-four years of experience in diplomacy I had become steadily more convinced of the stupidity of indirection and that he could always count on complete frankness from me in our relations. We had therefore mutually arrived at the same conception by different roads.

I said that it would be helpful if I might report to my government about his attitude toward the protection of American interests in China. The Minister replied definitely that he would guarantee the protection of American interests in China and that if questions should arise in connection therewith he wished me to inform him of them.

* An officer of liberal leanings who, when later the Emperor chose him as Prime Minister and directed him to form a cabinet, failed to do so because the Army regarded him as too liberal and refused to nominate a Minister of War.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 247

not used

辯護側文書第二〇六號(二三)

外務大臣宇垣大將トノ初會見

一九三八年五月三十一日

今回ノ外相宇垣大將ハ各國最高外交使節トノ個別的接見ヲ本日行ツタ。彼ハ英語ヲ知ラナイト見エ、通譯ヲ通シテ語ツタ。

彼ハ米國トノ親交ヲ進展サセルタメ全力ヲ盡シタイト思ツテキル旨ヲ語リ、ソレニ加ヘテ外交政策ニ全ク經驗ヲ有タヌ故ソノ複雑怪奇サニナラワズ依ツテ常ニ卒直ニ語リ度イト語ツタ。

私ハ亦私ガ外交生活三七四年ノ經驗ニヨツテ認同スルコトノ愚ナルコトヲツクツク悟ツテ吾ルカラ吾々ノ關係ニ於テハ何時デモ私ガ全ク腹藏ノナイコトヲ信ジテ敢イト宜シイト答ヘタ。茲ニ於テ吾々ハ夫々違ツタ道カラ同一ノ考ヘニ到達シタノデアル。

私ハ支那ニ於ケル米國ノ利益擁護ニ對スル彼ノ態度ヲ私ガ政府ニ報告スルコトヲ出來レバ非常ニ助ケニナルダラウト云ツタ。外相ハ斷言シテ彼ハ支那ニ於ケル米國ノ利益保全ハ保證スルト云ヒ、若シ之ニ關係シテ問題ガ起ツタナラソレヲ彼ニ告ゲテ欲シイト云ツタ。

and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same

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(X)自由主義的ナ人物ヲ後ニ天皇ガ彼ヲ首相ニ選定シ組閣ヲ命ビラレタ時軍
ガ彼ヲ余リ自由主義デアルトテ陸軍大臣ノ指令ヲ拒ンダノテ組閣ニ至ラナ
カツタ人物デアル。

グルー前米國大使日記一在日十年一抜

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二四七頁

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Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same

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WHY FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA LOST HIS JOB

June 21, 1938

A prominent member of the Japanese Government, speaking with full knowledge of the situation, has given the following picture of the purposes of the recent change in the cabinet and the intentions of the Government as they shape up at present. Prince Konoye and other members of the Government realized that if progress were to be made in consolidating Japan's position in China and in avoiding serious friction with Great Britain and the United States the conduct of everything except purely military affairs must be taken out of the hands of the Army and lodged in the civil part of the Government. Hirota had fallen because he was too weak in opposing the Army while at the same time insisting that the Foreign Office has control of Japan's foreign relations in China. This the Army would not tolerate, and it was for this reason that they were now setting up the so-called "China Organ" to deal exclusively with questions relating to China.

General Ugaki and Finance Minister Ikeda had accepted office only on condition that political and economic affairs in China should be taken out of the hands of the military, and this explains the appointment of General Itagaki as Minister of War, because he has the confidence of the younger officers in the Army and at the same time believes that the Army should stay out of politics and should limit itself to its duties as an efficient fighting machine. Both Ugaki and Ikeda realize that the solution of Japan's problem in China will be impossible unless good relations are maintained with Great Britain and the United States and Ugaki therefore proposes to do everything possible to see that their respective interests are protected. Obviously it is not going to be easy to take these matters out of the hands of the military and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same

time the purpose of setting up the North China Development Company and the Central China Renovation Company is to take economic affairs in China out of the hands of the Army. In all these questions "the Big Five" see eye to eye. The foregoing statement of the Government's position "came straight home from the horse's mouth" and is considered entirely reliable.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
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辯護側文書第二〇六號（二四）

廣田外相失脚ノ経緯

一九三八年六月二十一日

現在ノ狀勢ニ充分ナ知識ヲ有ツ日本政府ノ一高官ハ今回ノ内閣變動ノ目的及ビ政府ノ現在ノ意圖ヲ次ノ如ク解説シテ居ル。近衛公其ノ他ノ政府要人ハ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ地位ヲ鞏固ニシ且英米トノ激シイ摩擦ヲ避ケルタメニ何等カノ進展ヲ期待スルタメニハ純然タル軍問題以外ノアラユル活動ヲ軍部カラ奪ヒコレヲ政府ノ文官島ノ手ニ收メサセル要ノアルコトヲ悟ツテホル。廣田氏ハ支那ニ於ケル日本外交ノ支配權ガ外務省ニアルコトヲ主張シテ居リナガラ、軍部ニ對抗スル力ガ充分無イタメニ失脚シタ。斯カルコトハ軍部ノ到底承認シ得ザル所デ、コノ故ニコソ現在軍部ハ支那關係問題ヲ專一ニ處理セシメルタメ所謂支那機關ヲ設立シテ居ル。

宇垣將軍及ビ池田國務大臣ハ支那ニ於ケル政府ノ經濟問題ガ軍部カラ取リ上ケラレルコトヲ條件トシテノミ入閣シタモノデ、コレニヨツテ板垣將軍ノ閣相就任ヲ説明スルコトガ出來ル。何故ナラ將軍ハ軍部若手將校ノ信頼ヲ集メテ居リ同時ニ彼ハ軍ガ政治圈外ニアラネバナラサズ且軍ガ優レタル以國機

therefore not allow the incident to develop. I knew that Ott would not mislead me, because our personal relations are of the friendliest, and that barring unexpected developments the incident would soon be settled.

開デアルトイフ任務以外ニ逸脱シテハナラマシテ信ジテキルカラデアル。宇垣池田共ニ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ問題ノ解決ハ英米トノ良好ナル關係ノ維持ナクシテ不可能デアルトノ信念ヲ持シテ居リ、ソレ故宇垣氏ハ雙方ノ利益ガ確保セラレタルタメニハアラユル努力ヲ惜シママトシテ居ルノデアル。軍部ノ手カラコレヲノ問題ヲ取リ上ゲ政府ノ文官島デ建テラレタ方針ニ軍部ヲ從ハセルトイフコトハ容易ナコトデアリ、ハ明白デ政府ガコレニ成功スルカ否カハ未決ノ問題デアル。同様に北支開發會社及中支振興會社設立ノ目的ハ支那ニ於ケル經濟問題ヲ軍部ノ手カラ取リ上ゲルニアル。カカル問題ニ就イテ五巨頭ハ意見ガ完全ニ一致シテキルト謂フワケデアル。上記政府ノ現状ニ關スル觀察ハ「馬ノ口カラ眞直ニ家ヘツテ來ターモノデ充分信頼スルニ頼ルモノト思ハレル」。

グルー前米國大使日記「在日十年」抄

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二四八頁

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JAPAN AND RUSSIA CLASH, BUT AVOID WAR

August 1, 1938

The chief development in July was the Soviet-Japanese fracas at Chengkufang on the Soviet-Manchukuo border, in which the Soviet forces occupied a strategic hill in disputed territory and, according to local reports, the Japanese drove them back again with considerable casualties on both sides. Similar incidents have been occurring in that general region periodically during the past six years, ever since we came to Japan, but this particular incident seems to have been more serious than usual and reminded us of the trouble over the islands in the Amur River last year, when the Japanese appeared to be trying out the Soviet strength. In the present case it may be that the Russians were testing the Japanese strength and determination, or they may have staged the incident in order to draw Japanese troops away from the drive on Hankow, with a view to co-operating with the Chinese. If this was their purpose, they seem to have been at least partially successful, for considerable troop movements to the north are reported, and Japan can now hardly afford to omit preparation for any eventuality in that area.

Being convinced that the Soviets do not want war with Japan at present, and equally convinced that the Japanese cannot now afford any such venture, I was not greatly perturbed by the incident and felt from the beginning that it would be localized. General Ott, the German Ambassador, who has close relations with the highest Japanese military officers, told me that these high officers had said to him that they want no trouble with Russia at present because they are far too much occupied in China and that they would therefore not allow the incident to develop. I knew that Ott would not mislead me, because our personal relations are of the friendliest, and that barring unexpected developments the incident would soon be settled.

not used

一九三八年八月一日

日ソ衝突するも戦争を回避

七月の主なる事件はソ聯國境の張鼓峰に於ける日ソの衝突であつた。この衝突でソ聯軍は紛争地帯の一戰略的重要高地を占領したが現地よりの報道によると日本軍はソ聯軍を再び退却、兩軍共相當の死傷者を出した。過去六年間、吾々が日本に到着以來同地方一帯にこの種の事件が週期的に生じてゐるが、今回の事件に限り何時もより重大なものであつたらしく、昨年日本軍がソウェット兵力の偵察を試みたと見られるアムール河諸島の紛争を吾々は想ひ出した。今度の場合はロシア側が日本の兵力と決意を打診したのかも知れず、或は又ロシアが中國軍隊に協力する目的を以つて日本軍隊を漢口進駐より逸すため本事件を仕組んだものかも知れぬ。若しこれが彼等の目的であつたとすれば、少なくとも或る理

correct these attacks, which were now being investigated.

The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitations and expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present time, but navies are "dangerous toys"; the progressive increase in naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general explosion and someday an

File # 206 (25)

度は成功したものだと思はれる。なぜならば相當数の軍隊の北部移動が傳へられて居り、日本は今や同地方に於いて今後或は生ずるかも知れぬ事件の準備を怠る丈の余裕が殆んど無いのである。ゾウエットは現在日本との戦争を欲してゐないといふ事及び日本側も現在かかる危険を冒す余裕の無いといふ事は共に私の信じてゐる所故、今度の事件にも大して驚かず局地的なものであらうと初めから感じてゐた。ドイツ大使オット大將は日本の陸軍の最上級將官達と密接な關係をもつてゐるが大使はこれら將官が同使に語つた言として、彼等は中國に於いて手一杯であるから目下ロシアとの紛争を望んでゐないといふ事及び本事件の擴大を許さない積りでゐる旨に語つた。私と大使の個人的關係は極めて親しい間柄であるから大使が私を誤らせる積りでないといふ事及び本事件は思はざる進展を示さない限り、直ぐ解決するといふ事を私は知つてゐた。幸ひ、同事件は休戦といふ形で解決した。同地には衝突の種

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Ref. No. #206 (25)

「滞日十年」と題する前米國大使グルーの日記抜萃二五〇頁と二
五一頁

子が常に存在してゐるが、張鼓峰事件も悉くは、一時的な興奮
をもたらし、消へてしまつた他の多くの事件の一つとなつてあ
らう。

.....

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not used

April 19, 1939

* * * * *

After dinner Admiral Yonai took Dooman aside (the Minister doesn't speak English very fluently) and asked him to tell me that my concern about the possibility of Japan's becoming involved in Europe had come to his attention and that he wished to tell me that I need have no further concern because "Japanese policy has been decided. The element in Japan which desires Fascism for Japan and the consequent linking up with Germany and Italy had been 'suppressed.'" Japan, the Minister said, while co-operating for the maintenance of friendly relations with both the democracies and the authoritarian states, must stand apart from either group, her own ideology being different from both of them.

Yoshizawa, to whom this talk was repeated, said that the decision to stay out of an alliance with Germany and Italy must have just been taken because he had not known of it. The Minister's statement to me might be taken as a definite indication that Japan intended to avoid embroilment in European troubles, and he knew that the Navy had held the balance of power in this important question, but we must not assume that there would be no strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In further conversation with Admiral Yonai he said that the need for restoring good relations with the United States was being keenly felt. On his being informed that our difficulties, such, for instance, as the bombing of our property in China, could readily be eliminated, he replied that he knew all about this and that effective steps would be taken to correct these attacks, which were now being investigated.

The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitations and expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present time, but navies are "dangerous toys"; the progressive increase in naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general explosion and someday an

agreement must be reached. "There must be disarmament," he repeatedly said.

This was one of the most important and significant conversations that we have had, and I regard it as marking a new trend, indeed a milestone, in Japanese-American relations, for Yonai can be trusted.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew, entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 280 and 281

Not used

Def. Doc. #206(28)

食後、米内提督はドーマンを傍に招き一同大臣は英語を余り流暢には話さない。日本がヨーロッパの事に巻き込まれる虞があり相だといふ事に就いて余が關心を持つて居る事に氣が附いたが「日本の政策は既に決定して居るファッシズムを日本に採用し其の結果としてドイツ及びイタリアと提携しよう并希望する日本の分子は既に抑壓せられた。」から今後一切心配するに及ばないと余に話して貰ひ度いと頼んだ。同大臣の言によれば、日本は民主主義諸國とも全体主義諸國とも友好關係を維持するよう協力して居るが、日本自体の主義はその何れとも違つて居るのであるから、どちらの仲間からも離れて居なければならぬのであるといふのである。

此事を其のまゝ聽かされた芳澤はドイツ及びイタリーとの同盟に加はら

×××××

一九三九年四月十日

辯護文書第二〇六號 (二八)

and I have plenty of evidence that my arguments have penetrated to the top -- is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most inflammable people in the world. In

ないといふ決定に就いては何にも知らないから、其話はちようど決まつたばかりに違ひないと言つた。同大臣が余に向つて此話をしたことは、日本がヨーロッパの紛争に捲込まれるのを避けようと考へて居たこと、並びに同大臣は此重要問題を決定する鍵は海軍が持つて居る事を心得て居たことをはつきり示すものと解釋しても差支ないかも知れないが、防共協定の強化は無いに違ひないと決めてかゝる可きではない。

米内提督と話を續けて居るうちに同提督は、合衆國との關係を元の親善關係に戻す必要が切實に感ぜられると語つた。

之に就いて米國側としての難點例へば在支米國財産の爆撃等の如き難點が速かに除かれて欲しいものだと言はれて同提督は此問題についてはよく知つて居り之等の攻撃を是正する爲に目下攻究中の有效な手段が講ぜられる筈だと答へた。

同大臣は更に海軍縮小問題に話題を轉じ、海軍縮少が差當つて實行出來ないのは残念であるが、海軍は「危険な玩具」である。海軍の要求は年々増加するばかりで破産や全般的破壊に終る外はなく、いつかは軍縮

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the American people are among the most inflammable people in the world. In

協定が成立しなければならぬと語った。「軍備縮少が行はれねばならぬ」と同提督は繰返し繰返し語った。

此會談は我々の會談中でも最も重要な意義の深いものゝ一つであつた。米内は信用の置ける男であるから、余は此會談を以て日米關係に於ける一つの新しい傾向を示すものとして、否寧ろ一つの里程碑として考へて居る。

(前駐日米國大使グルー氏著)

「滯日十年」二八〇頁乃至二八一頁より拔萃)

and I have plenty of evidence that my arguments have penetrated to the top -- is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most inflammable people in the world. In

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JAPAN STEERS AWAY FROM THE AXIS

May 15, 1939

The high light of the first half of May until we sailed on leave of absence was the effort to keep Japan from tying up in a general alliance with Germany and Italy. Up to our departure this effort was successful and I was given categorical official assurances that there would be no general alliance, although there would be some arrangement by way of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact with applicability only to Soviet Russia. But I know very well that the pressure on the Government will continue, and if Great Britain concludes an alliance with Soviet Russia it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that either the Government will be forced into a totalitarian alliance or will fall, Hiranuma to be succeeded possibly by General Minami, Marquis Kido, or Navy Minister Yonai. But the appointment of Yonai would still mean no totalitarian alliance.

I think that the present political situation in Japan is full of dynamite and that further assassinations are possible, if not likely. The country is sick of the hostilities in China, with no outlook for peace, and wants concrete results which do not appear to be maturing. This does not at all mean that Japan is weakening; on the contrary, there is every evidence of determination to see the whole thing through, and there is very little evidence of any financial or economic crisis in the near future. But there is plenty of dissatisfaction with the failure to achieve final results and to get the "China Incident" over with. The people are restive.

The line that I have taken in talking with Japanese high and low -- and I have plenty of evidence that my arguments have penetrated to the top -- is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most inflammable people in the world. In

such a case the pacifists and isolationists would be in the forefront of those supporting war -- at least, the great majority would be. If Germany were to bomb London and Paris and kill a great many civilians, that alone would stir the American people to the depths. And then, even if Germany and Italy had overrun Europe in the first few weeks of the war, the determination and unlimited resources of the United States would with mathematical certainty have won in the long run, as they did in 1918. If Japan were then tied up in the German camp in a general military alliance, it would be almost impossible for the United States to remain at peace with Japan.

It therefore behooves Japan to look into the future and decide where her friendship ought in her own interests to be placed. Japanese-American relations are temporarily strained owing to difficulties arising out of the campaign in China, but these difficulties should eventually be overcome and Japan should look at the long haul rather than at the immediate present. From every point of view -- economic, financial, commercial, sentimental -- the United States can be a better friend to Japan, if Japan plays the game with us, than any other country in the world. A Japanese-American war would be the height of stupidity from every point of view. In the meantime, what can Germany and Italy do for Japan? What concrete results are to be gained from their friendship in the long run? These considerations are worth weighing now, before it is too late.

These arguments, as I have said, appear to have been widely discussed and weighed. I have reason to believe that they reached the Emperor, and several highly placed people have encouraged the line I was taking. Some, including the Navy Minister on his own initiative, spoke of my "anxiety" and said that I need worry no more as things were going to turn out the way I wanted them to do.

So we leave Japan for these few months of furlough feeling that, whatever the final result, at least nothing has been left undone to steer Japanese-American relations into healthy channels, which, after all, is my job.

A five-month furlough in the United States interrupts the diary at this point.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 281-283

辯護文書二〇六(二九)

日本は樞軸より外れる

一九三九年五月十五日

我々は五月十日賜暇歸朝の爲め出帆したが其頃迄最も著るしく人目を惹いた事は獨逸との同盟を結ばせまい様にと日本を引き留める爲の努力であつた。我々の出發間際迄此努力は成功裡に終つて居た而して自分は蘇聯のみに適用さるべき反共協定強化を名として何等かの工策が行はれるかも知れないけれど兎に角右の如き同盟は締結されないであらうとの具筋よりの端的な保證を行て居たが併し自分は亦政府に對する壓迫は依然として徒續するであらう事を知つて居る而して萬一英國が蘇聯と同盟を締結するとせば政府は全体主義的同盟を締結する可く余儀なくされるか或は瓦解するであらう事は必ずしも不可能ではない、而して此場合平沼の後繼者は多分南大將か木戸侯か或は米内海相であるであらう但し米内が任命された場合全体主義的同盟は其意義を失するに等しい

現今日本の政況は爆藥に充ちて居り此上乍らの暗殺も決して望ましくは

等は戦争を支持する人々の最前戦に立ちませう、少くとも其大多數が此んな態勢を採るでせう。若し獨逸がロンドン及パリを爆撃し多數の市民を殺すとすれば夫丈で米國人を驚く騒がすだらう。其場合假令ドイツとイタリーが戦争の最初の數週間中に歐洲を屠捲したとしても米國の決意と無限の資源は數字的確實性を以て一九一八年に於けるが如く終局に於て勝つだらう。其時若し日本が一般的軍事同盟に於てドイツ側に結盟したとすれば米國が日本と平和を維持することは殆んど不可能であるだらう。だから將來をよく觀て自國の利益よりして其親善關係の置き場所を決定するのは日本の當然なるべきことである。日米關係は一時的に日支事變により生じた困難のために緊張しては居るが此等の困難は結局は打勝たるべきものであり又、日本は目先よりも大局を見るべきである。經濟的、財政的、商業的感情的、如何なる觀點よりするも、若し日本が我々と一揆に事柄を運ぶならば米國は世界の他の如何なる國よりも日本に對し良き友であり得る。

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[illegible]

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若し獨逸がロンドン及パリを爆撃し多數の市民を殺すとすれば夫丈で米國人を深く騒がすだらう。其場合假令ドイツとイタリイが戦争の最初の數週間中に歐洲を席捲したとしても米國の決意と無限の資源は數字的確實性を以て一九一八年に於けるが如く終局に於て勝つだらう。其時若し日本が一般的軍事同盟に於てドイツ側に結盟したとすれば米國が日本と平和を維持することは殆んど不可能であるだらう。

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だから將來をよく爲て自國の利益よりして其親善關係の置き場所を決定するのは日本の當然なるべきことである。日米關係は一時的に日支事變により生じた困難のために緊張しては居るが此等の困難は結局は打勝たるべきものであり又、日本は目先よりも大局を見るべきである。經濟的、財政的、商業的感情的、如何なる觀點よりするも、若し日本が我々と一緒に事柄を運ぶならば米國は世界の他の如何なる國よりも日本に對し良き友であり得る。

何處から見ても日米戦争は愚の骨頂だ、一方ドイツとイタリーは日本のために何が出来るか、結局に於て彼等の親善關係から如何なる具體的結果が得らるゝか、此等の考慮は今、遅すぎない間に考慮に價する。

既に云つたやうに此等の議論は廣く討論せられ評量せられたやうに見えるた、私け其等は天皇に到達し且數々の高位の人達が私の取つて居る線に於て激勵したと信すべき理由がある。自らの發意に基いての海軍大臣を含む或人々は私の「心配」について話し、事柄は私が望んで居る方向に選んで居るから私は最早、痛心に及ばぬと云つた。

そうして我々は數ヶ月の休暇の間、終極の結果はどうあらうとも、少くとも結局の私の仕事である、日米關係を健全な道筋に導くためにしなかつたことは何もないと感じて日本を云るのである。

米國に於ける五ヶ月の休暇は、此處に於て中断して居る。

Not used

Defense Document No. 206-B(4)

Copy to Lawrence 22-9-47

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR PAYS HIS RESPECTS

November 20, 1933

At 11 Yurenev, the Soviet Ambassador, made his official call after our recognition of the Soviet Union. I received him in my study at the Residence and we pledged each other's healths in some excellent sherry. I believe he played a prominent part in the revolt of the Russian Navy at the very beginning of the Revolution. He has been Ambassador to Italy and Minister both to Persia and Austria, so must have accumulated considerable diplomatic experience. He says that Russia will not cede an inch on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and gives an impression of pessimism as to the future relations of the two countries. He is clearly overjoyed at our recognition and very, very friendly.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 107

not used

Dof Doo 206 B(4)

Exh 4

譯例文書第二〇六號B(四)

ソビエツト大使放言を表す

一九三三年十一月二十日

ソビエツト大使エルネスト氏は吾國のソビエツト聯邦承認後の正式挨拶のため十一時に私を訪問した。余は官邸の書齋に同使を迎へ二人は相互の健康を祝して瓶上のシェリー酒を乾杯した。たしか同大使は革命の最初期に於けるロシア海軍の反亂に際し重要な役割を果たした人である。彼はイタリイ大使、ベルシャ、オーストリヤ公使などをつとめ従つて外交には相當の経験を積んでゐるに相違ない。ロシアは東支鐵道に關しては一步も譲らぬ譲りである。彼は聲明しており、兩國々交の將來に關し悲觀的な印象を與へてゐる。なほ同使は明らかに吾國の承認を非常に喜んでおり又極めて友好的態度を示してゐる。――

グルー前合衆國大使の日記抜萃 第一〇七頁

Not used

CALM BEFORE THE STORM

* * * * *

January 24, 1934

Dinner at the Embassy for the Foreign Minister.

Hirota was very friendly as usual but also evidently very tired from the strain of the opening of the Diet and of answering interpellations. Said it was an entirely new and difficult experience for him.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW
page 116

not used

Exh. No

Def Doc# 206-B(9)

暴風雨の前の静けさ

一九三四年一月二十四日

外務大臣を招待して大使館で晩餐。

廣田は常の如く誠に親密な態度であつたが、議會開會と、議會に於ける質問應答の緊張とから明らかに、非常に疲れてゐた。彼は、それが彼にとつて全く新しい、困難な体験であつたと言つてゐた。

前合衆國大使グルー氏日記より抜萃（一一六頁）

not used
RUSSO-JAPANESE TENSION BEGINS TO EAST

February 8, 1934

* * * * *

(6) The highest influences in the country are pacific. The Emperor is a man of mild and peaceful character. The era of his reign is characterized by the word "showa," which he himself chose and which means "enlightened peace." There is no reason to believe that he approved of the Manchurian adventure, for the matter did not lie in his decision. Prince Saionji, the Genro, and Count Makino are profoundly imbued with the horrors of war. Since 1931 they have not been able to make their view publicly felt, but they are constantly working behind the scenes and it is believed that their influence is gradually increasing.

The Prime Minister is personally an influence more peaceful than bellicose. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has displayed unexpected strength and is personally largely responsible for the comparatively milder tone of the press since he took office and for a new orientation in endeavoring to develop better relations with foreign countries. A strong group of liberals in the country have been steadily working behind the scenes and are, it is believed, developing more strength than they formerly possessed. At a recent dinner at the Tokyo Club in honor of Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador, and Ambassador Debushi, Baron Hayashi, the chairman, in introducing the speakers, said slowly and with firmness, in a tone nearly menacing and emphasizing his remark with a bang on his fist on the table: "We want peace!" This is a small detail, but Baron Hayashi is Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court and one of the Emperor's favorites.

(7) From the point of view of the Army itself--for in the last analysis the Army is likely to have the last word as to whether it shall be peace or war--new factors may exert a restraining influence. Even in the Army itself there are not lacking sane elements who are aware of the seriousness of a Japanese-Soviet conflict and who question whether the end to be attained would justify the risks run--whether the game would be worth the candle.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREY, pages 118-119

not used

Exh. 5

Def. Doc. 206-2(10)

辯護國文書第二百六號Bの十

日ソの緊張緩和す

一千九百廿四年二月八日

X X X X X X X X

(c) 國の最高の權力者達は平和を愛好してゐる。天皇は穩かに平和的な方である。彼の治世は「昭和」といふ言葉で表はされてゐる。この昭和といふ言葉は、天皇御自身が御選びになつたもので、「文化の花咲く平和」といふ意法である。滿洲事變は彼の決斷の範圍外であり、彼が之を承認したと信ず可き理由はないのである。元寇西園寺公及び牧野伯備は、戦争の惨害を衷心から恐れてゐる。一千九百廿一年以來彼等は、その考を一般の人々に感じさせる事が出来ないうで居つたが然し遂に絶えず働いて居りその勢力は漸次増しつゝある。首相は、個人的には、戦争好きといふより寧ろ平和を愛する有力者である。

外相廣田は、就任以來意想外の力を發揮してゐる彼の就任後日本の新聞が比較的穩かな論調を取るやうになつた事や、外交關係の改善に努力する新傾向を示した事實は廣田の個人的影響が大ひに與つてゐるのである。國內自由主義者の強力なる一群は、蔭に居つて絶えず働きて、従前より強力になりつゝあると信じられてゐる。最近東京俱樂部で、英國大使フランシス・リンドレイ卿と出淵大使を主賓として催ふされた晩餐會で、司會者林男爵は、辯士を紹介する時、ゆつくりと、而も斷固たる態度と殆ど威嚇せん計りの調子で、卓子を舉げてどんと叩いて言葉を強めて、「我等は平和を欲する」と云つた。是は一瑣事である。が然し林男爵は式部長官であつて、天皇の御氣に入りの一人であるのである。

(7) 結局、軍が平和か戦争かを最終的に決定するであらうがその軍自身の見地よりするも、新要素が現れて止め役の働きをするかも知れないのである。軍部自身の内にも、日ソ紛争の重大性を承知して居り、這せんとする目的がこれに伴ふ危険を冒すだけの價値のあるものか、即ち獲物は之を追ふだけの骨折り甲斐のあるものかどうかを疑ふ、健全分子が無いわけてはない。

前米國大使グルーの日記第一一八一九頁からの抜萃

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEES THE SPRING OF 1934 AS DECISIVE

March 9, 1934

During a long conversation today with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Yurenev, he first told me the present status of the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway; these negotiations are still confined to pourparlers between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself, the general conference not having yet reconvened. These pourparlers have taken the form of bargaining pure and simple, each side naturally wishing to win a success -- especially Mr. Hirota, who will have difficulty in satisfying Japanese public opinion. In brief the situation is as follows:

The Soviet Government places the negotiations in two categories, the first comprising (1) replacement of the Russian personnel of the railway and (2) Manchukuo assumption of the railway's debt, and the second category comprising the actual sale of the railway itself. For the compensation of the personnel the Soviet Government will expect an amount of between nine and ten million yen. The approximate amount of the debt he did not tell me. With regard to the price for the railway, the Manchukuo authorities have not moved from their original offer of fifty million yen. The Soviet demand which was originally placed at two hundred and fifty million rubles was later reduced to two hundred million rubles. In order to convenience the Japanese, the Soviet Government had subsequently agreed to receive 50 % of the total amount in merchandise and of the other 50%, 15% would be paid in yen immediately on signature and the remaining 35% would be paid within three years by the Manchukuo Government. The final figure to be agreed upon would be a global amount. Bargaining with regard to the type of merchandise to be received is now going on, the Japanese desiring to make as favorable a deal in this respect as possible.

I asked the Ambassador whether he was optimistic as to an eventual favorable outcome of the negotiations. In reply he made the significant remark: "An agreement will be reached if the Japanese wish to avoid war with Soviet Russia." I said to him: "That remark could be interpreted as meaning that if the Japanese do not come to terms the Soviet Union will declare war." He replied that this was not his meaning and that what he wished to convey was that if an agreement for the sale of the railway should not be reached, this fact would be a significant indication that the Japanese intended to bring about a war and would use the failure of the negotiations as an excuse to satisfy public opinion in Japan as to the reasons for such a war.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 122-23

not used

Doc. Doc 206 B 12

K. H. H. O.

辯護文書第二百六號Bの十二

ソヴェット大使一千九百廿四年の春を目して大詰め時期とす。

一千九百廿四年三月九日

本日ソヴェット大使ユレネフ氏と長時間の會談中に、彼は第一に、東支鐵道買却交渉の現状を予に告げ此等の交渉は本會談が未だ再開されないの外相と彼との間の下交渉の域を依然出でて居らないと云つた。此等下交渉は純然たる取引の形式を取つて來てゐる。自然に双方がうまくやらうとしてゐる、廣田氏は日本の輿論を慮つて殊に懸命である。簡単に云ふと下の1

即ちソヴェット政府は交渉を二つの範圍の中に入れてゐる、第一は(1)東支鐵道のロシア人従業員への補償並びに(2)滿洲國が鐵道の負債を引受ける事であり第二の範圍といふのは鐵道其物の實際の買却である。この従業員の補償にソヴェット政府は九百萬圓から一千萬圓の間の金額を豫期してゐる併しユレネフ氏は負債の總算額は予に云はなかつた。鐵道の代償に就ては滿洲國當局者は元來の一千五百萬圓の申出を固執してゐた。最初二億五千萬圓であつた。ソヴェットの要求は、後で、二億圓になつた。

日本政府に都合のよいようにソヴエツト政府は其後金額の五十パーセントを商品で受取る事に同意し他の五十パーセントの内で十五パーセントは割戻後滿洲國が直ちに國で支拂ひ残り三十パーセントは三年以内に支拂ふことになつてゐる。最後に取極められる数字が總計額である。受取らる可き商品の種類に關して、目下交渉進行中であつて、日本政府は、この點で取引を出來るだけ好都合にしようとしてゐる。

予は、交渉の結果が大丈夫好都合に落つくと思つてゐるか否かと、大使に問うたら、彼は之に答へて左の如き意味深重な言明をした。「日本政府がソヴエツト・ロシヤとの戦争を避け度いならば取極めが出來よう」と。予は彼に「この言は取り違へでは日本政府が話を纏めないと、ソ聯は宣戦するだらう」といふ意味にも取れる」と云つた。彼は答へて「さういふ意味で云つたのではなく、鐵道買却の取極めが出來なければ、之は日本政府が戦争を惹起する虞りで、その理由を交渉の失敗に歸して、日本の輿論を満足させる意圖を持つてゐるのだ」と結論を下す重大な理由となるのであらうといふ意味の事を言ひ度かつたのである、と云つた。

前米國大使グルーの日記第百廿二―三頁からの抜萃

not used

Defense Document No. 206-B(16)

Exhibit# _____

(Mr. Grew to Mr. Prentiss B. Gilbert, American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland)

Tokyo, May 17, 1934

Confidential

Dear Mr. Gilbert:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of April 5. In answer to your letter and in compliance with the suggestion contained therein I shall endeavor to outline briefly the present political situation here with particular reference to the Japanese attitude toward international co-operation both at present and in relation to the basic Japanese policy of dominating East Asia.

In your letter you remark that "one gains the distinct impression that having achieved to such a large degree their objective in Manchuria, the Japanese are now endeavoring to effect an appeasement of the feeling against them in every direction possible." That is, in fact, the specific task which Hirota has set himself as Foreign Minister. Accordingly -- to use the phrases current in the Japanese press--for the "desperate diplomacy" of Count Uchida there has been substituted the "national defense by diplomacy" of Mr. Hirota.

In promoting his policy of conciliation Hirota has shown force and ability. He came into office last September at a moment when the pendulum of public feeling was tending to resume the norm.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, page 135

not used

Def, Doc, ☆ 206-B (16)

Exh, ☆

親
展

(グルー氏ヨリ在スキス、ジユネーヴ駐在
アメリカ領事ブレンドンテイス、B、ギル
ート氏宛)

東京發信 一九三四年五月十七日

四月五日附ノ貴翰有難ク受領シマシタ。ソノ返信トシテ貴翰中ノ御提案ニ
從ヒ、私ハ、特ニ日本ノ國際的協力ニ對スル態度ヲ現下ノ情勢ニ關聯シ、且
又東亞征服トイフ日本ノ基本政策ニ關聯シテ、説明シツツ、當地ノ政界事情
ヲ簡略ニ概説シマセウ。
貴信中ニ、一日本ガ滿洲デソノ目的ヲ大々的ニ遂ゲル事ガ出來タ現在デハ、
日本人ハ出來得ル限リアラユル方面デ對シ感情ヲ宥メント努力シテキルトノ
明瞭ナ印象ヲ第三者ハ受ケル。トアリマス。事實コレコソ廣田ガ外務大臣ト
シテ特ニ着手シタ任務デアリマス。從ツテ、一現今日本ノ新聞紙上ニ常ニ
用ヒラレル句ヲ借りレバ、一内田伯爵ノ「無償砲外交」ガ廣田氏ノ「外交
防策」ニ取ツテ取ツテ代ラレタノデアリマス。

廣田ハ彼ノ調停政策ヲ促進スルノニ資カト才能ヲ示シマシタ。彼ハ昨年
九月、日本國民ノ感情ヲ常態ニ復シカケタ瞬間ニソノ職ニ就イタノデアリ
マス。

X
X
X
X
X
X

前合衆國大使グルーノ日誌
一三五頁ヨリノ抜萃

not used

Defense Document No. 206-B(18)

(Mr. Grew to Mr. Prentiss B. Gilbert American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland)

Tokyo, May 17, 1934

* * * * *

Furthermore, through public utterances and in the Diet, the voice of public opinion revealed dismay at the size of the military budgets and an inclination to blame the Army for the unnecessary and dangerous state of agitation into which the nation as a whole had been led. Businessmen and capitalists wished to be free to reap the profits of the export boom.

During all these months Hirota worked steadily, and I believe sincerely, to create a friendly basis upon which to deal with China, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. His hand was manifest in an immediate toning down of antipforeignism in the press; it was revealed in the renewed efforts to solve the current problems between Japan and Soviet Russia one by one; and it was emphasized to me in conversation in which Hirota showed an eagerness to explore any possible avenue which would lead to an improvement in American-Japanese relations. Certain people considered him a genuine liberal and the strongest Foreign Minister since Komura and Kato.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 136

not used

Def. Doc. #206-B (18)

Exh. NO.

グルー氏ヨリ在スイス、ジュネーヴ、アメリカ領事ブレンティス、B・ギルバート氏宛

東京發信一九三四年五月十七日

更ニ輿論並ビニ議會ヲ通ジテ民衆ハ膨大ナル軍事豫算ニ對スル驚愕ヲ示シ、國民全体ヲ不必要且ツ危險キハマル興奮狀態ニ引キズリコンダ軍部ヲ責メル傾向ヲ示シマシタ。實業家、資本家ハ輸出擴張ノ利益ヲ自由ニ收獲シタイト望ンデ居マシタ。

近來不斷ニ廣田ハ、中國、ソ聯及ビ英米トノ外交交渉ニ對スル友好的基盤ヲ創造セント努力シマシタ。而シテ彼ハ又誠實ニ努力シタト私ハ信ジマス。彼ノ方策ハ就任後直チニ新聞ノ排外主義ヲ抑ヘタ點ニ明ラカニ示サレマシタ。又日ソ間ノ懸案ヲ逐一解決セントノ努力ヲ再開シタ點ニモ明ラカニアラハレテキマシタ。彼ノ意向ハ私ニ對シ更ニ明瞭ニ示サレマシタ。スナハチ私トノ會談ニ於テ廣田ハ非常ナ熱意ヲ以テ日米關係改善ニ導キ得ル手段ヲ發見シヨウトシマシタ。或ル人々ハ彼ガ小村及ビ加藤以來アラハレタ眞ニ自由主義的ナ且ツ最モ強力ナ外務大臣デアルト考ハマシタ。

前合衆國大使グルーノ日誌一三〇頁ヨリ
ノ抜萃

not used

(Mr. Grew to Mr. Prentiss B. Gilbert, American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland)

Tokyo, May 17, 1934

* * * * *

With Soviet Russia Japan is trying to keep the peace at present. Viewing the situation from Tokyo, neither side has now any stomach for war, nor are there indications in Japan or Manchuria of preparations pointing to imminent warfare. For the time being at least we need only fear a frontier incident of unusual gravity. Although Hirota has taken up the Chinese Eastern Railway question, the yen-ruble exchange question, the fisheries dispute, and the boundary problems one by one with an evidently genuine desire to remove them from the slate, progress has been very halting and bids fair to continue so.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, page 137

not used

Dof, Doc, #206-B(19)

Exh, NO

(グルー氏ヨリ在スキス・ジエネーヴ・アメリカ領事ブレンティス・B
B・ギルバート氏宛)

東京發信一九三四年五月十七日

ソ聯トハ日本ハ現在平和ヲ保タウト努メテキマス。東京ニ於ケル情勢
ヨリ觀ルニ兩國何レニモ戰爭ノ意志ハ無キガ如ク又日本ニモ滿洲ニモ戰
爭ノ急迫ヲ思ハセルガ如キ軍備ノ減低ハ見ラレマセン。少クトモ茲シバ
ラクハ殺スハ不慮重大國境事件ガ發生セズ限リ心配ハ無イト思ハレマス
廣田ハ四ラカニ衷心ヨリ解決ヲ切望シテ東支鐵道問題、獨！ル！ヴル！
算問題、漁業權問題、國境問題ヲ逐一取り上ゲタガ解決ハ非常ニ遲滯シ
ナホ今後モオソラク遲滯スルデアラウト思ハレマス。

前合衆國大使グルーノ日誌一三九頁ヨリノ抜萃

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X X X X X X X

not used

HIROTA ON THE 1934 NAVAL CONFERENCE

September 7, 1934

Leave of Absence

I called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take leave of him before department on a month's leave of absence to Peiping and told him that if any questions should arise during my absence which he wished to discuss with the Embassy Mr. Neville would be in charge and would be glad to be helpful at any time.

Naval Conference

The Minister, on his own initiative, approached the question of the Naval Conference and said that Japan had definitely decided to abrogate the Washington Treaties toward the end of 1934. Many elements in the Navy wished to abrogate immediately, but Mr. Hirota had insisted on waiting until after the London conversations in October because as soon as one signatory had abrogated, the Washington Treaty would become null and void as regards all the other signatories and Mr. Hirota intended to discuss the matter with the other parties before abrogation in order not to give offense to the other signatories and also in order to avoid, prior to the next naval conference, unfavorable atmosphere which might be created if the abrogation should take place without some preliminary mutual understanding. The Minister said that the discussions concerning abrogation would be conducted with the various powers separately and that owing to Ambassador Saito's absence from Washington the matter is to be taken up with the American delegation to the preliminary conversations in London by Ambassador Matsudaira.

Mr. Hirota said that while the difficulties of solving the Naval problem with foreign powers were no doubt considerable, they were not so difficult as the domestic problem which he had to face in dealing with the chauvinists. He said he had great hopes of some solution of the naval problem which would avoid saddling the various countries with future heavy building programs, especially because the younger officers of the Japanese Navy were definitely opposed to the building of big ships and were in favor of small ones.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 142-143

Not used

Def Doc 4 206 B(6)

Ref No

二

幕閣訓文第(二)六號B(二六)

一九三四年の海軍會議に於する廣田の態度
一九三四年九月七日

賜暇

余は一ヶ月の賜暇を得て北京に出発するにさき立ち、外務大臣に先づ、外務大臣に暇乞の訪問を行ひ、余の不在中、我が大使館との意見交換を希望するか如き問題發生の場合にはネビル氏か代理となり何時にも喜んでお役に立つてあらうと話つた。

海軍會議

同大臣は自らすすんで海軍會議の問題に觸れ、日本は一九三四年の末頃ワシントン條約を廢棄する決意を固めたと言明した。海軍部内では即時廢棄を希望してゐる同きも多かつたが、ワシントン條約は一締約國が廢棄すれば、他の締約國全部に關して直ちに無効となるもの故、拾月のロンドン會議後迄待つ可しと廣田氏は主張した。また廣田氏は廢棄に先立ち、他ノ締約國と同問題を論議する意向であつたが、これは他の盟約國の感情を害することゝを恐れたためであり、且つ豫め相互の諒解を得ずして廢棄した際、次期海軍會議を前にして、面白からぬ空氣の生ずるのを避けんとする用意

からであつた。同大臣は更に、廢棄に關する意見の交換は各國と個別的に之を行ふこととし、目下齋藤大使ワシントン不在の爲、公平大使がロンドンの豫備會談におけるアメリカ代表を相手として本問題の解決を決定せんと聲明した。廣田氏は、海軍問題の對外的な解決に於て各種困難は勿論相當なものではあるが、國內の對外強硬論者を相手とする際どうしても直面しなければならぬ。對内問題に比すれば、さほど困難ではないと述べた。また、この海軍問題も、特に日本海軍の青年將校が大型船機の建造に斷乎反對を唱へ、小型船隻を可としてゐる故、各國に將來尙重なる造船計畫を貢はせぬ様な解決策を得る大きな希望を有してゐると言ふた。

グルー前合衆國大使の日記抜萃

第一四二—一四三頁

EXPLAINING THE DIARIES AND DISPATCHES

January 22, 1935

On reading back over this diary I really wonder how I have the courage to send it to anyone, it is such a patchwork and crazy quilt and so many of the comments so rapidly set down require further elucidation or discussion. The field of Japanese-American relations, for instance, is so broad and so impossible to cover in a running document of this kind that my day-to-day comment, hastily expressed, might well give erroneous impressions. Our official dispatches, taken as a whole, probably cover the field fairly well, and from the point of view of history they must furnish the criterion. The only thing the diary can do is to supply a few illustrations to the text, but these illustrations, historically, should never be considered without the text. They are too likely to give one-sided and inadequate impressions.

Our dispatches, also, must be read as a whole and over a period of time to get the correct picture. Some of our dispatches, for instance, might be regarded as inconsistent. For instance, one of our dispatches on the naval conversations (No. 1087), which I am told was sent to the President, was based on the idea that the Japanese as a whole are absolutely intransigent regarding the question of naval parity and that there is complete solidarity in the country on that issue. That is absolutely true at present, but a fortnight later I wrote another dispatch (No. 1102) conveying the idea--though only as guesswork and so stated--that when the Japanese eventually find that we mean business in maintaining the present ratios, and that we intend to build and do build up to treaty strength, and propose to continue that policy even if it means a naval race, they, the Japanese, will seek a compromise rather than face such a naval race, and that although they have burned their bridges behind them, they are capable of remolding public opinion and policy over a period of time--even during the two years elapsing before the treaty expires. This, as I said, can be but guesswork, but everybody in the Embassy, including the Counselor and the Naval and Military Attaches, agrees that it is a sound guess. So the two dispatches were not actually inconsistent: the first dealt with the present, while the second had to do with the future if certain things happen, namely, the clear and factual demonstration of our determination to construct and maintain our navy on a 5-3 proportion, I only hope that the President, if he saw both dispatches, will get this point.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREY, Pages 152-153

Not used

Exh. 5

Def. Doc. 206 B(29)

辯護側文書第二〇六B(二九)

日記及公文電報の説明

昭和十年一月二十二日

此日記を讀返して見て私はどうしてそれを他人に述べる勇氣があるかと、本當に疑ふのである。その日記はそれ程のつぎはぎ細工であり寄せ集めなのである。そして又、非常に迅速に書下された非常に多くの説明は更に説明乃至は審議を必要とするのである。例へば日米關係の緯緯は非常に廣く此種の現況報告書ではその全部を含める事は不可能なのである。それで大慌てで記された此私の日々の説明は間違つた印象を與へるかも知れないのである。全般的に言つて我々の公文電報は多分、日米關係の舞臺を可なりよく包含してゐる。日記が役に立つ只一の事は「本文」に對して若干の例證を與へる事である。併し是等の例證は歴史的には「本文」がなければ決して考慮されてはならぬものである。其等はあまりに一方的且つ不十分な印象を與へ勝ちである。我々の公文電報も又正確な狀況を窺む爲には全体として又一定の期間を経て

讀まなければならぬ。例へば公文電報の若干は矛盾してゐると考へられるかも知れない。例へば海軍の交渉（第一〇八七號）に關する我々の公文電報の中の一つ即ち大統領に送られたと言はれてゐるものは日本側は大体に於て海軍同率の問題に就て絶對的に非妥協的であり、又その問題に關し日本に於ては完全なる結束があるとの考を基礎としたものであつた。それは現在では絶對に眞實であるしかし、それから二週間の後、私は今一つの公文電報（第一〇二號）を書いた。その公文電報で、それはたゞ推察に過ぎなかつたのであり又其様に書いたのだが、日本が遂に、我々が本氣で現在の比率を支持する積りであり、さうして我々が條約で定められた海軍力迄我海軍を除々に建造し増進して行く積りであり、さうして、たとへそれが海軍競走を意味しても、その方針を續行するよりに提案するつもりである事を知つたならば、日本人はそのやうな海軍競走に直面するよりは寧ろ妥協點を見出すだらう。さうしてたとへ彼等が背水の陣を布いたとしても、彼等は輿論と政策を一定期間内に於て、たとへ條約の期限の切れる前の二年間に於てすら再び變へる事が出来るのである。との意味をその公文電報で傳へたのである。これは私がさう述べた如く、只單に推察である。併し大使館に於いては法律顧問、陸海軍武官を含めた總ての者がそれが健全な推察であることに同意してゐる。そのやうにして此二つの公文電報は事實に於いては矛盾

してゐなかつたのである。最初のは現在のことを扱い二番目の公文電報では何かの事が若も起るとしたならば將來のことを取り扱はなければならなかつたのである。つまり我海軍を五對三の比率に建造し維持する爲の我々の決意の明瞭にして事實上の表示であつたのである。私は大蔵領が若し是等二つの公文電報を見られるなら此點を憚む事を希望する次第である。

元米大使グルーの日記より抜 萃

第百五十二頁より百五十三頁

not used

Defense Document No. 206-B(34)



FARWELL TALK WITH HIROTA

July 18, 1935

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and told him that having been more than three years in Japan my Government had accorded me a leave of absence and that I was sailing for the United States tomorrow. Said that I expected to return to Tokyo sometime in the late autumn. The Minister was good enough to say that he hoped I would return without fail because changing ambassadors always caused a certain amount of disturbance and an undesirable interim during which the new ambassador and the government to which he was accredited had to get used to each other. He thought it most important that no change should be made especially at the present time. I replied that so far as I was aware there was no intention to make a change at present and I fully expected to return to Tokyo.

I said that on arriving in Washington I would of course report directly to the President and to the Secretary of State and tell them of my observations and impressions concerning the situation in Japan and the situation between our two countries. If the Minister should desire to express any views, I would be only too happy to communicate them to the President and to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hirota replied by reminding me of the statement he had made to me when he first took office, to the effect that he considered good relations between the United States and Japan to be of paramount importance and that he intended to make the improvement of those relations the cornerstone of his policy. He said that while our relations had been difficult two years ago he felt that they were now distinctly good and he saw no reason whatever why they should not remain good. It was his purpose to do everything in his power to contribute to that most desirable result. He added that in his opinion the relations between Japan and certain other countries were very much more difficult and less satisfactory than the present relations between Japan and the United States.

In this connection he mentioned the naval situation and said that unless there was some prospect of coming to an agreement and concluding a treaty this year, he thought it much better to leave matters in abeyance and to maintain the present "peaceful" situation. He said he thought the most important thing to avoid was the bringing of pressure by one country on another, which could only

cause irritation. The Japanese Navy had no plan at present and was content to let things remain as they are for the time being. He thought that a conference would have to be held before the end of the year but it could be a purely formal meeting and could adjourn for a year or two without necessarily stirring up controversies. Mr. Hirota gave me the impression that the Japanese Navy was in a less exacting frame of mind than it has been but he did not say this in so many words. The idea expressed was that if given sufficient time a good many difficult problems could be smoothed out.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW,
pages 159-160

not used

Def. Doc. #206-B(34)

Exh. 4

辯護側文書二〇六一B (三四)

廣田外相との別れの會談

一九三五年七月十八日

自分は今朝、外務大臣を訪問し、自分は日本に赴任以來三年以上になつたので、今回政府より賜暇を得て明日アメリカへ向け出帆する旨を傳へた。そして秋の終り頃には又東京に歸つて来る予定であると述べた。外相は、「大使がかはれば必ず或程度支障を來し、又新任大使と派遣先政府との間ではお互ひに両者の事情にをれる筈、不都合な空間を生ずるものもあるから、私に必ず歸つて來て頂きたい」と、好意ある言葉を私に送つた。外相は、時に現在に於ては大使の異動のよい事が最も重要であると云つた。私は、「自分の知る限りでは、現在の所——異動する様な意向はなく、自分では東京に歸つて來るものと充分期待してゐる。」旨返答した。

又、「ワシントンに到着の際には勿論、大統領及び國務長官に直接報告をなし、日本の現状並びに日米兩國間の狀態に關する自分の觀察及び所感を兩閣下に傳へるつもりである。若し貴下の方で何か御意見でもあれ

ば、おきまして大統領及びハル長官に御傳へしませう」と語った。廣田外相は、彼が外務大臣就任の際自分に送った聲明に言及して、次の様に答へた。「自分は、日米兩國間の友好關係維持を最大の重要事と考へてゐる。そして、この兩國關係の改善をもつて自分の外交政策の基礎となすつもりである。」と。彼は又日米關係は二年前には困難な状態にあつたけれども現在では閑らかに良好であると考へて居る。そして又この良好な状態の維持を不都合とする運動は一切ない」と語った。外相の意圖する所は、この最も望ましい結果を實現する様万全を盡す點にあつた。外相は更に附言して、「自分の意見では、日本と或る他の諸外國との關係は日米關係よりなるかに困難な又好ましくない状態にある」と語った。

此の點に關聯して、外相は又海軍の情勢を次の如く語った。「若し双方が意見の一致をみて、今年中に條約の締結を見るやうな見通しがつかない限りは、問題に關して手を着けず、現在の平和的な情勢を維持して置く方がよいと思ふ。」と。又一國が他國を壓迫することとは、單に懷德焦慮を賣すのみであるから最も避くべき重要事である」と述べた。日本海軍は目下の所何等の計畫もなく、當分は何事も現状維持で満足してゐる。年末迄には會議を開く必要はあらうけれども、しかし、それはたゞ形式的に開いて、殊更に論争を誘起せずして、終らしめ、あと一二年間

は會議を開かずしておくことも出来ると彼は考へてゐる。
廣田外相から得た印象は、日本海軍の態度は以前のやうに強硬ではない
といふことであつたが、しかしこれについて彼は右の如く文字通り言明
したのではない。たゞ、若し充分な時間の餘裕を與へられれば、相當多
くの困難な問題も圓滑に處理されるであらうといふやうな表現であつた。

元米國大使グルーの日記(二五九頁―二六〇頁)の抜萃

Handwritten: *not used*

Defense Document No. 206-C(I)

THE LIGHTNING STRIKES:
TWO TELEGRAMS THAT MADE HISTORY

Telegram Sent

TO: Secstate Washington

36 February 26, 10 A.M. 1936

The military took partial possession of the Government and city early this morning and it is reported have assassinated several prominent men. It is impossible as yet to confirm anything. The news correspondents are not permitted to send telegrams or to telephone abroad.

This telegram is being sent primarily as a test message, to ascertain if our code telegrams will be transmitted. Code room please acknowledge immediately upon receipt.

GREW

Telegram Sent

TO: Secstate Washington

RUSH

37 February 26, noon. 1936. Section 1.
Embassy's 36 February 26, 10 A.M.

1. It now appears fairly certain that former Premier Admiral Saito, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Count Makino, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki, and General Watanabe, Inspector General of Military Education, have been assassinated. It is also reported that Finance Minister Takahashi and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board have been wounded.*

2. The military have established a cordon around the district containing the Government administration offices and the Imperial palace and do not permit ingress without Army passes. Telephonic communication with the administrative offices has also been stopped. The stock exchange has been closed.

Section 2.

3. It is now reported that Premier Okada, Home Minister Goto, and former War Minister Hayashi were also assassinated and that Finance Minister Takahashi has died of his wounds. The Embassy cannot confirm any of these rumors.

*See photographs Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

4. So far there has been no disorder and no street fighting, as far as the Embassy is aware. The troops taking part in the uprising appear to be under perfect discipline and are not interfering with the normal affairs of the people. Until the nature and probable results of the uprising are better understood by the Embassy, however, the Embassy is advising those who ask to remain at home. There appears to be absolutely no antiforeign feeling involved in the affair.

Section 3.

5. A mimeographed statement was left by groups of soldiers at each of the principal newspaper offices this morning. The statement alleged that the present Government has been drifting away from the true spirit of Japan and that it had usurped the prerogatives of the Emperor. As evidence of this the statement cited the signing of the London Naval Treaty and the dismissal of General Mazaki. It continued rather vaguely with an expression translated by the U.P. about as follows: "If this condition is permitted to continue, the relations of Japan to China, Russia, Britain, and the United States will become 'explosive in nature.'" The statement was signed by Captain Nonaka and Captain Ando, both of the Third Infantry Regiment stationed in Tokyo. According to the soldiers who delivered this statement, another announcement will be made at five o'clock this evening and at that time "a new law of state" will be promulgated. The Embassy's informant believes that certain constitutional prerogatives will be suspended. He likened the existing situation to the Batista coup d'etat in Cuba.

Section 4. (Paraphrase)

6. The uprising, as far as can be ascertained by the Embassy, is in the nature of a coup d'etat engineered by the young Fascist element in the Army and intended to destroy the entire group of elder statesmen who have been advisers to the Throne and thereby effect the so-called "Showa Restoration." Presumably to prevent anyone from obtaining access and securing an Imperial Mandate which would interfere with the plans of the Army group, the Emperor himself is apparently being held in the palace incommunicado. The trial of Aizawa, murderer of General Nagata, which has excited the feelings of the Fascist element in the Army, and the recent election which returned an unexpectedly large number of more candidates who are liberal, appear to be the immediate causes of the uprising. Latest reports indicate that Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, has assumed the position of Acting Prime Minister and that General Mazaki is the leading spirit in the affair. The movement, down to the last detail, appears to have been thoroughly organized in advance. (End of paraphrase)

7. The Embassy has just learned from a fairly reliable source that Count Makino is safe.

-GRLW

THE MURDER OF VISCOUNT SAITO

February 27, 1936

This is a dreadful time and I have just returned from a harrowing experience--calling at the Saito * house, the very one where he was murdered yesterday, being ushered up to the little room where his body lay on the floor under a sheet, probably the same room where he was killed, kneeling to burn incense and then turning to the mourning family and finding myself face to face with dear Viscountess Saito herself. Yesterday she was in the hospital, recovering from the wounds inflicted on herself; she must have dragged herself out, her arm in a sling, to be with the body of her beloved husband.

She asked if I wished to see his face and then removed the sheet; there was a bullet wound visible (only one of his thirty-six wounds), but he looked peaceful enough. How we loved him and admired and respected him. He had a winning smile, always, and his white hair gave him a distinction quite apart from the distinction he had won in his many high posts and useful life. Only a few hours before the assassinations he sat at our table beside Alice, jolly and gay, and his wife next to me, and opposite me was Admiral Suzuki, who lies at the point of death from his own wounds.

Today, when I had paid my respects, Viscountess Saito said to me while we were both still kneeling in front of each other beside the body that her husband had never before seen the sound films and that he had loved the picture at our Embassy and that she knew he would wish her to thank us for having given him such a happy last evening. I was really too much moved to do more in reply than to convey Alice's sympathy too. Who could have foreseen that he was leaving our Embassy that night, and probably Admiral Suzuki too, to go straight to his death by bullet and bayonet in his own peaceful little Japanese home?

These assassinations have stirred us terribly--Saito, Takahashi, Watanabe dead and Suzuki probably fatally wounded. Thank heaven that Count Makino escaped; he was warned in time and managed to leave the hot-spring hotel where he was staying and find some refuge just before a gang of the insurgents broke in with the intention of killing him in cold blood. Kabayama has talked with him since and telephoned from Miyanoshita to tell me so. Prince Seionji, in the country at Okitsu, also escaped in time, but those in Tokyo seem to have had no warning whatever.

* See photograph No. 7

It is significant that somebody telephoned to our servants during dinner asking that they be informed the moment Saito left our Embassy and when we looked up the number later it was found to be the local police station; they may have had some special warning or it may have been merely the usual precautionary protection, probably the latter. At any rate, Saito's presence under our roof that night made no difference one way or the other; he left well before midnight and was not killed until 5 or 6 o'clock the next morning. It would have been doubly horrible if the murderers had invaded our Embassy, as they could easily have done so far as their force was concerned, and bayoneted him at our table; the international aspects of such a move would probably have weighed little with those young hotheads if they had felt that it would facilitate their object; some and perhaps all of their groups were armed with machine guns; in the case of the Prime Minister several police were mowed down before the building was entered, and at the Watanabe house his entire family and servants were wiped out.

PIECING TOGETHER THE COURSE OF THE TRAGEDY

March 1, 1936

Everything that happened before the revolt now seems so trivial in comparison with the events of the past four days that there is no incentive to record the earlier daily notes. Little by little I shall have to try to piece out all that took place between February 26 and 29. The final denouement, namely the sudden reappearance of Prime Minister Okada, alive and uninjured, after we and nearly everybody else believed him to have been assassinated savors of the most intense melodrama and it has certainly made the insurgents the laughingstock of Japan if not of the world, which is a very healthy thing. Yet sorrow and anger overcome the humor of it.

To begin the story we have to go back to our dinner for the Saitos on the evening of February 25. We sat down to two tables, thirty-six in number, and wishing to give the old gentleman and our other guests something out of the ordinary in the matter of entertainment I had seen several films at the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio during the past few days. On the last afternoon, Shatin showed me *Naughty Marietta*, with Jeanette MacDonald and Nelson Eddy and I decided at once that the ideal picture had been found, for it was full of lovely old Victor Herbert music, beautiful scenes, a pretty, romantic story and no vulgarity whatever, almost as good a film as *One Night of Love*.

Almost immediately after dinner the film began. We put Viscount Saito in a comfortable armchair, knowing that if he was

bored with a film he could comfortably sleep because he had told Neville that he had learned in the Navy to catch a nap at any time and under any circumstances. But I think he enjoyed it too much to sleep. We had a pause with refreshments halfway through and then continued, nearly two hours of film. Betsy Neville said that the Japanese ladies' eyes were distinctly red at the end of it, so I think they were moved by the romantic story. There was supper afterward, but the Saitos left at about 11:30, pretty late for them because they generally leave dinners punctually at 10. I saw the old gentleman out and that was the end of a friendship which began when I made my first call on him as Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in June, 1932.

It is interesting to think that he began his great career with Americans--with Admiral Schley and at the Naval Academy at Annapolis--and finished it at the American Embassy. He was a lovable character, gentle, charming, courtly, but with great wisdom and broad liberal views in an age of chauvinistic strife. I had hopes that he would be able to use his influence in settling the school crisis in Korea, arising out of the demand of the petty authorities that both Christian pupils and teachers worship at the Shinto shrines--a demand which may result in the closing of all our mission schools if persisted in. He always supported our missionaries. But now his wise influence has gone and who knows what the future will bring?

The telephone rang early on the 26th--it was Neville, I think--who broke the news of the assassinations during the early morning--wild rumors that the insurgents had taken over the Government and parts of the city--no one knowing who had been killed and who survived or how intensive the insurrection might be. Our first telegram was sent in the morning and was acknowledged by the Department, six hours in transmission. During the four days of revolution we had scouts constantly moving about the city, especially our Military Attache, Colonel Carey Crane, and his language officers, observing developments to the best of their ability. On the very first morning Neville quietly walked through the lines of troops, politely telling the soldiers in Japanese that he wanted to go to the Foreign Office and being passed through with equal courtesy; I think he was probably the only foreigner who got to the Gaimusho that first day--and he did it twice.

That night Alice was nervous lest the American Ambassador might be included in a sort of supplementary program of the revolutionists and insisted on our sleeping in an unusual room and nearer to the baby; I fear she didn't sleep very much at all but I laughed at her fears, well knowing that the last thing the insurgents wanted was trouble with the United States at this particular

juncture. The next day our Embassy was heavily guarded with troops, outposts, and sandbag barricades below the chancery, as well as three detectives (including our friend Iida from the police station) and two soldiers inside the house, and whenever I descended to the chancery they insisted on coming too.

The Mexican Minister came into town from the country the first day and couldn't even get into his Legation and telephoned to me for help; I did my best through Horinouchi, but the Foreign Office was completely powerless and the Minister seemed to be satisfied with my efforts, unavailing as they were. The rebels were situated in the official residence of the Prime Minister and the Sanno Hotel, very near us, and their banners floated from both buildings; we watched developments through glasses from our roof.

The Japanese Government quietly made all military preparations to capture or kill the rebels, meantime maintaining the most perfect discipline and order in the city, and then waited for two days until they surrendered little by little, in small groups, as a result of broadcasts, leaflets dropped from airplanes into the grounds of the Prime Minister's residence and the Sanno Hotel, and a big streamer attached to a balloon, all stating that the Emperor called on the men to return to their barracks, where they would be pardoned because they had been misled, that their parents and brothers and sisters were weeping at the thought of their disobeying the Emperor, and that unless they disbanded they would be shot. This had precisely the desired effect and the whole thing was settled with very little, if any, shooting except for the original assassinations. I should call this anything but barbarism.

We now know that when the last soldiers had left the Prime Minister's residence and the Sanno Hotel, the officers who had engineered the revolt finally surrendered after four days and that the Government gave them two hours to commit hara-kiri. But they didn't commit hara-kiri because they expected civil trials as in the case of former assassins and they fully intended to use the courtroom as a forum to stir up the people against the Government. It must have been a great shock to them when they were tried by court-martial and several of them sentenced to death and shot.

The story of one incident, that of the attempt to kill Count Makino, is deeply moving. The old gentleman was staying at a hot-spring hotel in the country when an officer and several soldiers arrived in the middle of the night to assassinate him. According to the story which reached me, and I believe it to be true, Count Makino's guard shot and killed the officer and was himself killed by the soldiers, who then set fire to the hotel with the intention of forcing Count Makino into the open. Behind the hotel was a precipitous cliff and the old gentleman was led by his granddaughter Kazuko and trained nurse up onto a ledge on the cliff from

which they could climb no higher. They were shortly lit up by the fire as if a flood light had been turned on them and the soldiers raised their guns. At just that moment, however, the little granddaughter, who was a lovely girl and a great friend of our daughter Elsie, spread her own kimono in front of her grandfather and the soldiers, being deeply moved by this heroic gesture, dropped their guns and did not shoot. I have always felt that little Kazuko was one of the real heroines of the February 26 incident and she certainly saved her grandfather from death.

JAPAN'S NEW ERA BEGINS

March 1, 1936

The period of the insurrection lasted only four days and yet we in the Embassy feel as if an era had passed since that happy evening when we had the Saitos and Suzukis under our roof last Tuesday. If time is measured by events, certainly an age has gone by since then. Such things are occurring in many parts of the world from time to time, disasters of one kind or another whether caused by the forces of nature or by the hand of man, and the rest of us look on objectively. We read the morning paper and say "What an awful catastrophe" and pass on to our daily tasks and thoughts, not greatly moved. It is only when such things occur in one's midst and when violent death and heroic action take place among one's friends and almost at one's door that the shock really comes home and remains.

Gradually, from the accounts of friends, we can now reconstruct the way the assassinations took place, and not only do the stories redound to the credit of the men but they show the true stuff of Japanese womanhood--how Viscountess Saite placed herself in front of her husband, said, "Kill me instead; my husband cannot be spared by the country," and actually put her hand on the mouth of the machine gun until her wounds forced her aside, and how Mrs. Watanabe lay down with her husband in her arms so that the assassins had to force the gun underneath her body.

The story of Admiral Suzuki should live in history; Captain Ando, pointing his revolver, discussed the situation with him for ten minutes and when the discussion faltered, Suzuki asked: "Have you anything more to say?" Ando replied: "No, sir." "Then shoot," said Suzuki, and Ando fired the three shots. One grazed his skull but failed to penetrate the brain, one went through the chest and lungs, and the third lodged in the leg. The chest wound was the serious one and the Admiral lost so much blood that only blood transfusions could save his life. It looks now as if he might pull through. Takahashi's murder was the really brutal one: not content with shooting, the rebel officer hacked him with his sword--and then apologized to the household for the "annoyance"

caused.

Well, we must carry on and try to see what it is all going to mean. One thing emerges as absolute certainty: there must be a "New Deal" in Japan or the same thing will happen--as predicted by the defense counsel in the Aizawa trial--again and again. I have confidence in Hirota, but he is saddled with one of the most difficult problems which any man ever faced. He has a tremendous opportunity, in some ways the same opportunity which confronted Franklin Roosevelt when he took office, and if he can deal effectively and successfully with the problem he should go down in history as a very great statesman.

It is easier to understand how such things as the incident of February 26 can occur in Japan if one stops to think that the history books upon which the Japanese youth is brought up are full of the records of just such deeds from the earliest times--assassinations or suicides for motives of revenge or loyalty to one's chief or the assumption of responsibility for a given situation. Paradoxically--and Japan is a country of paradoxes--these young officers held that they were acting in the interests of the Emperor, ridding him of the alleged nefarious influences around the Throne, men whom the Emperor himself had chosen. And there was no personal animosity involved. When they had killed Saito and Watanabe and Matsuo (mistaken for his brother-in-law, the Prime Minister), they called for incense to burn beside the bodies; in the Takahashi house no incense could be found, so they insisted on placing lighted candles beside the murdered statesman. If these things are to be prevented in future, not only will a social and economic New Deal have to be brought about within the country, but Japanese education in the schools and in the Army will have to undergo a radical alteration.

One of the pleasant things which emerged from the incident was the absolute unity of the Embassy staff as a single team both in action and spirit. This included the Naval, Military, and Commercial Attaches, and their several assistants who worked with the rest of us, hour by hour, in the closest co-operation, pooling their observations and information for the good of the whole, without any special thought of their own departments. Although all our nerves had been pretty well tried by the end of the four days, there was never a sign of irritation or friction on the part of anyone. Of course it is easier to weld such a group into a unit in a place like Tokyo than in London or Paris, and we certainly have unity here. Our staff is made up of all sorts of heterogeneous types and characters, yet no club membership could be more congenial. One of the secrets, I think, lies in the fact that any group of men who play together a lot will almost certainly work well together too.

Defense Document No. 206-C(1), cont'd

HOW PREMIER OKADA ESCAPED ASSASSINATION

March 2, 1936

The facts concerning the escape of the Prime Minister now seem to be fairly well established. Early in the morning of February 26 the alarm bells in the official residence rang (as they once rang by mistake when Alice and I were dining with Viscount Saito when Prime Minister some four years ago and the report got around that we were being assassinated). Admiral Okada looked at his watch and remarked to his brother-in-law, Matsuo, who was sleeping in the same room: "Well, my last hour has come but I won't die in pajamas." Matsuo replied: "Your life is too valuable to be spared," and while Okada dressed, Matsuo ran downstairs and into the garden, shouting "Banzai," where he was pursued and promptly killed, being mistaken for Okada in the early-morning light.

Five of the police guards were shot and killed at the entrance and one wounded. Okada was pushed into the servants' quarters and shut in a closet. There he remained until the next night, when Matsuo's body was removed and Okada, disguised, simply walked out with the mourners. I should say that Matsuo was the real hero of the whole rebellion because, while there were plenty of brave and loyal police who met death in trying to protect their charges, they were acting in line of duty and Matsuo's action was spontaneous altruism.

HIROTA REORGANIZES

March 5, 1936

Cabled to the Department that Hirota has been commanded by the Emperor to form a cabinet. I am very much pleased because I believe that Hirota is a strong, safe man and that while he will have to play ball with the Army to a certain extent, I think that he will handle foreign affairs as wisely as they can be handled, given the domestic elements which he will have to conciliate. I think too that he wants good relations with the United States and will do what he is able to do in that direction--in other words, as much as any Japanese Minister could do. If I had had the pick myself, I know of nobody whom I would have more gladly chosen to head the Government, with American interests in view. To have chosen an out-and-out liberal would have been fatal because any Prime Minister at this juncture must absolutely possess the confidence of the Army and Navy if he is not to be hamstrung at the start.

To our astonishment, Hirota immediately announced the make-

up of his new cabinet, including Yoshida as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the press said that Yoshida was acting as his chief of staff in choosing the various Ministers. This seemed to us precisely like waving a red flag at a bull because not only is Yoshida a pronounced liberal but he is the son-in-law of Count Makino. But naturally the Army wouldn't accept him for a moment, and it was soon announced that Hirota had run into hot water and was having difficulty in forming his cabinet and that General Terauchi, his choice for Minister of War, would not serve unless a radical alteration were made in Hirota's slate.

I can't imagine why Hirota made the announcement because he surely must have known that Yoshida would be impossible and it would seem to put him, Hirota, in a weak position to have to throw Yoshida overboard and revamp his cabinet at the Army's dictation. There must have been some deep-seated purpose in the maneuver, possibly to place squarely on the Army the responsibility for tampering with Hirota's foreign policy. To anticipate a little, it took Hirota four days to smooth out his differences of opinion with the Army and to submit to the Emperor his final slate in which he himself is to keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for the time being. Throughout all this time very little if anything has been heard from the Navy, publicly that is. It is said that no love is lost between the two forces and that during the uprising the Navy, which brought several ships up to Tokyo, said to the Army: "Settle the affair quickly or we will either settle it for you or pull out," and they did pull out almost immediately. I am told that they are, in fact, thoroughly ashamed of the Army's responsibility for the whole business. The story of Admiral Csumi's going to the palace the first day of the uprising surrounded by a large body of bluejackets and with two machine guns is perhaps significant.

HIROTA DEFINES "POSITIVE DIPLOMACY"

March 13, 1936

At 3 o'clock Mr. Hirota received me in the Prime Minister's official residence and while I was waiting to go in, Kishi, who has now been appointed Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, showed me the room where Okada slept and from which Matsuo ran out into the garden to his death. Hirota saw me alone without an interpreter. He said at the start that the policy which he has been following as Minister for Foreign Affairs would continue unchanged and that now that he was at the head of the Government this policy would always prevail. He said that he had the support of all members of the cabinet and that eventually he would select a Minister for Foreign Affairs upon whom he could count equally to support his policy.

I asked Hirota if he would define the term "positive diplomacy" which was now being aired in the press as the program of the

new Government. Hirota said that this term applied only to China and Soviet Russia and it simply meant a general speeding up of the policy already followed. So far as Soviet Russia was concerned, the Army is dissatisfied with the great difference between the Soviet forces in Siberia and the Japanese forces in Manchuria and they wish the latter-referred to as "defensive forces"--to be built up to a point more nearly approximating the Soviet forces across the border. He said, however, that a Soviet-Japanese war would be stupid because neither party could be expected to accomplish concrete results and he assured me that there would be no war so long as he is in office.

With regard to China, Hirota said that the three points already enunciated would form the basis for future Sino-Japanese negotiations and that these points had already been accepted by the Chinese Government in principle. At my request he defined these points as follows:

- a. A stop must be put to anti-Japanese activities and propaganda in China.
- b. It is understood that de jure recognition of Manchukuo by China at present would be difficult and it is not demanded, but what is desired is recognition of the existence of Manchukuo and regularization of such factual relations as customs, communications, transit, et cetera.
- c. Sino-Japanese co-operation is desired to combat the spread of Communism.

I told Hirota that it would be helpful if he could authorize me to reassure my Government that the pursuance of Japan's policy in China would not interfere with foreign rights and interests, including the principle of the Open Door. The Prime Minister said that there would be no tampering with the principle of the Open Door by Japan and that, so far as he could see, the only possible way in which foreign rights and interests might be indirectly affected by Japan's policy would be through the possible relinquishment by Japan of her extraterritorial rights some time in the future.

Before leaving I took occasion to speak to the Prime Minister, on my own initiative and not under instructions, about the difficulties which the Government in Washington is encountering through the increasing flow of cheap Japanese goods into the United States; I spoke of the co-operative efforts which were being made between the Department of State and the Japanese Embassy in Washington to solve these difficulties on a practical and equitable

Defense Document No. 206-C(1), cont'd

basis, but said that in spite of all efforts in this direction, our domestic industrial interests were bringing greater and greater pressure to bear on our Government and it might become necessary eventually to ask for more restrictive efforts by the Japanese Government.

Incidentally Hirota said during our conversation that, as he had told me at our first interview, good relations between Japan and the United States were the cornerstone of his policy and would continue to be so.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 169-181

not used

Def Doc # 206 c 1

Exh NO

群衆書證第二〇六―(一)

電報―歴史的の二通の電報

發信電報

ワシントン 國務長官宛

(三六) 一九三六年(昭和十一年)二月廿六日午前十時

軍は今日早朝政府及市を部分的に占領した、そして數名の要人を暗殺したとの報あり、併し未だ何事も確認することが出来ない、新聞通信員は外國に電報を發し又は電話をかけることを許されてはいない、この電報は我が暗號電報か傳達されるかどうかを確めるため、主として試驗電報として發信されるのだ、暗號室は返信次第直ちに知らせて下さい

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發信電報

ワシントン國務長官宛

至急

(三七) 一九三六年(昭和十一年)二月廿六日

正午 第一部

大使館の三六、二月廿六日午前十時

一、前總理大臣齋藤、前内大臣牧野、侍從長鈴木大將、教育總監渡邊大將等が暗殺されたことは今や大體確からしい。また大蔵大臣高橋及警視總監が負傷したことも傳へられている。(註)

二、宣は政府諸官及官殿を含む地取の周圍に非常線を張り、軍の通行券なくしては出入を許さない。諸官との電話通言もまた遮断された。株式市場は閉鎖された。

第二部

三、總理大臣岡田、内務大臣後藤及財閥重臣林も暗殺され大蔵大臣高橋は負傷により死亡したと今傳へられている。大使館はこれ等の噂の何れをも確認することか出来ない。

(註) 寫眞第四、五、六及七號参照

警察書證第二〇六〇(一)

四大使館の知る限り、混乱や市街戦はこれ迄なかつた、反乱に参加した軍除の規律は完全のようで、人民の日常業務を妨げてはいない、併し反乱の性質及その豫想の結果が大使館に一層よく判明する迄は、大使館はそれを希望する人達は自宅に留まるよう勧めている、この事件には絶對的に何等排外感情は含まれていないようである

第三部

五今朝各主要なる新聞社に續篇版刷りの聲明書が各班を作つた兵卒達によつて、配布された、この聲明書は、現政府が本來の日本精神より遠ざかり天皇の大權を剝奪したと斷言していた、その證據としてこの聲明書はロンドン海軍條約の調印及真崎大將の免職を擧げていた、なほこの聲明書は何れもか稍々眞然と述べて居り、ユーロ通信はそれを次の如く翻譯してゐる「一もしこの状態にして成任せんか、日本と中國、露國、英國及合衆國との關係は一觸即發の性質を及びて來るであらう」この聲明書には、共に東京駐屯の第三歩兵聯隊附の野中大尉及安西大尉の署名があつた、この聲明書を配布した兵卒達の言ふ處では、今夕五時に更に聲明が送られ、同時に新刑法が公布されることである、大使館の通信報者は或る憲法上の大權が停止されるであらうと信じてゐる、彼はこの

現状をキューバのパチスタ非常手段に類似しているというた。

第四部（戦時）

六大使館の確知せる處では、この反乱は陸軍の青年ファシスト分子により企圖された非常手段の性質を及びて居り、天皇側近の忌告をであつた皇臣の全部を殺し、かくして所謂昭和維新を成就せんとしたのである。何人も天皇に接觸しこの皇國の町堂に干渉するが如き勅令を發給する事を許さるため、天皇御自身も多分宮城に拘留され、外部との連絡を断たれて居らるるであらう、陸軍のファシスト分子の感情を刺激した永田少將の被害者相澤の裁判及最近の選挙にて更に自由主義者が意外に多数當選したことからこの反乱の直接原因らしい、最新の報告は海軍大臣大角大將が臨時總理大臣の位置に就いたこと及横崎大將がこの事件の主導者であるといへる、この運動は最後の幾細な點に至るまで、前以て完全な組織されていたらしい。（戦時終り）

大使館は相當信すべき所より改訂の無事であることを今知つた。

齋藤子爵の殺害

一九三六年（昭和十一年）二月二十七日

今は恐ろしい時であるとして私は痛ましい経験をして今歸つた處です。即ち昨日彼が現に殺された齋藤宅を訪問したのです。私は多分彼が殺されたと同じ室であらうにが床の上に敷布を掛けた彼の遺骸が横へられていた小さい室に室内され膝まづいて焼香をしそれから裏服の遺族に向い親愛なる齋藤子爵夫人と直面した。昨日彼女は身に受けた負傷を治療して病院にいたのだ。彼女は彼女の愛すべき夫の遺骸に附添うため、吊り籠して、無罪に飛び出して来たに違いない。彼女は私に彼の顔を見たいかと尋ねて敷布を除けた、小銃弾の痕が見えた一彼の受けた三十六個のうちの唯一の傷だ。併し彼は非常に安らかな顔をしてゐた。吾等は非常に彼を愛し、賞讃した。尊敬した。彼はいつも愛嬌のある笑を漏らしていた。そして彼の白髪は彼が彼の多くの高い役を勤め、有斐な生涯に渡り得た榮譽とは全く別な品位を彼に與へた。暗殺のはんの数時間前に、彼は陽気に快活にアリスの隣りに坐つて私共の食卓についていた。そして彼の夫人は私の次に、それから私と差し向いに鈴木大將が居つた。同大將は今負傷して垂死の状態にあ

るのた。

今日私が敬意を表した時齋藤子爵夫人は私共二人がまた遺憾のそばに差し向いで坐つてゐる間に、私に次のように語つた。即ち彼女の夫は以前に参院映畫を見たことがなく、彼は我が大使館でやつた映畫が面白かつた、それで彼はかくも楽しい最後の晩を彼に與へて呉れたことを私共に感謝するよう彼女に望んでゐるに違ひないと、私は實際感謝のあまり、アリスの同情をも傳へる以上に、何の應答も出来なかつた。彼がその夜我が大使館を去つて行つた擧句自分の平和な小さい日本の家庭で、彈丸と銃劍で、直ちに殺されることに——多分鈴木大將も同様の運命であらうが——なるのだとは誰が見ることが出来たでせうか。これ等の暗殺は私共を慨然たらしめた——齋藤、高橋、渡邊死し、鈴木は多分致命傷を受けた。牧野子爵が免れたのは有難い事だ。彼は暴徒の一隊が無慈悲に彼を殺さんと囂入するすぐ前に、秘め警告を受け、彼の滞在していた。温泉宿を去り、とある避難所を見け出した。神山は其後彼と話し、そして官の下より電話をかけて、私にそう告げた。奥津の別荘に居る西園寺公も、前以て避難したが東京に居つた前述の人は全く警告を受けなかつたらしい。

註 寫眞第七参照

辯護書證第二〇六(一)

誰かが、晩餐の間に、私共の召使に電話をかけ、齋藤が、我が大使館を去る正確な時間を知らせて呉れと請求したのは、何か意味がありそうであつた。そして私共は、後程その番頭を調へて見たら、地味警察署であることが分つた。彼等はある特別な警告を受けたのだらう。或はそれは單にいつもの用心深い体面であつたかも知れない、多分後者であつたらう、兎に角、その夜、齋藤が、私共の館に來てゐなかつたかはいづれにせよ事件の發生には無關係であつたらう。彼は眞夜中前に元氣で去つた。そして翌朝五、六時迄は殺されなかつた。もし暗殺者が我が大使館に侵入したら、二重に恐るべきものであつたでさう。彼等は、その暴力に關する限り、容易にそうすることが出來、また彼を私共の食卓で刺し殺すことも出來たのだらう。もし彼等がそうした方が目的を一層容易に達成することが出來ると感じたならば、かかる行動の國際的影響などは、それら短氣者にとりては殆んど問題とするに足らなかつたであらう。彼等の國体の或る若、否恐らく全體が機關銃を備へていたであらう。總理大臣の場合には、同様に暴徒が侵入する前に外人の巡査が薙き倒され、近邊家にては全家及召使達が全滅であつた。

悲劇の進程を綜合す。

一九三六年（昭和十一年三月一日）

反復前に起つたことは凡て今から見れば、安四日間の事件に比べると非常に些細なもので、それより前の日記の記述を促すような刺激となるものはない。少しづつ私は二月二十六、二十七日間に起つたことを取り纏めてみなければならぬ。最後の大口圓、即ち總理大臣岡田が、私共及外の殆んど誰にでも暗殺されたものと信じられていたのに、生きて負傷もせず突然また現はれたのは、最も強烈なメロドラマといつた趣がある、そしてそれにより確かに暴徒は、世界は兎に角、日本の笑草となつた。そしてそれは非常に健全な事だ。併し悲痛と憤怒のあまり、それを面白がる餘裕はなかつた。

話を始めから述べるには、私共は二月二十五日の晩、家族を主賓とした、私共の晩餐に戻らなければならぬ。主賓三十六人は二つの食卓に就いた、そして余共は何か裏つたことをやり、老紳士とその客達を喜ばせようと思つて、私は過去数日はメトロ・ゴールド・キン・メイ・撮影所で、数篇の映畫を見た。最後の日の午後、シャティン・私は私にジャンネット・マクドナルド及ネルソン・エディ出演の「明白なマリエツタ」を見せて呉れた、私は直ちに現代的映畫が見付かつたと思つた。それは楽しい、面白いウィクタール・ハー・パートの音楽や、美しい場面、面白い小説的映畫がたつぷり織

送されて居り、野郎は少しもなく、殆んど「夢の一夜」の如く夢良な
 時であつた。
 夢の死んど直後、映が治まつた。私共は斎藤子爵を、坐り心地のよ
 い安樂椅子にからせた。それは彼が海軍に居る間に何時でも、さたどん
 な境遇に於ても、居眠りが出来るようになったと、彼はネヴィルに以前
 話したことがあるから、もし彼が映に退屈を感じた時は、心地よく眠る
 ことが出来ることを私共は知つてゐたからであつた。私共は映が半
 併し私は彼が映に興味を感じ、眠る暇でなかつたと思ふ。私共は映が半
 はで休んで軽いものを食べた。それからふつと二時間映が續いた。ベ
 スティネヴィルは映が終つた時、日本婦人達の目が明らかに赤くなつて
 いたといつた、それで私は彼等があの小説的物語に感激したと思ふ。後
 退夕食があつたが、齋夫妻は十一時半頃辭去した。彼等は正統に十
 時には晩餐會を去ることにしているから、彼等としてある時はかなり遅
 かつたのだ。私は老紳士を見送つたとして、私が一九三二年一昭和
 七年一六月に總理大臣兼臨時外務大臣としての彼を、最初に訪問した時に
 治まつた交際の終りであつた。——シユリ大將と、そしてア
 彼がその偉大な經歷を、米國人と共に始め

ナポリス海軍大學に於て——そしてそれを米國大使館に於て終つたことは
 考へても興味のあることだ。彼は優しい愛嬌ある、禮儀正しい、愛すべき
 人物であつたが盲目的愛國主義の争鬭の時代に於て、勝れた智力と、廣い
 自由な見解を持つていた。私は彼が下級當局若輩の、基督教傳仰の生徒も
 教師も、神社を拜すべきだといふ要求より生じた、朝鮮に於ける學校危機
 を、彼の感化力を以つて消滅せしむることが出来ると期待した——この要
 求はもし何れまでも突つ張ると、我國經營の全部の宗教學校の閉鎖を來す
 恐れがある。彼は常に我が基督教道を支持した。併し今や彼の啓蒙な感化
 力は失せた。將來如何なる事が發生するか計り難い。

電報が二十六日早朝鳴り響いた——早朝暗殺の報を傳へたのはネヴィルであつ
 た。私は思ふ——反徒は政府及市の各所を占領したといふ流言蜚語を——そして誰が殺され誰が生
 き残つたか、又反亂が如何に激烈になるであらうかを知る者は一人もなかつ
 た。私共の最初の電報は午前中に發せられ、國務省より受命の知らせがあ
 つた。これか傳達に六時間を経た。遂に我が大使館に
 革命の四日間、私共は偵察官を通じて上能力を發揮して、事件
 國宣武官ケアリ。クレイン及その言語係官達に上能力を發揮して、事件
 の發展を觀察せしめた。最初の朝ネヴィルは靜かに宣餘の列の回を歩き、
 丁寧に日本語で兵卒に彼は外務省に行きたいと告げ、同様に丁寧に知らせ

たのだ。
 私は彼が多分あの最初の日に外務省へ行つた唯一の外人だと思ふ。
 しかも彼は二段行つた。
 しかも彼はアリスは、アメリカ大使が革命者達の一類の補足的計畫の内に含
 まれてはいはしないかと、神意を問ふた。そして私共がいつもと異つた、
 室に居り、赤ん坊のもつと近くに居ることを主張した。私は彼女の恐ろしかるのを笑つた、
 全くよく眠られなかつたと思つたが、私は彼女の問題を起すことは最も欲しない
 それに反してはこの特種の時々に、合衆國と問題を起すことは最も欲しない
 所で、つたことを自ら承知していたからだ。

辯證側文書二〇六〇(一) 續

翌日我が大使館は軍隊、前哨兵により記録所の下には砂礫を以て嚴重に警護され、又その上に三人の刑事(警察から来た我々の友人飯田氏を含む)及び二人の兵が、家屋の内部を警護した。そして私が記録所に下りて行く度に彼等も同行する事を主張した。

第一日にメキシコ公使は田舎から歸京したが、自分の公使館へ入るとさへ出来ず、私に電話で援助を求めた。私は堀内氏を通して最善を盡したが、外務省は全く無力であり私の努力は無効ではあつたが、公使はそれに満足したやうに見えた。叛亂者達は我々の所から非常に近い總理大臣官邸及び山王ホテルに居て、彼等の旗はその二つの建物に翻つてゐた。我々は屋上から双眼鏡で事件の展開を見守つた。

日本政府は最も完全な規律と秩序とを市内に保ちつゝ、叛亂者達を鎮撫し或は殺す爲に凡ゆる軍事的準備を靜かに整へた、而して彼等が放送を聞いたたり、首相官邸及び山王ホテルの敷地内に飛行機から散布した印刷物や、氣球に附けた大きな吹流しを見た結果少數の集團を爲して少しづつ降伏するまで二日間待つた。それ等のものは總べて陛下が兵に彼等の兵營に歸るやうに呼び掛けられたもので、誤つた指導を受けたのだから兵營で彼等は特赦されるであらう又彼等の親兄弟姉妹は、彼等が陛下に叛逆してゐる事を思つて泣いて居り、又彼等が解散しなければ射殺され

る事を述べたものであつた。これは全く希望通りの効果を挙げ、最初の暗殺の爲を除いては殆ど發砲する事なく万事落着した。私はこれを慶賀行爲とは呼びたくない。

最後の兵選が、首相官邸及び山王ホテルを引き上げた時、叛亂を繰つた將校達が、遂に四日後に降伏し政府は切腹の爲彼等に二時間與へた事を我々は今知つてゐる。併し、彼等は以前の暗殺者の場合の如く、民事裁判を期待し、又彼等は法廷を政府に對して國民を運動する演説場として利用する意圖があつたので彼等は切腹をしなかつた。彼等が、軍法會議にかけられ、數名が死刑を宣告されて銃殺された時それは彼等にとつては大きな衝撃だつたに違ひない。

一つの事件、即ち牧野伯爵殺害の計画の話は深く人を動かす、この老紳士が、田舎の温泉旅館に滞在してゐた時、一人の將校と數名の兵が、彼を暗殺する爲に深夜到着した。私の聞いた話によれば、そしてそれは眞實だと信ずるのであるが、牧野伯爵の護衛はその將校を射殺し自かも兵選に殺された。彼等はそれから、牧野伯爵を戶外に運出す心算で旅館に放火した。旅館の裏には險阻な斷崖があり老紳士は令孫和子嬢及び看護婦に依てそれ以上高くは登れない斷崖の突端へと導びかれた。間もなく彼等は恰も照明燈を向けられたやうに火幕に依つて照らし出され、兵選は銃を舉げた併し丁度その瞬間美しい少女で私選の娘エルシーの仲よしであつた可愛い令孫が、自分の着物を祖父の前に横げた、すると兵

逕はこの英雄的な動作に深く動かされて銃を落し、發砲しなかつた。私は可愛い和子嬢は二、二六事件の眞の英雄の一人であり確かに彼女が祖父を死から救つたのだと何時も感じてゐる。

日本新時代始まる

一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月一日

叛亂は四日間で終つた。併し我々大使館員はこの前の火曜日に齊藤夫妻や鈴木夫妻とこの建物に共に楽しく過した夕以來一時代が過ぎ去つたやうに感じる。若し時代を事件によつて測るなら、確にあれ以來一時代が過ぎ去つた。此のやうな事件、即ちそれが自然の力により或は人爲により起つたにもせよ、何等かの種類の災害は世界の各所で次々に起つてゐる。そしてそれに關係のないものはそれを客觀的に見つめてゐるといふ譯である。我々は朝刊を読み「何と恐しい災難であらう」と言ふそしてひどく心を動かされることもなく日々の仕事又思索へと移つてゆく。衝突が眞に胸に應へて存続するのはこのやうな事件が我々の身邊に起つたり又は急激な死と英雄的行爲が我々の友人の間に然かも吾々の極く身近に家の入口で起つた場合に限る。

今や我々は友人達の話から徐々に暗殺の行はれた筋道を辿ることが出来るそして諸報道は男子達の名譽をたかめるのみならず日本女性の眞隨

をも示す。。。。齊藤子爵夫人は如何に夫の面に立ちはだかり「私を
 代りに殺して下さい夫は國の爲に替へがたい人です」と言ひ受けた傷で
 横に押しやられる迄事實機關銃の口に手をあててゐた。又渡邊夫人は夫
 を自分の腕で抱へて共に臥れたので暗殺者は銃を夫人の身の下に押しつ
 けなければならなかつた。
 鈴木大將の語は歴史に残るべきである。安藤大尉は拳銃を向けたまゝ
 十分間彼と情勢を論じ何つた。議論が途絶えた時、鈴木は「もつと何か
 言ひたいことがあるのか」と尋ねたところ安藤は「もうありません」と
 答へたので「それなら撃て」と鈴木が言つた。そこで安藤は三發發射し
 た。一發は頭蓋を擦つたがしかし脳には達しなかつた。一發は胸部肺臓
 を貫通し三發目の弾丸は脚部に入つた。胸部の傷は重傷で大將はひどく
 出血したので鐵血で漸く彼の生命を取止めた、現在彼は危険を通り越し
 さうである、高橋の殺害は本營に残虐そのものであつた。射殺しただけ
 では満足せず叛亂軍將校は彼を自分の劍でつき刺しその後で家族に、起
 した迷惑について申譯ないと言つた。

さて我々は更に續けて一體總て如何云ふ事になるのか考へて見なければならぬ。或一つの事柄が絶對的に確實なものとして吾々の眼に映じて来る。

即ち、日本に於て「新政策」が行はるべきである。さもなければ相澤公判に於て辯護人が豫言した如くに同様の事が繰返し起るであらう。私は附田を信じてゐる併し彼はかつて誰も直面した事のない難問題の一つを負はされてゐる。彼は素晴らしい好機を持つてゐる。それは或る點ではフランクリン、ルーズヴェルトが就任した時彼に直面したのと同じ好機である。そして彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく處理することが出来れば彼は一大政治家として歴史に残るであらう。

日本の青少年の教育に用ひられた歴史の本は初期の時代から首長に對する復讐或は忠義或は興へられた地位に對して責任を取るといふ動機からの暗殺或は自殺などといふ記載で滿ちてゐるといふことを考へ出せば日本に於て二・二六事件の如き事が如何にして起り得たか了解するのは容易である、逆説的に言へば——日本は逆説の國であるが——これらの青年將校は、天皇自身を選んだ、天皇御近の邪な重臣等を除かうとして天皇の聲に働いてゐるのだと信じてゐた。そしてそこには個人的憎悪は全然含まれて居なかつた。彼等が加藤、渡邊、松尾（義兄に當る首相と間違へら

れた一を殺した時、死^シの傍に火^ヒく香を出してくれと云つた。高橋邸に於ては香が見當らなかつたので彼等は殺害された政治家の傍に火を點じた蠟燭を置くことを主張した。この様な出来事が將來にぬやうにしやうとするたら國中に社會的經濟的新政策が遂行せられねばならぬばかりでなく學校や軍隊に於ける日本の教育は根本的變革を経るべきであらう。この事件により起つた愉快の一つは一つのチームとしての大使館員の行動及び精神兩面に於ての完全なる團結であつた。これは大使館附海陸軍武官、商務官及びその數名の助を含んでゐた。彼等は少しも夫々の内部の事を考へず、全體の爲に観測情報を集め、密接なる協力の下に刻々我々と仕事をしてくれた。四日間の終りの頃には我々の神經は相當疲勞してゐたが誰れにも焦燥不和の色は見えなかつた。勿論東京の如き所でこの様なグループを一部隊に結合させるのはロンドンやパリに於てより遙に容易である。我々館員はすべての異つた型、性格の人々から成つてゐる、まして如何なる俱樂部會員の關係も此以上親密なものはない。秘訣の一つは共によく遊ぶ人々の集りは、又確に共に良く働くであらうといふ事實に存すると私は思ひます。

辯護書證 第二〇六號。(一) 續き

岡田首相暗殺を免れる顛末

(一九三六年)

昭和十一年三月二日

岡田首相が暗殺を免れた事に關しその真相が現在相當確實に分つて來たやうである。

二月廿六日早朝

首相官邸の警報の鈴が鳴つた。(かつて約四年前アリスと私が齋藤子爵と食事を共にして居た時何かの間違ひで此警鈴が鳴つて私共が暗殺されてゐたと弘まつた事がある。)岡田大將は彼の懷中時計を見て同室に居て居た義弟、松尾に向つて言つた「さあ私の最後の時が來た、然し慶卷のまゝでは死ねない」「今兄さんの命はとても大切だ死んではいけない」と松尾は言い返した。

首相が着換へて居る間に松尾は二階から駆け降りそれから庭に飛び出した。そこで追いかけられた後早朝の薄明りに首相と見誤られ、萬歳を叫びながら彼は殺された。

護衛警官の中五名は入口で射撃されて死し、一名は負傷した。岡田は使用人の室に入れられ押入に閉ぢ込められた。彼は次の夜、松尾の死體

が遅び去られる時迄そこに止つて居つて、首相は變装して會葬者と共に徒歩で出て行つた。松尾は此叛亂事件全般中に於ける眞の英雄であつたと言はなければならぬ。外にも自分の設備すべき人々を守らうとして生命を失つた勇敢且つ忠誠な警官は數多くあつたが、それは彼等の職務上の行爲であつた。然るに松尾の行動は自發的であり愛他的主義によるものであつた。

廣田の再組閣

一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月五日

陛下から廣田に對し組閣の命令が降下した事を國務省に打電した。私は廣田が強力な安穩な人物である事を信ずるので大に嬉しく思ふ「或程度彼は陸軍とも交渉しなければならぬが外國との事柄も國內の人々とも融和しなければならぬが國內要業を與へられるならば出来るだけ賢明に取り扱ふものと考へる。」

廣田はアメリカ合衆國と交友關係を欲し其方向に向つて出来るだけの事をやる換言すれば日本の大臣が爲し得るだけの事をやるものと私は考へる。私が人選するとすればアメリカの利害から見れば廣田以外に政府主腦として進んで選ぶべき人物を知らない。徹底的自由主義者を選んだなら致命的であつたであらうなぜなら此際誰が首相になつても首相として最初から不具的にされぬためには絶対に陸海軍の信用を持たなければ

ならぬから。

驚いた事には廣田は直に吉田を外務大臣とする新内閣の組織を發表した。新聞は吉田が外の閣員を選擧する主腦となつて活動して居ると報告した。吉田が著名な自由主義者であるばかりでなく彼は牧野伯の女婿であるから彼を外務大臣とする事は正に牡牛に向つて赤旗を振ることと我々には思はれた。然し當然陸軍は暫時でも彼の就任を認めようとしなかつた。間もなく廣田が組織上非常な窮境に陥つた事、陸軍大臣として彼が物色した寺内大將は廣田の候補名簿に根本的變更が加へられぬ限り就任しない事が發表された。

私は廣田が何故あんなやうな發表をしたのか分らない。何故かと云ふと吉田が適任者でない事又陸軍の指圖で吉田を内閣から追放し内閣を改造しなればならぬならば自分が弱い立場となる事を廣田は確かに知つて居た筈である。此工策は何か根本に深い目的があつてやつたに違ひない、廣田の外交方針に干渉する陸軍に其責任を全面的に負はせる目的であつたかも知れない。

少し急いで、云ふと、陸軍との意見の相違點を調整し當分外務大臣の職を彼自身擔當するとして閣員名簿を陛下に捧呈するまでに四日を要した。此全期間中海軍側から殆んど何の話も公的には聞かれなかつた。陸海軍の間には好感は存在して居なかつた事又今次の叛亂に際し東京灣に敵艦の軍艦を回航して來た海軍は陸軍に向つて「問題を早く解決せよ、さもなくば海軍が陸軍に代つて解決するか又は軍艦は東京灣を出航する」と云つたがそれから殆ど直ちに軍艦は出航してしまつたと云はれる。實際の海軍は陸軍の今回の全事件に對する責任に就き深く恥じ入つてゐる、と私は聞いて居る。大角大將が叛亂第一日水兵の大部隊及び二機の機關銃に圍まれて宮城に参内した話は恐らく重要な事であらう。

廣田「積極外交」を定議す

(一九三六年)昭和十一年三月十三日

三時に廣田氏は私を首相官邸で迎へた。私が入らうとして待つて居ると今回首相の秘書官に任命された岸が岡田の寢てゐた部屋即ち松尾が庭に飛び出して殺された部屋を私に見せてくれた。廣田は通譯なしに一人で私に面會した。先づ第一に彼は外務大臣として實行して來た方針を相變らず繼續し又彼が首相となつた今も此方針が常に繼げられると言つた。全閣僚が彼を支持し、繼る事及び何れ自身と同様に彼の方針を支持し彼の信頼出來る

人物を外務大臣として選擇すると彼は語つた。

目下新政府の方針であると類に新聞紙上に見受ける「積極外交」を定義するやう私は廣田に求めた。廣田は此言葉はたゞ中國とソヴィエトロシアだけに適用する言葉で單に今迄の方針を一般的に促進する意味に過ぎないと言つた。ソヴィエツトに關する限は、陸軍はシベリアのソヴィエツト軍と滿洲の日本軍の間に甚だしい差のある事に不満を抱いて居り、陸軍は後者を防衛軍と云つて居たがこれを國境外のソヴィエツト勢力に今少し近い程度に増強する事を要望して居る。然し、日露兩國どちらも具體的效果を導る事は期待し得ぬから日露戦争はあり得ないと廣田は語つた。又彼の在任中は決して戦争が起らぬと私に保證した。

中國に關しては既に言明した三點が今後の日本、中國間交渉の基礎となる事及び此三點は既に原則として中國政府の承認済みなる事を廣田は語つた。
私の求めに應じ、廣田は次の如く是等の點を明確にした。

(イ) 中國内の排日的活動の宣傳は中止せしめられなければならない。

(ロ) 現在の中國が正式に滿洲國を承認する事の困難は分る。それは要求しないが滿洲國の存在に對しては承認を求める、又關稅、通信、通行通路等の事實上の關係の規定が望ましい。

(ハ) 中日兩國の協力して共產主義の擴大を防止する事が望ましい。若し廣田が中國に對する日本の政策遂行は門戶開放の原則を含めて外國の權益及利害關係を害さぬものであることをアメリカ合衆國政府に向つて再び保證する旨確約して頂けるなら好都合である。私は廣田に告げた。

日本が門戶開放主義を冒す事のない事又廣田の所見では日本の方針によつて外國の權益及び利害關係が間接に影響を受ける場合ありとすれば、それは日本が將來何時か治外法權を放棄するかもしれない場合だけであると廣田は語つた。

除去する前、指令によらずたゞ私自身だけの發意でアメリカ合衆國へ日本の生價な商品が續々増加流入するので米國政府は之に對し困難を感じて居る事に就て首相に話して見た。實行の可能と公平を基礎にして今迄此種問題の解決の爲め國務省及びワシントンの日本大使館の拂つた協力努力に關して話し、且、此方向に於て全力を盡したにも拘らずアメリカ國內の産業關係者は益々はげしく政府に迫つて來て居るので結局日本政府が現在以上制限するやう盡力する事が必要となるかも知れぬと私は話した。

廣田は第一回目の會見に於て語つたやうに又今回も日米の友交關係が彼の政策の基礎であり今後ますますであると言つた。

グルー元米國大使の日記抄萃

(一六九頁—一八一頁)

not used

CHECKING IN WITH UTOPIA

November 30, 1936

During my call today on the Prime Minister to pay my respects on returning from leave of absence, the conversation at first entered upon the recent election in the United States and the assurance that the general foreign policy of the present administration, including the policy of the good neighbor, would be continued for another four years. I spoke also of the Harvard Tercentenary celebration and the Japanese art exhibition in Boston.

When I asked Mr. Hirota how things were going in Japan, he replied that his greatest difficulty at present had to do with taxation. He said that the Japanese Army and Navy were seriously disturbed at the great increase of armaments in Soviet Russia which exceeded even the military organization of the czarist regime, and it was largely owing to these increasingly heavy Soviet armaments that the Japanese Army and Navy were calling for greater increases of armaments in Japan, which in turn led to the necessity for higher taxation.

Since Mr. Hirota on his own initiative had touched upon foreign affairs, I then asked him concerning the reports in the press about an agreement between Japan and Italy. He replied that no agreement existed. The simple facts were that Italy was going to open a consular office in Manchukuo and Japan would eventually do the same in Abyssinia and that this was all there was to it.

The Prime Minister then said that as regards China the negotiations were proceeding very slowly and that they were still based on the three points which he had formerly enunciated, particularly the demand that anti-Japanese activity in China should cease and that steps would be taken to combat Communism. I asked him about the reports to the effect that the Japanese demands included tariff questions and also the appointment of Japanese advisers. Mr. Hirota said that these points had also come up: that the question of the tariff had already been settled and that as regards Japanese advisers, the simple fact was that other countries had many advisers in China whereas Japan had none and that the Japanese merchants in China were pressing for the appointment of such advisers. Mr. Hirota said definitely that such advisers would be purely economic and not political or military. He said that obviously the Chinese Government was in a difficult position regarding the Bolshevik menace because there were so many Communists in China itself.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR CREW, page 190

not used

Dof. Doc. 42050(3)

廣田との談話手合せ

一九三六年十一月三十日

余は本日賜暇歸朝歸任挨拶の爲め總理大臣を往訪の際談は偶々米國に於ける最近の選舉及亞米利加現政府の善隣政策をも含む一般外交政策は向後四ヶ年間は依然として確かに引き續き行はれるだらうと云ふ事に及びました。余は又ハーバード大學三百年祭典やボストンに於ける日本美術展の事に言及しました。

1

余は廣田氏に此間日本の情勢は如何なりしやを訊ねましたが彼は彼が目下一番苦勞して居る事は課税問題であると言へ尙日本の陸海軍は蘇聯が「ザア」時代の軍組織をも凌駕する様子を軍備の擴張を爲して居る事に關し痛切に頭を悩まして居る事、而して此蘇聯の軍備擴張の爲の日本の陸海軍も亦其軍備を擴張せざるを得ざるの羽目にあり、従つて之が爲により公平な課税の必要に迫られて居る事を語りました。廣田氏は自ら進んで外務をも擔當して居たのですから余は日伊協定に關

Dof. Doc. #2060 (3)

シエヴィスムの恐威に關し著るしく困難な情勢に置かれてある事等を語りました。

前米國大使グルー氏日記一九〇頁抜萃

する新聞情報に就いて彼れに尋ねましたら彼は右の如き何等協定も未だ成立し居らず只伊太利が滿洲國に領事館を創立する手筈となつて居り日本と亦都合ではアビシニアに同様領事館を創立する事になるでせう、日伊間には目下只此丈の事外ありませんと答へました。

尋で總理大臣は支那との交渉が非常に通々として進まざる事、本交渉は彼が已に言外した三點殊に支那に於ける反日行動の中止及び支那が共産黨打倒の爲め何等かの工作をなすべしと云ふ此要請に重點を置いて居る事等を語りました。余は更に日本の要請中には關稅問題や日本人顧問の任命等をも含んで居るとの情報に就いて彼に尋ねましたら、彼は此等の問題も上場した事、關稅問題は已に解決を見た事、日本人顧問問題に關しては外國では已に顧問を支那に送つて居るのに單り日本のみ未だ其任命を見て居ないのだから在支日本人は顧問任命の一日も早からん事を懇望しつゝあると云ふ事。

又此の如き顧問は單に純經濟的のもので政治的又は軍事的のものでない事を判然と語り而して支那政府は支那にも多くの共産黨が居るのでボル

Dof. Doc. 2060 (3)

シエウイスムの恐威に關し著るしく困難な情勢に置かれてある事等を語
りました。

前米國大使グルー氏日記一九〇頁抜萃

not used

Defense Document No. 206-C(4)

AN AMBASSADOR DETECTS A GERMAN-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

December 3, 1936

An ambassadorial colleague told me today that there is no doubt in his mind that the German-Japanese treaty includes a secret military agreement.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR CREW, page 191

not used

Def. Doc. # 206(C) -4

大使、日獨同盟を看破す

一九三六年十二月三日

大使の一同僚が日獨條約が秘密軍事協定を含む事は疑を入れないと
今日私に語つた。

前アメリカ大使グルーの日記よりの抜萃（一九二頁）

not used



Defense Document No. 206-C(16)

WHEN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE NEVER BETTER

February 12, 1937

This afternoon Alice, having a cold and feeling poorly, stayed at home while I did the family duty by going to a reception at the Chinese Embassy, and it was worth while because it gave me an opportunity for a long and intimate conversation with Amau. Amau said that he thought that Japanese-American relations had undergone a great change in the last two or three years and that Japan's attitude toward America was very different from that of three years ago. He said that there were really no important issues pending between us at the present time and he thought it very significant that the speech which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is about to make in a few days is going to state that Japan desires the most friendly relations with both the United States and Great Britain; so far as the United States is concerned he will stop right there, but so far as Great Britain is concerned he will continue to the effect that current controversies can be settled by diplomatic negotiations. In other words, said Amau, the absence of comment with regard to the United States would indicate that there are no prime issues worth mentioning.

I said I thought that this situation was in large measure due to Mr. Hirota and his efforts in curbing the Japanese press, which had caused so much trouble in times past in its bitter comment about the United States; these comments were repeated by correspondents to America and of course the American press took them up there, causing a vicious circle all around. Amau then told me of his own efforts in this direction and how in the weekly meetings with representatives of Japanese journals he had tried to influence the editorial writers to lay off bickering with the United States. In this respect he had been rather successful. I told Amau that although I had ascribed the credit for our improved relations to Hirota I knew very well that he himself had had an important hand in this development.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 205-206

Not used

Ref, B88, #200-9(10)

Exh, No

辯護側文書第二〇六號〇一六

日米關係が最も良好であつた時
一九三七年二月十二日

今日午後アリスは風邪をひいて気分が悪く家に引籠つて居たので、予は支那大使館の招待會に臨んで一家の役目を果たしたのだが、天羽と長い間懇談する機會を得たので行つた甲斐があつた。天羽は日米關係が過去二三年間に非常な變化を來し又日本の對米態度も三年前の態度とは著しく變つて居ると語つた。現在のところ兩國間には實際懸案になつてゐる重要問題はない、又近い中に外務大臣がすることになつて居る演説は日本が合衆國及英國の兩國との至上の親善關係を希望する旨述べんとして居るのであるが、これを甚だ意義深く思ふ事、合衆國に關する紛争が外交交渉に大臣は現狀に停止するが、英國に關する限りでは現在の紛争が外交交渉により解決することが出来るとの建前で進むだらうとも語つた。言葉交換へて云へば、合衆國に關して何も云つて居ないといふことは言及に値する程の主要な問題が無いといふことを示す譯である。天羽は云つた。予は今日の情勢が廣田氏と氏の日本新聞抑制の努力に俟つところ極めて大なるものがあると思ふ。日本の新聞は過去に於て合衆國を痛撃して多大の紛議を惹起したもので、其の言説は通信員に依つて亞米利加に反復

せられ、米紙も勿論これを採上げて到る處に悪循環を生ずるに至つたものであると話した。そこで天羽は此の點に就ての自分の努力を語り、日本新聞代表者との毎週會見の席上彼が如何に合衆國に對する爭論を中止する様編輯者を動かさんとしたかを語つた。此點に就ては天羽は成功して居た様である。予は我國との國交好轉は廣田の功績に歸するものと見てゐるけれど、貴下御自身も此の好轉に重要な役目を果されたことを充分よく知つて居ると天羽に話した。

前合衆國大使グルーの日記二〇五—六頁より抜萃

not used

Defense Document No. 206-C(17)

WHEN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE NEVER BETTER

February 12, 1937

* * * * *

I said I thought that Japan was at present in a very critical position and that she really stood at the parting of the ways; Amai agreed with me and said that this was why a moderate cabinet had been appointed at the present time. On the whole this conversation seemed to me significant because Amai emphasized so distinctly the fact that the present cabinet is moderate and it looks at present very much as if this might prove to be the case.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GRLW, page 206

not used

Def. Doc. # 206-C(17)

辯設側文書第二〇六〇（一七）

日米關係親善ヲ極メタ頃

一九三七年（昭和十二年）二月一二日

私ガ日本ハ現在非常ニ危険ナ立場ニアリ事實分歧點ニ立ツテ居ルト考
ヘルト云ツタニ對シ天羽ハ私ニ同意シソレガ故ニ今同種健ナル内閣ガ任
命セラレタノデアルト語ッタ。天羽ガ現内閣ハ穩健デアルトイフコトヲ
斯ク明ラカニ強調シタノデ全体カラ見テヨノ會談ハ私ニハ有意義デア
ト思ハレタ。サウシテ現在ノトコロメレハ事實全ク穩健デアルヤウニ見
受ケラレル。

グルー元米國大使 日記抜粹

（二〇六頁）

not used

Defense Document No. 206-D(1)

THE CHINA INCIDENT BEGINS

July 8, 1937

Fighting has broken out at the Marco Polo bridge not far from Peiping between Chinese and Japanese troops. Not clear who started the trouble, but Nelson Johnson says that considering the fact that the Japanese conduct maneuvers close to a Chinese garrison it is only surprising that such an incident had not occurred long ago.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW,
page 211

Rejected
Ry 80.20797

Defense Document No. 206-D(2)

AMERICAN AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIONS

July 14, 1937

The Japanese and Chinese representatives in Washington yesterday called at the Department and the opportunity was taken to express our hope that both sides would exercise restraint. The British Government was informed of our action and the following press release was issued by the Department:

The Japanese Ambassador and the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy each called at the Department this morning and communicated information in regard to events in North China. In the course of the conversations which ensued both were given expression of the view that an armed conflict between Japan and China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world progress.

No reinforcements have yet left Japan.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 211

not used

not used

辯護文書第二〇六―D (二)

米、英兩國の申入れ

一九三七年七月十四日

ワシントンに於ける日華兩代表は昨日國務省を訪問したがその際我が方は兩國ともに自割せられたい旨の希望を明にした。國務省は此の處置を英國政府に通知すると共に次の如く新聞に發表した。即ち日本大使並に中國大使館顧問は夫々本日午前本省を訪問華北の事件に關する情報を傳達せられたり、次いで行はれたる會談に於て吾々は兩國代表に對し日華兩國間の武力衝突は平和と世界の進歩とにとつて一大打撃となるであらうとの見解を表明せり。日本の増援軍はまだ出發してゐない

前 米國大使グルー氏日記抜萃 (二一一頁)

not used

CHINESE BOMBS ON SHANGHAI HURT
CHINA'S CAUSE ABROAD

August 29, 1937

* * * * *

The bombing in Shanghai on August 14 was one of the most horrible episodes in modern times. The bombs fell indiscriminately, hitting the Cathay and Palace Hotels and killing hundreds of Chinese civilians gathered on the Bund and elsewhere. Bob Reischeuer, the son of an American missionary, was fatally injured at the entrance to the Cathay and other Americans may have been killed or injured. I wrote to Dr. and Mrs. Reischeuer in Keruizawa. Subsequently we received the most heart-rending first-hand accounts from refugees.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 216

Not used

LEF DOC # 206 D-5

辯護書類 第二〇六の(五)

中二側による上海爆撃は海外に於ける中國の立場を損ふ

一九三七年八月廿九日

八月十四日の上海爆撃は近代での最も恐ろしい出来事の一つであつた。爆弾は魔雲ばず落下してカセイ、ホテル及びパレス、ホテルに命中し、バンドなどに集つてゐた數百の一般中國人を殺した。一美國宣教師の息ボブ、ライシヤウアーはカセイ、ホテルの入口で致命的重傷を負つたが其他の米國人も死んだり負傷したかも知れぬ。予は經井澤に居るライシヤウアー夫妻に手紙を出した。後で避難者達から直接極めて痛しい話をいろいろ聞いた。

前美國大使グルー氏日記抜萃 (二一六頁)

not used

HULL DENIES HIROTA'S CHARGES

November 17, 1937

The Department cabled us the full text of the Declaration adopted by the Brussels Conference on November 15.

The Embassy in Rome reports that a Havas dispatch from Tokyo gives the purported terms which Japan intends to impose on China and asks for our comment. We replied to the Department that the Foreign Office spokesman on November 15 described the reports as "entirely groundless."

Referring to my talk with Hirota, the Secretary cabled me that the words "united action" nowhere appear in the Declaration adopted by the Brussels Conference. Mr. Hull assumes that Hirota may have had in mind the last paragraph of that Declaration, which was phrased as follows:

Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her refusal, the States represented at Brussels must consider what is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party to an international treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of that treaty, and sets aside the provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold to be operative in the circumstances.

The Secretary also authorized me to tell Hirota from him that there is not an atom of truth in any report that we took the initiative in calling the Conference. Mr. Hull also understands that no Government at the Conference has done more than to assume its share of the common responsibility for an exchange of views and is astonished that any Foreign Office with the information publicly available could have any misunderstanding with regard to these facts. He asked me to tell Hirota of his appreciation of the latter's wish to maintain good relations with the United States, for which he, Mr. Hull, has constantly worked during the past five years, but that he must frankly and in all friendliness express his apprehension lest the cause of developing and fostering these good relations, which both have always in mind, should be injured by the present situation in the Far East.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, page 227

not used

Def, Doc, #206-D(15)

Exh, NO

辯護側文書 二〇六―D (一五)

ハル長官廣田外相の非難を否定

一九三七年十一月十七日

國務省は十一月十五日ブラッセル會議によつて採擇せられた宣言書の全文を我々に打電してきた。

ローマ駐在大使館の報ずる所によれば、東京よりのハバス電報は、日本が支那に押しつけやうとする條約草案を通告し來り、我々の批判を求めてゐる。我々は、外務省スポークスマンが、十一月十五日、右の報導は「何等根據なし」と述べた旨國務省に報告した。

自分と廣田外相との會談に關して國務長官から自分の受取つた電報は、「共同動作」なる言葉はブラッセル會議によつて採擇せられた宣言書の中にどこにも見當らないと云つてゐる。

廣田外相は、右宣言書の最後の二節を考へてゐるものであらうとハル氏は云ふ。それは以下の如き特句である。

「日本がどこまでも自國の拒否を通さうとは考へないけれどもブラッセルが會議に於ける代表諸國家は、或る國際條約の一事、事實國が、その他餘の當事國の意見に反して、自國のとつた行動は右條約の埒外にあるものなりと主張し、他の當事諸國が現在右の國際條約の條項は實行可能な

りとするにも拘らず、之を無視するやうな場合に、他の當事國は如何なる共同態度をとるべきかを協議しなければならぬ。」

國務長官は又、右會議召集に當つてアメリカ合衆國がその發議をしたとの報導には何等眞實のない事を廣田氏に傳言を委任した。

右會議に關しハル長官は何れの國の政府も、その與へられた共同責任分擔の範圍内で意見の交換を行つたにすぎず、と了解して居り、いやしくも一國の外務省が、情報が公然と得られるにも拘らず、右の如き事實に關し誤解を持つてゐる事に對しては意外に思つてゐる。

ハル氏は廣田氏に對し右の如き傳言を私に依頼して來た。即ち、日米間の友好關係維持にはハル氏自身過去五年間終始努力してきたのであるが、廣田外相の同様の努力に對し感謝するとともに、兩國が常に留意してゐるかゝる友好關係の發展育成の目的が、極東に於ける現狀によつて、阻止されはしないかとの不安の存在する事を、率直且凡ゆる好意を以て表明せざるを得ない、との主旨である。

(前米國大使、グルー氏の日記、二二七頁よりの抜萃)

WHY HIROTA MISUNDERSTOOD HULL

November 20, 1937

Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, told me in private that there had been some misunderstanding about the phraseology and substance of Mr. Hull's message to Mr. Hirota, which I had communicated to the latter on November 18. What happened was this. In order to be sure of conveying Mr. Hull's message precisely as cabled, I had written it down before going to see Hirota and actually read it to him, taking no chances on a casual oral communication. The message said that Mr. Hull sincerely appreciated Mr. Hirota's desire to maintain good relations with the United States; that during the past five years Mr. Hull had constantly striven to that end; and that in all friendliness and frankness Mr. Hull must express his apprehension lest the cause of fostering and developing those good relations which they both have in mind be injured by the present situation in the Far East (paraphrase).

In view of the implied sting in the tail of the message I was a little surprised when Mr. Hirota expressed great pleasure at receiving it and asked me to thank Mr. Hull. Hirota asked me if I would leave with him the message as I had written and read it to him, but I pleaded that the piece of paper was merely a rough record and that I would send him a neater transcription as soon as I returned to the Embassy. The reason for this was that I could not leave with him the true reading because it had come in confidential code and also because there were other notes on the paper which I didn't want to give him. As soon as I had returned to the chancery I sent him a personal letter with a close paraphrase of the message.

When I saw him at the time of my call with MacMurray * this morning I asked if he had received my letter. He said no and that he had thought of telephoning me to ask for it. I said that I had sent it two days ago, immediately after our interview and that I would investigate. Just as we came out of Hirota's office we met Yoshizawa going in with my letter. He said that it had gone first to the Archive Bureau and had thus been delayed. Yoshizawa asked Dooman to come to see him this afternoon and said that Mr. Hirota had understood the message quite differently; he thought that Mr. Hull was saying that he was working for good relations with Japan in spite of the situation in the Far East. Apparently Hirota had misunderstood the significance of the word "apprehension."

*Former American Minister to China, at this time Ambassador to Turkey.

Defense Document No. 206-D(16), cont'd

Hirota was so pleased with the message, as he had understood it, that he had cabled it to the Japanese diplomatic missions in several capitals abroad. Now that he had received my letter he saw the marked discrepancy between his understanding and the actual meaning of the message and he found himself in something of a dilemma as to whether to correct the misunderstanding by sending a revised version abroad. Yoshizawa thought that it would probably be better to leave the matter as it is. All this arose through Mr. Hirota's inadequate grasp of English and goes to indicate that one can never rely on purely oral communications. I am glad at least that the misunderstanding cannot be attributed to any carelessness on my part because I read to Hirota the actual message from the original text.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 228-229

辯設側文書 第二〇六號一D(一六)

廣田は何故ハルを誤解したか

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十一月二十日

外務省アメリカ局長芳澤は私が十一月十八日に廣田に傳達しましたハルから廣田宛のメッセーデの言葉遣ひ及びその内容に就いて或る誤解があつたといふ事を私的に私に語りました。即ち次の事柄が起つたのであります。私は打電された通り精確にハル氏のメッセーデを傳へる事を確實にする爲に廣田に會見しに行くにそれを書き止めました。そして又不時の口頭傳達を原因にして乗ずる機會の無い様に實際にそれを彼に讀んで聞かせました。そのメッセーデには「ハル氏は合衆國との親善關係を維持しようとする廣田の熱望を衷心より喜んだ事。『過去五年間ハル氏は絶えずその目的の爲に盡力した事。全く友誼的に正直にハル氏は彼等兩者の心にある親善關係を培ひ進展せしめる原因が極東に於ける現在の情勢に依つて阻害されはしないか』といふ懸念を述べなければならぬ」事等が記されてありました。(意譯)

メッセーデの末尾に含蓄のある諷刺があるのに鑑みまして私は廣田氏がそのメッセーデを受けとつた時非常な喜びを示し、ハル氏に宜しくと私に乞ふた時、稍驚きました。廣田は私がメッセーデを書き止め、彼に讀んで聞かせたメッセーデを若し出來たら彼に残して行つてくれる様を乞

ひました。併し私は「その紙片は單に草稿に過ぎず、大使館へ歸れば直ぐにもつと綺麗に清書した寫しを彼に送りませう」と述べました。此の理由はそれが密電で來、そして又其紙片には私が彼に與へたくなかつた他の記察事項があつたので私は彼に原文其ものを殘して來られなかつたのであります。

私は記録所に歸るや否やメツセーデの精密な意譯をつけた私信を彼に送りました。

私は今朝マツクマレーと共に訪問して彼と會つた時私は書翰を受けとりましたかと尋ねました。彼は「いゝえ」と云ひ「私に電話をかけてそれを求めようと思つてゐた」と言ひました。私は「二日前私達の會見後直ちにそれを送りました。調べて見ませう」と言ひました。

私達が廣田の省（外務省）を出た丁度其の時芳澤が私の書翰を持つて入つて行くのに逢ひました。

彼は「その書翰が最初文書局へ行つて居つた爲にこんなに遲延したのです」と申しました。芳澤はドウーマンに「本日午後會ひに來る様に」乞ひ「廣田氏はそのメツセーデを全く違ふ意味に解釋した」と申しました。彼はハル氏が「樞東に於ける情勢に拘らず、日本との親善關係の爲盡力して居る」と述べてゐたと思つてゐた。

明らかに廣田は「懸念」といふ言葉の意味を誤解して居りました。

◎前駐支アメリカ公使、現在駐トルコ大使。

廣田は彼が理解した如くにそのメツセーヂを受けとり非常に喜んだとしてそれを五六の外國首都に於ける日本外交使節に打電しました。彼は私の書翰を受けとつたので彼の解釋と實際のメツセーヂの意味の間に著しい相違のある事を知りました。そして彼は訂正された翻譯を外國に送つて誤解を正さうかどうかといふ事について幾分デレンマに入つた事を知りました。芳澤はその事をそのまゝにしておいた方が多分よいだらうと思ひました。此の事はすべて廣田氏の不十分な英語の把握から起つたのでありまして私達は全く口頭傳達に頼る事は出来なといふ事を示すに至ります。私は實際のメツセーヂを原文から廣田に讀んで聞かせましたので誤解が私の側の如何なる不注意にも依るものではないといふ事を少くとも喜びます。

前合衆國大使グルーの日記抜萃。
二二八―二二九頁

not used

DEFENSE DOC. Nos.	206-E (1)	206-E (8)	206-E (16)	Exhibit No. _____
	206-E (2)	206-E (9)	206-E (17)	
	206-E (3)	206-E (10)	206-E (18)	
	206-E (4)	206-E (12)	206-E (19)	
	206-E (5)	206-E (13)	206-E (20)	
	206-E (6)	206-E (14)		
	206-E (7)	206-E (15)		

DOCUMENTS

1. Subject: Excerpts from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew, Entitled "Ten Years in Japan".
2. Date: 12 October 1939 to 10 June 1940
3. Certificate: Not necessary
4. Translation: Not applicable
5. Excerpts: Not filed under Rule 6-B-1 as required.
6. Comment: The following excerpts are reports of official conferences and communications, some are recordings of actual events. A very few are the personal (recorded as an official) views of the Ambassador. At times he adds speculation without giving reasons, but this is insignificant.

Apparently the Documents are admissible generally, the objectionable matters being harmless.
7. Rebuttal: No comment.
8. SUMMARIES:

Excerpt 1. -- 12 October 1939, Polish Ambassador Finds Japanese Anti-German.

Visit by Grew to Mr. de Romer, Ambassador of New Polish Government, where he was informed recognition by U.S. had influenced recognition by Japan. de Romer credited Grew's influence with keeping Japan out of a Military Alliance with Germany to that time (12 Oct. 1939), and said that Japanese were more than ever eager for friendship with United States; that except for a small group the Japanese were now intensely anti-German.

DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206E-(1) through-(20) except 206E-(11).

Excerpt 2 -- 15 October 1939. Proposed Speech Before America-Japan Society.

Upon learning that Japanese Cabinet and its backers, Hiranuma and Prince Konojo, were anxious to improve relations with U.S., Grew decides against original draft, but not to minimize American resentment against actions of Japanese Army in China, and to avoid seemingly going to the public over the heads of the Japanese Government.

Excerpt 3 -- No date. "The New Order in East Asia".

Says American Government and people understand it to mean security, stability, and progress, which Americans desire, but it has also appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed.

Excerpt 4 -- 19 October 1939. Background of Historic Address Before America-Japan Society.

In memorandum describing background Grew recognizes American public demand for an embargo against Japan and attitude of Administration not to allow American interests to be crowded out of China. Also realizes a policy of sanctions may lead to war. However, U.S. position in Far East regarded as important factor in its position in world affairs, and the President and Secretary of State are determined to support that position.

Takes position that facts should be given Japanese people regarding depredations against Americans and American interests by Japanese military in China, and that U.S. will not "back down" from its Far East policy. Also sees necessity of getting this to the military through influential people.

Describes repercussions from speech, being accused of "arrogance, impertinence, and surprising lack of diplomatic propriety".

DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206E-(1) through -(20) except 206E-(11).

Excerpt 5 -- 25 October 1939. Results of "Speech-making Speech"

Grow informed by Japanese friends that Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, and others who had studied speech would form a team to "keep the ball rolling"; that such men believed the time had come to start improving U.S. - Japanese relations.

Excerpt 6 -- 1 November 1939. Necessity for Prompt Action.

Speech is released to Japanese press at request of Foreign Office. Grow sees necessity of getting results promptly by both negative (cessation of bombings, etc.) and positive (opening Yangtze to foreign trade) steps. Otherwise he sees imposition of embargo, to the downhill movement of relations.

Excerpt 7 -- 1 December 1939. Lack of Statesmanship.

Says the Japanese Government is weak and "floundering" for lack of strong statesmanship. Most Japanese want good relations with U.S., but are not grasping the power and taking measures to bring them about. Future outlook does not appear bright.

Excerpt 8 -- U.S. and Nine-Power Treaty. No date.

Mentions solemn commitment of U.S., by Nine-Power Treaty to uphold (a) territorial and administrative integrity of China and (b) the Open Door.

Excerpt 9 -- No date. Japanese Inflation

Mentions inflationary movement reflected in slower absorption of government bonds, large increase in paper currency, mounting commodity prices, and attempt to control prices.

Excerpt 10 -- No date. Effect of American Embargo.

Does not believe economic pressure from without alone can defeat Japan. Psychological factors to be considered.

DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206E-(1) through -(20) except 206E-(11)

Excerpt 12 -- No date. Isolation of Japan by Sanctions

Answering arguments that Japan should be brought to terms through isolation and reduced to a second or third-class power to curtail her Pacific expansion, Grew favors the exhaustion of diplomacy, before imposing sanctions which enforced would lead to war.

Excerpt 13 -- 4, 18, 22 December 1939. Conversations with Foreign Minister Nomura Re Japanese-American Relations.

Account of three conversations with Nomura in December, 1939. Nomura gave categorical assurances that American impression that Japan was attempting to expel American interests from China was erroneous, that incidents complained of were "accidents" due to gigantic military operations, and that commercial limitations (monopolies) were temporary.

A long list of questions pending settlement was discussed, as was the expiration of the treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Opening of the Yangtze river for general navigation as far as Nanking was assured.

Nomura stated that "we" must prevent spread of European War to Far East.

Excerpt 14 -- 14 January 1940. Formation of Yonai Cabinet.

Yonai forms new Cabinet with Arita as Foreign Minister. Yonai was the man who had blocked military alliance with Germany in the spring (1939).

Excerpt 15 -- 18 January 1940. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

On assumption of Foreign Office duties Arita discussed with Grew the status of the "treaty merchants", hoping to enlist his support for a continuation of the treaty status. Grew contacted Washington and it was referred back to Tokyo.

DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206F-(1) through -(20) except 206E-(11)

Excerpt 16 -- 23 January 1930. British Cruiser Takes 21 Germans off Japanese Ships.

Incident of British Cruiser stopping Asama Maru and taking off 21 Germans liable to naval service in Germany, just off coast of Japan, and explanatory statement of British Ambassador, excite Japanese people and press to high pitch.

Excerpt 17 -- 10 April 1940.

Grew comes to conclusion that the futility of the China campaign is coming home to the majority of thinking Japanese. He bases this on (a) statements of an influential Japanese publicist, who had been vitriolic in denunciation of U.S., and Great Britain, that he believed Mr. Hull's views were right and Japan was wrong, and (b) that Japan should deal direct with Chiang Kai-shek, permit mediation of third powers, and define "New Order in East Asia".

He expresses his views against sanctions and supports them with viewpoint of other Americans, pointing out at length the possible war which might result, as against a solution by allowing time to solve the problem.

Excerpt 18 -- 26 April 1940. Discussions with Foreign Minister ARITA

In conversation with Foreign Minister ARITA both agree that continued conferences on a new commercial treaty would be futile.

They discuss the continued and aggravated bombings and indignities against American nationals and interests, with the usual results of hopes and promises.

Arita urged Grew not to take his anticipated leave to U.S., as it might create impression of diplomatic breach.

Excerpt 19 -- 1 May 1940. Netherlands East Indies Issue.

It is believed a German circulated reports in neutral capitals that U.S. contemplated taking Netherlands East Indies over in event Germany invaded Holland. Arita made official statement 15 April that Japan wanted no change in the status quo of these islands. Mr. Hull made statement that "we are also interested in the fate of the islands", putting U.S. squarely on record.

DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206E-(1) through -(20) except 206E-(11)

Excerpt 20 -- 10 June 1940. Hypothetical Loss of British Fleet

Says from now on future calculations must be based on hypothetical loss of British fleet. Roosevelt knows it and he believes Wilkie does.

not used

THE BACKGROUND OF A HISTORIC ADDRESS

October 19, 1939

The background of the speech is described in the following memorandum which I gave to Doonan, Creswell, and Smith-Hutton after my return to Tokyo:

During my stay in the United States American public opinion was steadily hardening against Japan. The denunciation of the Treaty of 1911 was almost universally approved and there is an almost universal demand for an embargo against Japan next winter. The present attitude of the administration is that we will not allow American interests to be crowded out of China. If Japan retaliates against an American embargo, there is every probability that our Government will counter-retaliate in some form or other.

I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably lead to eventual war. There is, however, no sign whatever of weakness in the administration's attitude now or in the attitude of the public. The President and the Secretary of State seem determined to support our position in the Far East. The fall naval maneuvers are to take place in Hawaiian waters. There has been talk of landing further American marines in Shanghai, but such a step, just before I left Washington, was held in abeyance. There can be little doubt, however, that if the Japanese military in China continue their depredations against Americans and American interests, and if they progressively take measures to drive them out of China, our Government will take retaliatory measures regardless of the eventual outcome, and the administration will be supported by the great majority of the American public. Very little is now heard of the wisdom of folding our tents and withdrawing gracefully from a possibly untenable position. Our position in the Far East is regarded as an important factor in our position in world affairs at large and not at all as an isolated problem.

Having in mind this attitude of the American Government and people, we must reach the inevitable conclusion that the time for exclusive reliance on the good will and efforts of the Japanese Government, as contrasted with the Japanese military, is past. Hitherto we in the Embassy have aimed to follow, as far as reasonable, a policy of avoiding words or actions which might tend to irritate the military. In view of the determined attitude of the American Government and people, I believe that more is now to be gained by discreetly conveying this present attitude to the Japanese Government and people in order to offset the prevailing feeling in Japan (at least prevailing before my departure in May) that in the last analysis the United States will back down. I do not now think that we will back down, and I believe that the efforts of the Embassy should now be directed toward letting that fact gradually penetrate to the Japanese consciousness. Only danger, and no good, can come from leaving the Japanese under a misapprehension on that score. But these efforts of the Embassy will have to be carried out with discretion.

During the past summer the Department of State was seriously considering writing another strong note to Japan, but Mr. Dooman advised against it and I supported him, on the ground that such a note would do no practical good and would merely anger the military, and that the record of our position was already complete. I did, however, take the position that something should be done to bring before the Japanese people the facts regarding the depredations against Americans and American interests by the Japanese military in China.

Those facts, so far as I am aware, are not generally known even by influential Japanese, who are therefore inclined to regard American opposition to Japan and Japanese policy, and to "the new order in East Asia," as arbitrarily based on what they consider to be obsolete legal technicalities on the one hand and a traditional sympathy for China on the other. If any movement is to be started by influential Japanese to restrain the military in their efforts to force American interests out of China (I have in mind, for instance, the members of the Privy Council, who presumably are influential),

those Japanese must first become aware of the determined attitude of the American Government and public and the facts on which that attitude is based. As long as misapprehension on those points continues to exist, we can hardly expect constructive steps to be taken to improve our relations. It is, of course, questionable whether any constructive steps or effective steps can be taken to curb the military, but we must not let that desideratum go by default.

There must be no tone of threat in our attitude. To threaten the Japanese is merely to increase their own determination. The attitude of the American Government and people must be presented merely as a patent fact which exists and should therefore be given full weight in formulating Japanese policy.

It therefore seemed to me, and the President and the Department concurred, that in my initial address to the America-Japan Society on returning to Tokyo, an effort should be made to get across to the Japanese the real feeling in the United States and the facts on which that feeling is based. The fact that I shall merely be reporting my observations in the United States during the past four months will lend particular force to this opportunity, and I believe that full advantage should be taken of it. Later speeches will not have this advantage. My thought is to present, in as friendly a manner as possible, the points which the Department had intended to include in its proposed but eventually abandoned note. The America-Japan Society is about the only forum that we possess. My speech would be fairly widely discussed and if published at least in the Japan Advertiser would come to the attention of a considerable element of influential Japanese both in the Government and out of it. Any complaint that I was going to the Japanese public over the heads of the Japanese Government could be met by the fact that prominent Japanese have in times past used the Society to present the Japanese point of view (cf. Viscount Ishii's speech at the initial dinner after our arrival in Japan in 1932) and that I can properly claim an equal privilege.

After the speech was made, some of the American newspaper correspondents were using such terms as "dumfounded," "astounded," etc., in describing the reaction of the audience. As a matter of fact, only Thompson of the United Press was present and he scooped all the others, who had expected the usual diplomatic platitudes, but Morin of the A.P. and Hugh Byas very quickly began to receive calls from New York for voluminous reports. The Japanese press reacted just as I had expected, some of the papers accusing me of arrogance, impertinence, and surprising lack of diplomatic propriety. The general trend was that in spite of what I said, the American people simply don't know the facts and have construed a few unintentional "accidents" into wholesale depredations. Also that we still don't understand the "New Order in East Asia." But a few of the papers, notably the Yomiuri, which in the beginning had castigated me personally for arrogance, eventually were courageous enough to intimate in veiled language that there might be some merit in the American point of view and that it should be carefully examined. Such attitudes here are generally regarded as sheer heresy, but they showed that the inoculation was "taking."

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 294-297

not used

D LF .LOC # 2 06-E (4)

編輯部文書第二〇六號一E (4)

私の歴史的演説の背景

一九三九年一〇月一九日

この演説の背景については次の覺悟の中に述べておいた。これは私が東京へ歸つた後ドウーマン、クレズウェル、スミス、ハットンの三名に渡したものである。

私の滯米 中日本に對する米國與論は次第に惡化して行つた。一九一一年の條約の廢棄はほとんどすべての國民の支持を得たのみならず、大多數の國民は來るべき冬に對日經濟封鎖を斷行すべきことを主張してゐる。我が政府の現在の立場は合衆國の支那における利益が斷じて侵されぬやう努力するといふにあつた。

もし合衆國の經濟封鎖に對して日本側が報復するならば、我が政府は必ずや何等かの形においてそれに對し更に報復手段を講ずるであらう。

すでに指摘したごとく、一たび制裁政策にのり出したからには以後

までそれを貫徹せねばならぬ、またかゝる政策がつひには戦争に至るかも知れないといふことも十分覺悟せねばならぬ。しかし現在政府の態度にもまた一般國民の態度にも弱味があるやうなけひは全然見受けられない。大統領も國務長官も共に東洋における我々の立場を支持しようと思つてゐる。この秋にはハワイ水域において海軍の演習が行はれる豫定である。一時は米國海兵隊を上海に増派しようといふ案すらあつたが、これは私がワシントンを去る直前延期となつた。しかしもし日本官報が今後には米人及び米國權益に對するその傷害行為を繼續するならば、また彼等が米人及び米國權益を支那から追出さうとする施策をこれ以上強化するならば、我が政府は必ずや、不慮の結果が生ずるかも知れないことを十分承知の上で所乎たる報復手段に出るであらうし、また政府のかゝる態度は米國國民の大多數の支持を得るであらう。現在では「恐らく見込がないから早くテントをたゝんでおとなしく引上げたほうが利口だ」といふやうな説を口にする者はあまりゐなくなつた。東洋における米國の地位は全世界における米國の地位

を左右する重大な要素であつて、決して他と懸隔のなき孤立した問題で、決してあると考へてはならない。

米國官民のこのやうな態度を念頭におくならぬ。我々は日本外務省を念頭に區別された意味における日本政府の好意のみに米國が轉るべき時期は政府の好すでに過ぎ去つたと結論せざるを得ない。現在實で我々大使館員は何をも得た事によらず日本外務省を刺戟するおそれある言動はできるだけこれをさへおそれける方針をとつてきたつもりである。しかし米國官民の所掌たる態度である。に鑑みるならば、今のうちにこの米國側の現在の態度を徹底的な方法である。日本官民に傳へ、それによつて「米國はこゝろがあくまでがねばれば」「米國最後には結局折れて出るだらう」といふ日本人の世間の多少の私心がいかに五月に日本を去つた當時においてはがういふ見方が支配的であつたといはる。氣持をくつがえすやうにしたほうがはるかに効果的である。私は信ずる。うが代

私は米國が折れて出ようとは考へない。従つてこれからの大使館の努力はこのことを次第に日本人に感服させるやうな方向にむけられるべきである。この點に關する日本人の誤解をそのまゝに正覺しておくならば、危険こそあれ、何の益もないであらう。しかし勿論大使館側のかゝる努力は慎重に行はねばならぬ。

今年の夏、國務省當局は日本に對しもう一つ強硬な舉動を遂ることを見計してゐたが、ドウーマン氏はこれに反對した。私もかゝる舉動は何等の實益なく却つて日本軍部を刺激するのみであること、またかゝることをせずとも合衆國の地位の根柢はすでに完全であるとの理由のもとに同氏の意見を支持した。

しかしその際私は日本軍部の在又不在に米國利益に對する侵奪行為事實を日本人に認識せしめるために何等かの方策を講じなければならぬと主張した。

これらの侵奪事實は少くとも私の知る限りでは日本の専断の人々の間にも一般には知られてゐない。従つてこれらの日本人は日本、日本

の政策並に所謂「東亞新秩序」に對する合衆國の反對が、陳腐な法技術論と合衆國の傳統的親支傾向との所産であると誤解しがちである。もし米露利益を支部から排斥しようとする支部の計畫を制止する運動が勢力ある日本人へ對へば極端に同官などは悉く勢力があると思ふのでさういふ人のことを實際にやいていつてゐるのであるが、これによつて起されることを望ましいならば、これらの日本人がまづ何よりも米露官民の所乎する態度並にかゝる態度の根柢たる諸事實を認識することが先決問題である。かゝる兩面に関する誤解が一掃されないかぎり、米露間の關係を良好ならしめるやうな建設的な方策をとることは不可能であらう勿論果して早急を制止するに足る建設的な有効な方策をとることが可能か否かは問題であるが、さればといつて片手傍観して目撃を待たずとすることは許されない。

吾々の態度に威嚇的なものがあつては絶対にならない。日本人を威嚇することは唯彼等の決心を固めさせるのみである。米國政府及人民の態度は唯現存の嚴たる事實であつてこれによつて日本の政策決定に當つて十分に考慮さるべきものとして示されなくてはならぬ。それが故私が米日協會に於て東京に歸つて初めてなす演説に於ては先づ日本人に米國の眞の氣持及その由つて來る所以を知らしめる努力が爲されねばならぬと思つたのであつてこれには大統領及本省も同意であつた。私が過去四ヶ月間の米國に於ける觀察を唯報告して居るのみであると言ふ事實は私の話に特別の力を與へるであらう。また私はこれを充分に利用せねばならぬと信ずる。後になつてする話ばかり、る利益を有ち得ぬであらう。私の考へでは能ふ限り友誼的な態度で本省が日本に送らんとして遂に取止めとした公文に載せんとした諸點を示す積である。米日協會は殆んど現在吾々に囑された唯一の討論所たらんとしてゐる。私の演説は恐らく可成廣く討論せられるであらう。そしてもし少くともジャバン、アドヴァタイザー

に掲載されるならば、政府及在野の日本人有力の者の大部分の注意を喚起するであらう。私が日本政府を差し置いて日本民衆に働きかけたと謂ふ非難に對しては過去に於て時に日本の高官が本協會を日本の見解の發表の用に供したことを以て（一九三二年吾々が日本に到着後最初の正餐に於ける石井子爵の演説を考へよ、私も亦同様の特權を世當に要求し得るとして反駁出來るであらう

演説後アメリカ新聞記者連の中には驕傲の反應を表はすに、示され返へつたとか、呵然とした、と云つた様な言葉を以てした。實際には、V、P通信社のトンプソンが一人出席して居つただけであつた。そして、彼は極めて當り障りのない外交儀禮的言辭を予期してゐた他の連中に先んじて、速ち早く特報を報じたのであつたが、時を移さずA・P通信のモリン、及びヒューバース氏等も紐育から詳細な記事を送るやうにとの照會電に接し始めたのである。日本側諸紙に表れた反撥も私の予期せる通りで、中には私を非難して傲慢とか不作法とか驚くべき外交的儀禮の缺如せるもの等と述べたものもあつた。一般國民の論調は、私の言にも拘らず、米國民は事實を認識せず、二三の偶然の出來事を取り上げて全面的な荒掠行爲であると解釋してゐるに過ぎぬと云ふに在つた。あまつさへ、米國側は尙も、東亞新秩序の何たるかを理解していないと考へてゐるやうであつた。然し二三の新聞紙特に讀賣の如きは、最初は、私一個の傲慢さを詰評して居つたのであるが、遂には、勇敢にもあからざるにはなかつたが、米國側の見解にも尤もなる點のあり得べきこと並びに夫に對しては慎重検討のなかるべき旨を報じたのであつた。

右の様な態度は一時的には全くに異端の立場と目されて居るのであるが、夫
にも拘らず我が所次教目を衰はしつつあることの體左に外ならない。

・日本滞在十ヶ年・と題する前
駐日大使グルー氏日記よりの
拔萃

二九四 一 二九七頁

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AMERICA'S ALTERNATIVES IN ITS RELATIONS
TOWARD JAPAN

December 1, 1939

A Japanese recently remarked that what Japan most needs at present is a statesman of the caliber of Prince Ito. No such figure, alas, has emerged nor is likely to emerge, and through lack of strong statesmanship Japan is bound to suffer. The Government is weak and is "floundering." Yet to control and unify the heterogeneous forces in Japan today would require a statesman of almost superhuman ability.

The crux of Japanese-American relations lies in the fact that while the Government is prone to give us soothing assurances, no individual or group in Japan is strong enough to bring about the full implementation of those assurances. There is little doubt that the great majority of Japanese, both in the Government and out of it, who know anything about foreign relationships want good relations with the United States, but they have yet to grasp securely the power of directing policy and taking measures in the effective way which alone can bring about good relations. International relations cannot thrive on mere pious expressions of intention. I have told them this, and am steadily continuing so to tell them, but it does little good. The outlook for the future relations between the United States and Japan does not now appear to be bright.

It is this outlook that now requires our most careful study and concern.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 299 and 300

not used.

Two Main Desiderata

* * * * *

The United States is solemnly (to use that somewhat overworked Wilsonian term) committed to uphold the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty, primarily to uphold the territorial and administrative integrity of China and the Open Door. Therein lies the point of principle.

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Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 300 and 301

not used

Can Japan Be Defeated?

* * * * *

I have already drawn attention to the beginning of an inflationary movement in this country, and I shall later discuss the further development of this movement as reflected in slower absorption of government bonds, a large increase in the paper currency, and mounting commodity prices, along with far-reaching measures designed to control prices. Attempts to control the supply and demand of rice are causing wide agrarian unrest.

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Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 301

Not used

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Defense Document 206-E (10)

Can Japan Be Defeated?

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* * * The majority opinion in the Embassy, which I myself share, does not believe that an American embargo, even if it covered all American exportation and importation to and from Japan, would bring about such a debacle as would cause the Japanese to relinquish their program in China.

Statisticians have proved to their own satisfaction, and will continue so to prove, that Japan can be defeated by economic pressure from without. But the statisticians generally fail to include psychological factors in their estimates.

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Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 301 and 302

not used

Is an Isolated Japan Desirable?

The argument is often advanced that Japan should and can be brought to terms through isolation. The corollary is furthermore advanced that unless isolated and reduced by economic and financial attrition to the rank of a second- or third-class power, it is only a question of time before Japan continues her continental and overseas expansion, involving the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and other Western possessions in the Far East; that the time to restrain her expansion is now.

With regard to this thesis, I raise the following considerations. The resort to methods calculated to bring about the isolation of delinquent nations must presuppose in the final analysis the use of force. Sanctions commenced but not carried through bring in their wake a loss of prestige and influence to the nation declaring them. Sanctions carried through to the end may lead to war. This statement seems to me to be axiomatic and hardly open to controversy. In my view, the use of force, except in defense of a nation's sovereignty, can only constitute an admission of a lack, first of good will and, second, of resourceful, imaginative, constructive statesmanship. To those who hold, with regard to the specific situation with which we are dealing, that it is not enough for good will and statesmanship to exist only on one side, my rejoinder would be that these factors exist also in Japan, albeit in latent form until now, and that one of the functions of diplomacy is to bring these factors into full vigor. Shidehare diplomacy has existed; it can exist again.

There will be time enough to speak of sanctions when the resources of diplomacy shall have been exhausted. At the moment of this writing, those resources have not yet been exhausted. By nature not a defeatist, I believe that those resources may yet win the day.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 304 and 305

not used

THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER NOMURA

December 4, 1939

The Foreign Minister, Admiral Nomura, asked me to call on him in his official residence at 2:30 today. Having been closeted with the Prime Minister, he came fifteen minutes late, very apologetic for the delay. The interview lasted for one hour and a half.

The Minister said that he was glad to resume our talks, the last of which had occurred on November 4, and that he was sorry for the delay in continuing them. He said that he had carefully studied the statements which I had made at our last meeting as well as the documents left with him. He considered very valuable the suggestions which I have made to him with regard to the importance of furnishing direct evidence of the intention of the Japanese authorities to put an end to the bombings of American property, the insults to American citizens, and the encroachments on American commercial activities in China which must be removed. Admiral Nomura realizes that the impression exists in the United States that these various acts have been deliberate and that there is an intention on the part of the Japanese authorities to expel American interests from China. He wanted to give me categorical assurances that such an impression is a misunderstanding and contrary to fact. Military operations on an unprecedentedly gigantic scale over extensive areas are going on in China and all of the incidents and cases of which we have complained have been accidents. The Japanese forces have been ordered to pay every possible attention in their power to protect and respect American property and citizens in China. The Minister said that he had discussed this matter with his competent colleagues in the cabinet and he could tell me as a fact that the personnel of the military commands in China has been so arranged as to ensure this protection and respect.

Admiral Nomura went on to say that such limitations to the commercial activities of Americans in China as have occurred are a result of the military

operations, including control of the occupied areas, such operations not being consonant with the peaceful enjoyment of ordinary commercial rights. These limitations are, however, exceptional and temporary and our rights will be restored when peace comes. It will only lead to misunderstanding and confusion to generalize and to forecast future conditions on the basis of these temporary circumstances.

At this point I mentioned some of the different ways in which American commercial rights and interests were being injured, including the setting up of monopolies which ruined the business of various American interests. It seemed to me difficult to explain these monopolies and other restrictions as due to military necessity. The Minister said that in wartime it became necessary to control commodities and that the monopolies and other handicaps could be explained on this basis. I countered, however, with the observation that many of these measures gave the American Government and people the impression that they were intended to be permanent and that I would welcome concrete evidence to the contrary.

Admiral Nomura repeated the assurances given me by his predecessors that the Japanese forces in China have not the slightest intention to drive out American interests and that they have the strictest orders to the contrary. He said that our commercial problems in China should be dealt with both in Tokyo and in the field and he requested that American officials in the field should keep in close touch with local Japanese officials.

Admiral Nomura said that the cases both of bombings of American property and insults to American citizens were decreasing. In Pakhoi and Kanning, for instance, he has heard of no damage to any American property in that area. Constructive measures were also being taken to facilitate American commerce, as in the case of shipments of food oil from Hankow and of lace and drapery from Swatow. The Minister was thus in a position, he said, to point out that possible measures were being taken in line with the valuable suggestions which I had made at our last meeting. He appreciated my honest desire to improve relations and by way of reciprocating this attitude he was now studying with the proper authorities such measures as could properly be taken.

Admiral Nomura expressed the regret that while he and I were making joint efforts to improve relations these efforts were being injured by the sometimes too-liberal expressions of opinion by important people in the United States, including statements with regard to a possible embargo against Japan.

At this point I called his attention to the freedom of the American press and of public discussion. I said that experience had taught us that measures to control the utterances of the press or of individuals often defeated their own object by causing an intensification of those utterances. I added that the public statements of individuals outside the Government, even though these individuals might be in close touch with the Government, did not necessarily represent the Government's views. The Minister smilingly observed that the same situation, especially with regard to the press, obtained also in Japan.

The Minister then said that he desired to present certain figures to meet some of my representations in our last conference and my concrete proposals for the settlement of pending questions. He said that the list of cases which I had presented to him had been carefully analyzed and a resume drawn up on the basis of available documents. He thereupon handed me an informal document in Japanese which he thought I would probably wish to have translated and he read to me the following resume:

A. Representations acknowledged or answered	179
B. Representations not acknowledged or answered	203
(1) No acknowledgment or reply required	22
(2) Not acknowledged but the contents dealt with by communication to the appropriate officials in China	27
(3) Not answered but settled locally or dealt with	8
(4) Investigations still going on but not yet answered	110
(5) Miscellaneous	36

Admiral Nomura expressed regret that some of our representations had not been acknowledged or answered, owing to clerical oversight, but he assured me that all of our representations were receiving attention and that the competent officials were seeking solutions.

Some cases had been settled or were about to be settled, and they amounted to thirty-nine in all. In these cases the investigations had been completed and the Japanese officials were in touch with our own officials in Shanghai, trying to find solutions. The Minister said that Mr. Yoshizawa would explain either to Mr. Dooman or to me the details of the informal document which he had handed to me and would also be glad at all times to discuss pending questions. He said he thought it would be well for us to have periodical and frequent talks with Mr. Yoshizawa and he recommended that the officials of the Foreign Office and the Embassy constitute themselves as a sort of permanent committee to deal with these pending matters. Thus, speedy settlement of these questions could be made or agreement reached as to how to solve them and this should lead to more stable relations between Japan and the United States.

The Minister alluded to the press reports that there are over six hundred cases awaiting solution. Such incorrect reports mislead the public and injure our relations. He thought it would be useful to publish the actual facts and suggested that Mr. Yoshizawa get in touch with us with that end in view.

The Minister then said he would now like to talk "off the record." With regard to our treaty of commerce and navigation he said that "even if the treaty expires, I hope that relations may be maintained in a normal way and that there will be no cause for the people of both countries to get excited about." Japan's trade with the United States represents a very large percentage of Japan's entire trade, and if commerce with the United States should be impaired Japan would obviously have to seek other commercial channels.

As this seemed to me to contain an implied threat and as I felt it might also be interpreted as an indirect move to open negotiations for a new treaty or for a modus vivendi, I read to the Minister a close paraphrase of Secretary Hull's remarks to the Japanese Ambassador on November 24, emphasizing the considerations contained in the last paragraph to the effect that the American Government did not feel it incumbent upon itself to take the initiative in proposing practical measures for removing the obstacles for friendly relations between the two countries.

I then took up with the Minister the following matters:

1. Further attack on August 1 on the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungpoh, Honan (Nyhus case).
2. Interference with the property of the Catholic Mission at Sinsiang.
3. I read to the Minister the pertinent parts of Peiping's telegram of October 20 with regard to mob attacks on the Free Methodist Mission at Chenliu.
4. I asked the Minister to give his personal attention and interest to a subject discussed by Mr. Crocker with Mr. Suzuki concerning the setting up in the Embassy of a radio receiving set in order that we might obtain direct information and news bulletins from our Government in Washington. I said that such sets existed in most of our important Foreign Service establishments, Japan being one of the main exceptions; that it was in the interest of both our countries that we should maintain close and rapid communication with Washington, and that while I did not wish to ask permission for establishing such a set in the Embassy (because this was a diplomatic right which we could properly exercise without permission), nevertheless I would prefer to obtain the definite approval of the Foreign Office before proceeding.
5. I told the Minister of the facts concerning the Tucker case and of the widespread interest which the case had aroused in the United States. I said that I had received many telegrams from important people at home

expressing interest in the case and that our Government also took an official interest in it. I said that Mr. Tucker had been released from prison after some six weeks in jail but that he was to be tried within the next two weeks for what I understood was an alleged indiscretion in passing out certain literature not approved in Japan; that the final result of the case would undoubtedly be published in the United States and might have an important effect on the American public as well as on Mr. Tucker's friends. I added that, not wishing to interfere with the normal process of Japanese justice, I had made no formal representations in the case but I wished the Minister to know of the general interest, including official interest, evoked in the United States by the case. The Minister said that it would be very difficult even for him to interfere in this case, which was in the hands of the Department of Justice, and he felt certain that Mr. Tucker would receive full justice.

The following press release was agreed upon: "The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador today continued their talks covering the general field of Japanese-American relations in a mutually constructive spirit."

December 13, 1939

Admiral Nomura asked me to call on him today at the Foreign Office and in a conversation which lasted one hour and a half he read to me, through Mr. Iguchi as interpreter, and then handed to me the pro memoria that I at once conveyed to the Department.

The Minister informed me definitely that the Japanese Government intends to open the Yangtze River to general navigation as far as Nanking "in about two months." The Minister added that for the time being certain restrictions would probably have to be imposed on such navigation owing to the military operations in China.

The Minister definitely proposed a modus vivendi to carry on

Japanese-American commercial relations after the expiration of the present treaty of commerce and navigation and expressed the hope that, as little time is now left before the expiration of the treaty, negotiations for a new treaty could commence shortly, if possible before Christmas. I replied that I had no instructions with regard to this matter and asked if the Minister desired me to communicate this to my Government as a definite proposal from him. He replied in the affirmative.

The Minister also touched on the following points:

1. Our problems were divided by the Minister into "positive" and "negative" categories. I replied that between our two countries there exist certain differences of opinion involving matters of fundamental principle, which as the Minister conceived them might not fall within either of the above-mentioned categories.
2. In my conversation with the Minister on November 4 I do not recall mentioning the possibility of bringing about in the United States "a speedy" reversal of public opinion.
3. After Nomura had completed his statement and I had expressed my own appreciation of the Japanese Government's efforts to improve relations between our two countries, I conveyed to him, informally and fully, as under my Government's instructions, the reaction of the Department to the statements made to me by the Minister on December 4. This included the observation of the Department that it feels that the efforts of the authorities of Japan thus far have little more than "touched the fringe of the problem."
4. With regard to the two "companies" and monopolies Nomura said that it had become necessary to set up "economic blocs" among Manchukuo, Japan, and China in order to overcome difficulties in questions of national defense. But he declared that Japan has no intention of excluding other countries and is "quite ready to welcome foreign capital." When I asked the Minister "On a non-discriminatory Basis?", he replied merely that foreign participation would be welcome in these enterprises.

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5. The Minister observed that with regard to currency questions they "had to finance the Army" but that these discriminations "when the fighting stops and a Government of China is set up will be modified."

6. The Minister said, "off the record," at the end of our conversation that we must prevent, in the interests of both our countries, the war in Europe from spreading to the Far East and that Japanese-American conciliation will be a powerful factor in avoiding such a contingency.

December 22, 1939

In an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening I conveyed to him orally the two separate statements substantially as set forth in two paragraphs from the State Department, dated yesterday. I also quoted the Department's instruction of December 18, which I handed to the Minister in the form of a pro memoria.

Admiral Nomura replied orally in Japanese and the interpreter later handed me the following translation of his remarks:

"The fact that the American Government has decided to take measures to facilitate normal commercial relations even after the termination of the effectiveness of the Japan-America commercial treaty and Your Excellency's efforts in this direction are greatly appreciated. However, the question of the commercial treaty is not limited to the commercial relations between the two countries but does, rather, in many ways relate to the general relations between our two countries. For example, even if commercial relations are maintained on a nearly normal basis without specific agreement, it is impossible to forecast day-to-day conditions in such relations. This is an uncertain prospect. In view of these considerations and looking to the improvement of relations between the United States and Japan from the broad viewpoint, I earnestly request that Your Excellency's Government give very careful consideration to the question of concluding a modus vivendi.

"I may inform Your Excellency that, as Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau, has already communicated to Mr. Doonan, Counselor of Your

Excellency's Embassy, the Japanese Government after careful study of the question from the above viewpoint has prepared a draft modus vivendi and has telegraphed this draft to Ambassador Horinouchi in Washington; and has informed him that he may submit the draft plan to the State Department in Washington at a propitious moment during his conversation there."

In our subsequent conversation I repeatedly made clear that Japan now had to give concrete implementation of its assurances that American rights and legitimate interests in China will be respected on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The following press release was mutually agreed upon in substance and definite assurances were given me that no publicity beyond this release would be given out by the Foreign Office:

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador this afternoon continued their conversations with regard to matters of interest to the two countries. Both the Minister and the Ambassador indicated a mutually helpful attitude toward a solution of the problems under discussion. Progress was made. The conversations will be continued."

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 305-312

not used

Defense Document No. 206-E(14)

ADMIRAL YONAI HEADS A NEW JAPANESE CABINET

January 14, 1940

The cabinet resigned and Admiral Yonai formed a new cabinet with Arita as Foreign Minister and my old friend Fujihara as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Yonai was the man who put the blocks to a military alliance with Germany last spring; I got to know him at the time of the visit of the Astoria with Saito's remains; he dined at our Embassy and I dined with him at the big Navy dinner, after which he told me that I need have no further anxiety about an alliance with Germany.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES
EMBASSADOR GREEN, ENTITLED, "TEN YEARS IN
JAPAN," page 312.

not used

Def Doc # 206 E (14)

Exhibit # _____

辭職側文書第二〇六號一五(一四)

米内海軍大將新内閣ヲ主卒ス

一九四〇年一月十四日

内閣ハ辭職シ米内海軍大將ガ、有田ヲ外務大臣ト、余ノ舊友藤原ヲ商工大臣トシテ新内閣ヲ組織シタ。
米内ハ昨年春、獨乙トノ軍部同盟ニ反對シタ人デアッタ。余ハ齋藤ノ遺骸ヲ持ツテ、アストリア號ガ日本ヲ訪レタ時、彼ヲ治メテ知ツタノデアル。彼ハ我が大使館テ晚餐ヲ共ニシタ事ガアリ、又余モ、海軍大宴會ノ際彼ト食事ヲ共ニシタ。此ノ宴會ノ後テ彼ハ余ニ對シ、獨乙トノ同盟ニ就テハソレ以上ノ憂慮ハ不要デアルト語ツタ。

グルー元合衆國大使ノ「日本ニ於ケル十年間」ト
題スル日記三一二頁ヨリノ抜萃

Defense Document No. 206-2(15)

Not used

ARITA RETURNING TO JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE

January 18, 1940

Arata received the ambassadors individually, on assuming office in succession to Admiral Nomura. He told me that he had instructed Horinouchi to call on Mr. Hull to arrange the status of "treaty merchants" after the expiration of the treaty and he hoped that I would support the matter in order to avoid injury to the nationals of both countries. I merely reported the statement of fact. The Department knows my views. Later the Department cabled that the Japanese Counselor who called on Hornbeck, Horinouchi being ill, was told that the conversations regarding the treaty status should be carried on in Tokyo, so I shall now probably be called by Arata and can only cable his proposals back to Washington. This is something like a game of battledore and shuttlecock, but I think the Department is wise in concentrating the conversations in one place. I spoke to Arata briefly and informally of the unfortunate publicity in Tokyo which had misled the public into believing that I had given Admiral Nomura assurances that a treatyless situation would not arise. Now, however the situation is being presented by the press in its proper perspective.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR CLEGG,
ENTITLED, "TEN YEARS IN JAPAN," pages 312-313

Ref. Doc. 206-1(27)

not used

That is the new setup. How it will perform in actual practice remains to be seen. In all probability Prince Konoye, reflecting the presumable attitude of the Emperor and the elder statesmen, will exert reasonable control over the "wild men" and will endeavor to move slowly and with some degree of caution, at least until it becomes clear whether Great Britain is going to win or lose the war. * *

* * * * *

ENC. DET FROM DAILY OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR GILLES,
BIRMINGHAM, "TEN YEARS IN JAPAN," page 325



Not Used

辯護側文書二〇六一(二七)

それが新態勢である。それが實際上如何なる役割を果すかは今後に見るべきである。

天皇及び元老の態度らしいものを反映して少くとも英國が戦争に勝つか負けるか明らかになる。では近衛公は恐らく「無茶な人々」を相手に制禦し徐々にある程度の警戒を以て行いしように努めると見てよからう。

「満日十年」と題する前米國大使の日記

三二五頁抜萃



Not Used

August 1, 1940

Among the photostats of interesting clippings from the American press received from the Department in the last pouch I note that with one exception these editorials and articles oppose a policy of "appeasing" Japan, and that the single exception is an editorial in the New York Daily News, whose arguments are presented by the "China Information Service" merely as a target to shoot at. It is therefore amply clear, if these clippings represent a fair cross section of the American press and of American opinion, that not many voices are being heard in favor of trying to "appease" Japan. The feeling appears from these clippings to be nearly unanimously the other way.

"Appeasement" has acquired since Munich a connotation which should forever bar the word from the vocabulary of good statesmanship. The attitude for which it stands is one from which I utterly and conclusively disassociate myself. That term connotes defeatism. The recommendations which I have made at various times during the past three years were calculated--if acted upon--to avoid need or occasion for the use of "appeasement" in any phase of our relations with Japan. The point which has possibly been overlooked by those who share the views described in these clippings is that, in the situation now existing, "appeasement" would be as distasteful to Japan as it would be to the United States. Our series of

Def.Doc. 206-B(28) - continued

telegrams on Japanese press comment has not overlooked emphatic statements to the effect that Japan will not respond to proposals for adjustment of relations which the United States may make on grounds of expediency or other considerations growing out of the impact on the United States of the military situation in Europe. I have before me an editorial which, commenting on the question put by Sir Robert Craigie to Mr. Matsuo whether Great Britain can expect to improve her relations with Japan, states:

"We know that British desires for improved relations with Japan are inspired only by British military defeats in Europe and we cannot expect that approaches in such circumstances to Japan for improvement of relations will be entertained."

After reading these clippings, which I assume are a fair cross section of the American papers, I have the impression that the American press and therefore the American public do not differentiate between "appeasement" and that form of adjustment of mutual problems which should not be beyond the wit and good will of men to bring about consistently with our honor, our interests, and our obligation to third countries.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
GARY, ENTITLED, "THE U.S. IN JAPAN," pages
325-326

Not used

JAPAN BECOMES A FULL-FLEDGED AXIS PARTNER

October 1, 1940

* * * * *

The opinion has been expressed that were sanctions to be imposed by us, they would have the effect of setting relations between Japan and the United States on a downward trend. Our recently initiated program of national defense, it is true, at present justifies steps not necessarily coming within the purview of out-and-out sanctions. We must keep in mind, however, the likelihood that export embargoes of a drastic nature on products so important as petroleum -- which are known to be possessed in abundance by the United States -- would be viewed by the Government and people of Japan as imperfectly disguised sanctions, which might, and probably would, cause some sort of retaliatory steps. * * *

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October

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew, entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 336



not used

MATSUOKA TALKS FOR TWO HOURS AND A QUARTER

October 5, 1940

I called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka today at his invitation, and we talked, for the most part informally and off the record, for two and a quarter hours. As usual Mr. Matsuoka did about ninety-five per cent of the talking because his continuous monologues can be broken only by forceful intrusion. Although from time to time he brings up points of marked interest, his volubility flows on by the hour with little or no punctuation, and his discourses are therefore difficult to chronicle.

On this occasion Mr. Matsuoka's main thesis was that the present world situation results logically from the clash between tradition and the machine age. Only once during the conversation were heated words evoked, and those came from me when the Minister attempted to justify, on the ground of imperative necessity, national expansion by war, especially in the case of Germany. I had, as I pointed out, personally known the old Germany when within its own boundaries it was a happy, contented country, progressive and prosperous. The action of Germany's present leaders in grinding her weaker neighbors into the dust to satisfy their own megalomaniac ambitions could not possibly be condoned on the ground of necessity: to try to do so was utterly preposterous. In the case of Japan, I personally appreciated her economic needs. Japan's relations with the United States have not, however, been brought to their present deplorable pass by the reasonable urge of those needs, but rather by the employment of methods of force in following that urge instead of the methods envisaged in Mr. Hull's logical and practical plans for following orderly processes in the solution of economic troubles. At that point Mr. Matsuoka characterized the Anglo-Saxon countries as smugly convinced that they are right in everything they do and intransigently unwilling ever to acknowledge themselves in the wrong. On that point I said that I had never yet found a Japanese willing to acknowledge the patent fact that Japan had violated the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which Mr. Matsuoka to my surprise said

that he was perfectly willing to admit that fact to me but he added naively that of course he could not do so politically as he had been urged to do before the League of Nations.

The Minister said that he had retired from public affairs for a long time and had thrice refused posts in the last Konoye cabinet, but that he had finally been led by his intensive pondering on the sorry state of his country to urge Prince Konoye to emerge again, as he felt that Konoye was the only person who could rescue Japan from impending revolution and chaos. Konoye was no longer the vacillating politician of his former premiership but an entirely different person, inflexibly determined to save his country, where even now revolution threatens. In answer to my question as to what kind of revolution he feared, Mr. Matsuka replied, "political, economic, and social revolution," and expressed his feeling that the danger was by no means past. He then discussed at some length the vacillation and weakness of the former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Matsuka said that now the alliance with Germany and Italy was consummated and off his mind, he intends to get to work immediately and do all that he can to clear up the accumulation of American complaints which I had presented to him. It had been a sine qua non of his taking office that he was to direct Japan's foreign relations, and he says he does not propose to let the military, particularly the hotheaded younger officers, dictate to him.

In the course of his talk the Minister said that Japan has no intention of driving the interests of other nations out of East Asia, but welcomes their co-operation in the development of the New Order. I immediately took him up on this point and said I was delighted to hear him say what he had. As I had clearly indicated in former talks, however, the fact of the matter is that many legitimate American interests built up through generations have already been driven out of Japan, and that the process goes on apace. Mr. Matsuka's reply was, as usual, that as soon as the hostilities in China are terminated and Chiang Kai-shek is defeated, these questions will

be solved. He also expressed his usual appeal that the United States should cease giving aid to Chiang. Also as usual, I repeated the American position relating to that question.

When I was just about to leave, the Minister earnestly requested me to urge that my Government impose on further embargoes against Japan. He said that such embargoes "would not seriously handicap us" but would intensely anger the Japanese people. He added that the thought of war between Japan and the United States made him shudder. (I believe that Mr. Matsuoka is right as to the immediate effect of such embargoes as contrasted with their longterm effect.)

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 344 and 345

not used

Def, Doc, No206-E(41)

松岡二時間十五分に互り語る

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月五日

余は招かれて本日松岡外相を訪問の上二時間と十五分に互り大体非公式に打解けて語り合つた。例により會談の九割五分は松岡氏が語したがこれは彼が獨りで話し續けるのを止めんとすれば無理に口喙を容れなければならぬからである。彼は時折興味ある話題を取上げはするものの、彼の能辯には殆んど句切がないので彼の談話を記録する事は困難である。此際の松岡氏の主論は世界の現狀は論理的には傳統と機械化時代との衝突より發生せるものであると云ふ事であつた。本會話中激昂した言葉が只の一處發せられた而も其言葉は外相が一体國家は緊急必要の場合には殊に獨逸に於けるが如く戦争に依ると云ふ様な事を正當化せんと試みた時に余の口から發せられたものであつた。已に指摘した様に余は獨逸は

Ref Hoc # 206 E (41)

其國境内に在る時は幸福な、満足した國であり進歩的で而も繁榮して居た事を個人として克く承知して居るのであるが、獨逸現代の指導者等が己が氣狂ひじみた野心を充たす爲めに弱小な近隣諸國を蹂躪しつつある共行動は單に必要だからと云ふ理由で許さるべきものではない。強ひて斯る行動を爲すことはたいそれた事である。日本に關しては余は其經濟的要求を認める、日米關係が今日の如き忌むべき狀勢となつたのは夫れ等の要求の合理的な追求の故ではなく、經濟紛争解決の爲採るべき順序ある手段として折角ハルが考へ及んだ處の合理的にして實際的な方法に據らず却つて武力を使用したからに外ならない。此の時松岡氏は一体アングロ、サクソン諸國は自分等の爲す事は何でも正當であると自惚れて居り、彼等が間違つてゐると云ふことは非妥協的に決して認めないとなした。そこで余は日本は九ヶ國條約を侵犯して居るのたが此顯然たる事實を進んで認識せんとする様な日本人が一人でもあるのかと云ふたら松岡氏は自分は此事實を充分に容認する者であると答へて余を驚かした併し彼は國際聯盟でやれと云はれた様に之を政治的に云々する事は到底出

Hef Doc #206 E (41)

來ない事かと附言した。

大臣は永い間公から離れて居り最後の近衛内閣に於て三度閣僚の地位を拒絶した。併し彼は祖國の悲しむべき情勢を深慮し遂に近衛公を促かし再び出馬せしむる事とした夫れは革命と騒亂とが焦眉に迫つて居る日本を救ふには近衛を措いて他に人なしと思つたからた。近衛は彼が以前總理であつた時の様に弱腰な政治家でなく、彼は今日も革命の脅威に暴かれて居る祖國を救ふべく不撓の決意を有し以前の近衛とは全然別人と成つて居る。余は然らば如何なる種類の革命を恐れるやと問ひたるに彼は「政治的、經濟的及社會的の革命」であると答へ此危險は決して去りたるに然らずとの彼の感想を述べた。尋で彼は前外務大臣の優柔不斷さを可なり長々と物語つた。

松岡氏は今や獨伊との同盟も完成したし念頭にないから直ちに仕事に就き余が彼に提出した數々の亞米利加側の抗議を解決する爲全力を注がなくてはならぬと語つたが抑も々々彼が外相の地位に据つたのは日本の外交關係を自ら指導する事が其必須條件であつたのであり而して彼は軍

部殊に血氣^にはやる若い將校等に指圖される様な事は斷じてしないと云ふのである。

會談中外相は日本は他國の利益を東西から驅逐する様な意圖は毛頭ない却つて新秩序發展の爲に彼等の協力を歡迎すると語つた。余は此點に就いて直ちに言葉を挟み余は彼が云つたことと聞いた事を以て欣快に思ふ旨語つた。併し前回の會談に就て云つた様に年數を重ねて確立された多くの亞米利加の權益が已に日本から驅逐され現在でもどしどし行はれてゐる。松岡氏は列に依り支那との戦争が終結し蔣介石が打倒されたら直ちに此等の問題は解決するであらうと回答し又米國は對將援助を止めて呉れと例の通り訴へた。余は之に對し又例の通り本問題に關する米國の地位を繰返し述べた。

辭去に際し大臣は米國政府が此上更に對日通商禁止を施さぬ様に主張されまいと余に熱心に申し出で斯様な通商禁止は日本を益く不利益な地位に置くものでないが日本國民を痛く憤慨させるであらうと語り尙ほ彼は日米戦争の如き考へる丈けでも恐しいことであると附言した。(斯様な

Ref Hor # 206 E (41)

通商禁止は其長期に至る影響と對照して松岡氏が其直接の結果に關し語る處は盡し當れりと余は信ずる。

前米國大使グルー氏「滿日十年」と題する
日記より抜萃

頁三四四及三四五

DEF. DOC. NO. 206-E (41) to(86) inclusive.

SUBJECT : EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR GREW'S "TEN YEARS IN JAPAN"

NOTE : To facilitate handling, all summaries of the documents of this series, being from the Grew Diary, are here grouped on one memo. The page of the Diary and date written are shown over each summary, with a comment on the group following the last item.

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Def. Doc. No. 206-E (41) - 5 Oct. 1940 (pp. 344-345)

Grew gets "off the record" admission from MATSUOKA that Japan had violated Nine-Power Treaty, but that Japan had no intention of driving other nations out of East Asia. He urged that the U. S. cease aid to CHIANG and stated that further embargos against Japan could "anger Japanese people" rather than create any serious handicap.

MATSUOKA says that the Triple Alliance has been consummated and off his mind, but he will do all that he can to clear up the accumulation of American complaints, as he does not propose to let the military dictate Japan's foreign relations.

N. B. This would harm more than help defense.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (42) - 9 Oct. 1940 (pp. 346-347)

Foreign Vice-Minister OHASHI asks explanation of U. S. Government "ordering" American citizens in Far East to evacuate, and also of press reports that U. S. has decided to declare a total embargo against Japan. OHASHI speaks of Japan's desire for peace with the U. S. and that she has no thought of attacking America. It gives Grew the clear impression that MATSUOKA is disturbed by the course of developments in the United States, and that such action is becoming effective.

N. B. Irrelevant unless to prove that such an explanation was refused, linking it up with other proof.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (43) - 22 Oct. 1940 (pp. 347)

Grew reports again hearing that the Emperor and KONOYE were opposed to the Tripartite Pact, that both were forced, the Emperor being told he "might not survive a refusal.

N. B. Irrelevant unless linked up to some issue.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (44) - 7 Nov. 1940 (p. 350)

MATSUOKA informs Grew that he has persuaded Admiral NOMURA to accept the post as Ambassador to Washington, that NOMURA is fundamentally friendly with U. S. and he being an ex-Foreign Minister, Grew knows him well and holds him in high esteem.

N. B. Opinion of character - not in issue.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (45) - 10 Nov. 1940 (pp. 350, 351)

MATSUOKA informally tells Grew that NOMURA had been reluctant about accepting post at Washington fearing he would be making assurances which might later be invalidated.

Mr. Grew tells MATSUOKA that they should read more American press reports and understand American public opinion; also, that Japan's actions in China against our interests will count more than mere assurances.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (46) - 10 Nov. 1940 (pp. 352, 353)

A general description of the elaborate ceremony in Tokyo of the 2600th anniversary of the Japanese Empire. Grew believes, and French Ambassador confirms, that Emperor was pleased and purposely showed his approval of Grew speech. Grew mentions that the text had been approved in Washington.

Def. Doc. 206-E (47) - 25 Nov. 1940 (p. 354)

Grew concludes from reports on good authority, that it was MATSUOKA who engineered Japan's approval of the Tripartite Pact and got the Emperor's okay on the theory that it would avert war with the U. S.

N. B. Facts and conclusion based on hearsay.

Def. Doc. 206-E (48) - 25 Nov. 1940 (p. 354)

Grew reports death of Prince SAIONJI, that he ordered usual respects and telegraphed condolences.

Def. Doc. 206-E (49) - 25 Nov. 1940 (p. 354)

Grew hears of Japanese peace offer to China instigated by Germany, which, if refused, will necessitate their recognizing Wang Ching-wei.

Def. Doc. 206-E (50) - 7 Dec. 1940 (pp. 355-357)

Grew reports that a prominent unnamed Japanese from the element who fear war wishes to go to America with some undisclosed plan to improve relations. Grew believes this to be merely another attempt to have U. S. mediate for peace with CHIANG Kai-shek and to improve current relations. He believes

that this "Mr. Y" lacks proper understanding of our government and people; that his group misunderstands our intentions as they read only Japanese censored news and they are powerless to accomplish anything in Japan.

Grew calls attention to his September 12th telegram urging that despite risk, a policy of firmness is much safer than to pursue a laissez-faire attitude.

N. B. Irrelevant and entirely Grew's opinion.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (51) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 358)

Grew reports that time for appeasement has passed; that we cannot await a British victory, and only by discrediting Jap extremists can we help matters. He believes they are digging in over a far-flung area, that the situation is dangerous, and we must be ready for anything.

Def. Doc. 206-E (52) - 1 Jan. 1941 (pp. 358, 359)

Grew says turning point in the war has come. President Roosevelt's address of December 29, 1940 is thought by Grew to have been a great influence.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (53) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 359)

Mr. Grew quotes part of a letter he wrote to President Roosevelt in which he lists what he believes are the chief factors to settle in the problem of when to have a "showdown" with the Japanese, (1) Britain's chances to win, (2) handicap to British if we enter, and (3) our stage of preparedness.

Def. Doc. 206-E (54) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 359)

Grew despairs over his eight-year endeavor to build enduring relations with Japan now gone. He predicts that Japan will eventually be seriously handicapped by the embargo but will push toward economic self-sufficiency.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (55) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 360)

Grew reports that our retaliation actions are giving grave concern to certain Japanese elements, including MATSUOKA, but that those elements are powerless; also, that the Germans are pushing them to start war with us.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (56) - 1 Jan. 1941 (pp. 360, 361)

Grew warns the danger of following a policy of laissez-faire and restates that without firm action we risk sudden strokes by Japan. That despite internal controversy the totalitarian expansion continues, clothed with righteous slogans.

Def. Doc. 206-E (57) - 21 Jan. 1941 (p. 365)

The President replies to Grew's December 14th letter and agrees with Grew's views and foresees the European conflict as a world conflict. As to hostilities with Japan hindering aid to Britain, he believes that we must first consider the possible hindrance that would result if Japan took the East Indies area. He feels that it is "possible" for us to join in stopping such a move without exceeding our capacity and giving the aid needed. He feels that with our help the British will ultimately win.

Def. Doc. 206-E (58) - 3 Jan. 1941 (p. 365)

Mr. Grew reports on German activities to cause some break in Japanese-American diplomatic relations, their efforts to embroil the two countries, and to propell the advance south. Grew tells of the arguments he uses to draw attention of influential persons, including the Foreign Minister, to the German efforts, and the bad results to expect if continued.

Def. Doc. 206E(59) - 7 Jan. 1941 (p. 366)

Grew refers to editorial in KOKUMIN which warns Japanese that "war between U. S. and Japan will be necessary" because of Britain's imminent collapse and America's expected entrance into European conflict, which will make the Pacific the major battle scene.

Def. Doc. 206-E (60) - 18 Jan. 1941 (p. 366)

Grew reports that at farewell luncheon for NOMURA, MATSUOKA said American-Japanese relations couldn't be worse. He "practically threatened" U. S. with war. Mr. Grew replied that the American people are peace loving, but determined to defend their rights and obligations in the Pacific.

Def. Doc. 206-E (71) - 10 Apr. 1941 (pp. 378, 379)

Grew reports of MATSUOKA's visiting Europe; of his talks with Stalin in which MATSUOKA compared Japanese family life as on a parallel with Communism; of his later telling the German press that he laid the worst ills to Anglo-Saxon domination.

Def. Doc. 206-E (72) - 10 Apr. 1941 (pp. 380, 381)

Grew finds the Japanese domestic situation worse; that HIRANUMA is responsible for the April Cabinet change, bringing in OGURA, TOYODA, and SUZUKI; also, that the Axis sentiment is cooling down a bit.

Def. Doc. 206-E (73) - 15 Apr. 1941 (p. 380)

ISHII is reported to have made a flat denial of the hot

rumor that Japan was to attack Singapore. General ISHIHARA retired, and belief is his advocating such an attack was cause of retirement.

Def. Doc. 206-E (74) - 17 Apr. 1941 (pp. 380, 381)

Grew advises that press comment on Japan's pact with Russia is very guarded since the press was given confidential instructions as to what they could say.

He also reports an increase of German fifth column activity and that the Gestapo is causing real concern, searching out anti-Axis sentiment to aid the Japanese police.

Def. Doc. 206-E (75) - 22 Apr. 1941 (pp. 381-384)

Grew analyzes causes of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: That Japan wanted no trouble at rear if moving south and Russia wanted a free hand to deal with Germany, also that no price had to be paid by Japan.

Def. Doc. 206-E (76) - 22 Apr. 1941 (p. 384)

Grew believes that Germany will attack Russia to get needed grain and oil.

Def. Doc. 206-E (77) - 25 Apr. 1941 (pp. 384, 385)

Grew learns of MATSUOKA's answer to the Black Dragon Society about the Neutrality Pact; that no secret clauses were involved, and that ideal was HAKKO ICHIU, universal peace without exploitation.

Def. Doc. 206-E (78) - 2 May 1941 (p. 385)

Writer thinks that his popular success in concluding the pact with Russia is encouraging MATSUOKA's ambition to become Premier, but the Cabinet is distrusting him more, fearing that he may cause war with U. S.

Def. Doc. 206-E (79) - 15 May 1941 - (pp. 387, 388)

Cleavage between HONDA, Japan's Ambassador to NANKING, and MATSUOKA is observed. Grew believes foreign policy is divided in the Cabinet, as MATSUOKA now supports negotiations with CHIANG Kai-Shek.

Def. Doc. 206-E (80) - 27 May 1941 (pp. 388-392)

Grew relates MATSUOKA's verbal opinion stated in Grew's presence that U. S.'s diplomacy toward Germany is "unmanly, indecent and unreasonable", and that in case of a war between Germany and U. S., Japan would be obliged to fight U. S.

MATSUOKA's apology for the above remarks is for his impropriety. He discloses that if Japan really desires peace with U. S., America's self-defense measures should not be regarded as "aggression" by Japan.

Grew says that MATSUOKA's unorthodox opinion does not necessarily represent the Japanese Government's opinion, but Grew reluctantly expresses doubts about MATSUOKA's intellectual and political honesty.

Def. Doc. 206-E (81) - 22 June 1941 (p. 395)

Grew surprised at sudden news of Germany attacking Russia, but says he predicted it.

Def. Doc. 206-E (82) - 26 June 1941 (p. 396)

Grew attempts to determine what Japan's attitude will be toward the German attack on Russia. MATSUOKA hesitates, being surprised. Apparently, their pro-Axis policy must assume a new basis.

Def. Doc. 206-E (83) - 5 July 1941 (pp. 396-400)

President Roosevelt seeks assurance from Japan that reports of Japan entering into hostilities against Russia to be a rumor.

KONOYE stalled, required discussions to be with Foreign Minister, who indicated it was only a rumor, but they still resist our helping Britain and do not consider it self-defense. MATSUOKA dies, before clear assurance is given.

Def. Doc. 206-E (85) - 12 July 1941 (p. 403)

Rumors that Japan is mobilizing certain reserves; but considered only precaution.

Def. Doc. 206-E (86) - 12 July, 1941 (p. 404)

As mobilization increased rail and sea travel is impeded and by August Jap ships quit sailing to U. S. Americans sailing to Shanghai practically stopped.

Comment as to Excerpts 206-E (41) - (86)

Although these excerpts show that our relations with Japan continued to become worse from October, 1940, to July, 1941, the bulk of these are personal opinions and observations by the Ambassador and few prove any overt act. In their nature the facts reported are mostly hearsay. It would appear that only the conversations reported should be admissible or the excerpts referring directly to actions taken; otherwise the record is burdened with cumulative observations.

"THE AMERICANS ARE NOT GOING
TO WIN THIS WAR"

January 1, 1941

* * * * *

On December 14 I wrote the following letter to the President:

Dear Frank:

. . . About Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown someday, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;

(2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

These are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 359

(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

辯護側文書二〇六一(五三)

「樞密院は今次戦争に勝算無し」

一九四一年一月一日

十二月十四日に私は大統領宛に次の手紙を書いた。

フランク様

……日本及び愚て日本の行動に就て。何日かは必ず我々が、内幕を公開しなければならぬといふ事が、愈々明白になると、私には思へます。そして當面の主要問題は暴行を早くするが、我々に有利であるか、或は遅くするが、有利であるかである。

此の角度から見れば問題の主なる原因は次の通りであると思はれます。

一、英國は歐洲戦争に勝つ見込みがあるか、又それは何時か

二、米國の對日戦争が、歐洲に於ける我々の對英援助の妨げとなつて英國

の勝敗に懸はるか否か

三、我々の極東政策は米國の國防計畫及び現在及び今後の日米の相對的



(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

not used

"THE AXIS POWERS ARE NOT GOING
TO WIN THIS WAR"



January 1, 1941

* * * * *

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. * * * Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

* * * * *

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 399

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(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

not used

辯護側書類第二〇六一（五四號）

樞軸諸國本大戦ニ就イテ断ジテ敗北ヒン

: : :

一九四一年一月一日

東京ヨリ見タル状勢ハ概略左ノ如クデアル。

日米關係ヲ何等カノ永續性ノ有ル建設的ナモノニ變ヤ上ゲントシタ八年間
ノ努力ノ結果モ外交ヲ以テシテハ如何トモシ難イ諸々ノ趨勢及勢力ノ爲ニ
敗北ヲ喫シ、吾々ノ努力モ隨風一過、殆ド若クハ全然其ノ跡ヲモ留メナイ
デキル : : : 米國ノ對日輸出禁止措置ニ伴ツテ生ズルト想像サレル經濟
的ナ障害モ終局ニ於イテハ日本ヲ深刻ナル不利ニ陷イレルモノデアルニシ
テモ當分ノ間ハ日本人ノ決死的ナ經濟自足体制確立ニ拍車ヲ掛ケルコトト
ナルニ過ギナイ

: : : : : : : :

對日十年
ト題スル前米國大使グルー氏日記ヨリノ抜萃

三五九頁



(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

Not used

Def, Dec, NC200-11(55)

日本ハスツカリ立派ナ樞軸ノ盟邦トナル
一九四〇年十月一日

モシ我々が制裁ヲ加ヘタラ日本ト合衆國間ノ關係ヲ惡化サセルヤウナ
效果ヲ得レハデアラウトイフ意見ガ發表サレタ。ナル程我々が最近開
始シタ國防計畫ヲ見レハ徹底的制裁ノ範圍内ニハ必ズシテ包含マレナイ或
ル種ノ措置ヲトルニ當然デアルコトガ解ルガシカシナガラ彼ハ合衆國ガ
多量ニ所持セルモノトシテ知ラレテヤル石油ノ如キ重要生産品ノ輸出禁
止ノ英斷ハ日本政府及國民ニヨリ僞裝不完全ナ制裁ト解サレ恐ラクハ成
ル直ノ報復手段ヲ採ラシムルカモ知レナイ否多分ソウナルデアラウトイ
フコトヲ我々ハ念頭ニ置カネバナラヌ。



- (c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;
- (d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

Not used

BACKGROUND ON THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PACT

April 22, 1941

I have already written, in the March diary, of Matsuoka's first talk with Stalin on the former's way to Berlin and how he lectured Stalin on Japanese ideology for fifty-eight minutes out of the sixty-minute interview, maintaining that there is a close parallel between Communism and Japanese family life. On returning from Berlin, Matsuoka told Steinhardt that he has little hope of concluding a treaty with Stalin because he was not willing, and the Japanese public would not stand for the concessions which the Russians were asking for a nonaggression pact. But then at the last minute it appears that Stalin suddenly suggested a neutrality pact, which was signed in a few minutes, with no concessions (unless there were secret concessions) on the part of Japan. Nobody, apparently, was more surprised than Matsuoka.

In my analysis of the results of the neutrality pact, in the absence of information as to any secret commitments or understandings, I have come to the following conclusions:

(a) Due to the fact that Japan, at least publicly, was not obliged to pay a price for the pact, it represented a great personal success for Matsuoka.

(b) Instead of defining the policies and obligations of the respective signatories, the treaty was apparently concluded chiefly for the effect which each party believed it would exert on the other party and on third parties (on Germany, from the Soviet point of view, and on the United States and Great Britain, from the Japanese point of view);

(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,

especially considering the somewhat formalistic Japanese mind;

(e) The pact will tend to stimulate and support the Japanese extremists who advocate a vigorous prosecution of the southward advance because it guarantees Soviet neutrality in case Japan gets into war with a third country (i.e., the United States).

During Matsuoka's talks with Steinhardt, who gave a luncheon for him, the following points emerged, and I have no hesitation in setting them down because Matsuoka, if he has time when he returns, will tell me everything that he told Steinhardt:

(1) No commitments were made by Matsuoka in either Berlin or Rome.

(2) The chief purpose of Japan in entering the Tripartite Alliance was to preserve peace -- a theme upon which Matsuoka constantly harps both in public and in private.

(3) Japan would be obliged to go to war with the United States only if we should declare war on Germany, but that Japan would of course confer with Germany first.

(4) Matsuoka does not believe that Germany will declare war on the United States, but if that should happen he hopes that Japan will be given time to make her position clear before we make any move in the Pacific.

(5) Japan will strictly carry out her obligations to the Axis.

(6) Matsuoka had been told by both Hitler and Ribbentrop that they did not want war with the United States.

(7) They had also suggested that anti-American agitation in Japan be stopped.

(8) All three of them had expressed a wish for peace but they saw no possibility of peace until England had capitulated.

(9) Hitler had created a personally favorable impression on Matsuoka, who characterized him as a genius. He had been reasonable and calm in all their talks and had shown none of the excitable characteristics generally attributed to him.

(10) Ribbentrop admired the fight that Britain was putting up and realized that she was stronger now, from the point of view of defense, than when the war began. He expressed the opinion that the British Empire should not be destroyed.

(11) Hitler would invade Britain only under necessity and fully expected to win through aviation and the submarine.

(12) Matsuoka did not believe that Britain could drive a wedge between Germany and Italy, the latter being largely under German control while mutual personal admiration existed between Hitler and Mussolini. But the Germans had been instructed not to "look down or talk down" to the Italians. Mussolini showed no discouragement over his recent reverses and was sure that he would shortly stage a "comeback."

(13) Owing to the excessive demands of the Soviets, Matsuoka had made little progress in talking with Molotov.

(14) Japan had the choice of coming to an agreement with Moscow or becoming embroiled with the Soviet Union.

(15) Matsuoka earnestly desired an end of the war in China and felt that this could be brought about if the President would tell Chiang Kai-shek that if he refused to accept reasonable and fair peace terms, American aid would cease. Nevertheless, the Japanese would not accept mediation and peace could be effected only through direct negotiation between the two nations.

(16) Unless the Soviet Union substantially reduced its delivery of supplies to Germany, the Germans would not invade Russia, although they were fully prepared to do so. He thought that it was for the purpose of frightening the Soviets into continuing supplies that the Germans had given out rumors of a possible attack.

(17) Matsuoka hoped that the President and Mr. Hull would have confidence in him.

Steinhardt later took the precaution of reading the foregoing points to Matsuoka, who confirmed them as an accurate record of what he had said.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 381-384

二〇六（七五）

一九四一年四月二十二日

私は既に三月の日記に松岡がベルリンに赴く途中スターリンと最初の會
 談をしたと及び彼が共産主義と日本の家族生活との間に極く似通つたも
 のがあると主張して、六十分間の會見の中五十八分間日本のイデオロギ
 をスターリンに説いた次第について書いた。ベルリンから歸還するや松岡
 はスターリンとの條約はスターリンにその氣が無く又ロシヤが不可侵條約
 に關し要求する程に對し日本の民衆が賛成しないから締結の望みは殆ん
 どないとシュタインハルトに語つた。
 併しながら會見の最後になつてスターリンが突然中立條約を提案した様に
 思はれる。そしてそれは日本側に於て何等の進歩（秘密の進歩が無いとし
 て一せう二、三分間の中に調印された。殊らく松岡自身最も驚いたことで
 あらう。

エトの中立を保證するのでそれは兩方進出の強力な遂行を唱へル日本の極端論者を刺激し支持するに至るであらう。シュタインハルトが干渉を供して松岡と會談中次の諸點が明かにされた。そして若し松岡が需つた時限があれば彼がシュタインハルトに語つた事をすべて私に語るだらうと思ふのでそれらの諸點を略略なく記入する。

(1) 松岡はベルリンに於ても何等公約はしなかつた。

(2) 日本が三國同盟に加入した主な目的は平和を維持する事であつた。そしてその事は松岡が公的にも私的にも不斷に繰り返して述べてゐる題目であつた。

(3) 若し我々がドイツに宣戰布告をする様なことがある場合のみ日本はアメリカ合衆國と開戰を餘儀なくされるだらう。併しそれについては日本は勿論先づドイツと協議をするだらう。

(4) 松岡はドイツがアメリカ合衆國に對して宣戰布告をするとは信じて居ない。併し萬一それが起つた場合には、彼は我々が太平洋に於て如何なる行動をもとらない中に日本の立場を明かにする余裕を與へられる事を希望する。

(5) 日本は樞軸國に對し日本の義務を厳正に遂行するだらう。

秘密の條約或は諒解に就いては何等情報を得て居ないので、私は中立條約の結果を分析して見て次の如き結論に到達した。

(A) この條約に對して日本は少くとも表面上は何等代價を拂ふことを強ひられて居ないといふ事實に鑑み、それは松岡の大なる個人的成功である。

(B) この條約は、各締結國の政策及び義務を限定することなく、主として相手方及び第三國人にソヴェトの立場からすればドイツに、日本の立場からすればアメリカ合衆國及び英帝國に與へると各自信ずるところの効果を狙つて締結されたものと思はれる。

(C) この條約は支那に關しソヴェト側が差控へて居る點があり、又微妙な言葉使用がしてゐるにも拘らず、支那事業の終結を阻止するよりは寧ろ助長する傾向がある。

(D) 日本のソヴェトロシアとの關係に關し、この條約は三國同盟の一方的性質を平衡せしめるであらう。殊に相形式主義的な日本人の心を考慮に入ればそうである。

(E) この條約は日本が第三國(即ちアメリカ合衆國)と戦争に入る場合にソヴェト

エトの中立を保護するのでそれは兩方進出の明力を遂行を唱へル日本の極端論者を刺激し支持するに至るであらう。シュタインハルトが干渉を供して松岡と會談中次の諸點が明かにされた。そして若し松岡が語つた時限があれば彼がシュタインハルトに語つた事をすべて私に語るだらうと思ふのでそれらの諸點を略なく記入する。

(1) 松岡はベルリンに於ても何等公約はしなかつた。

(2) 日本が三國同盟に加入した主な目的は平和を維持する事であつた。そしてその事は松岡が公的にも私的にも不斷に繰り返して述べてゐる題目であつた。

(3) 若し我々がドイツに宣戰布告をする様なことがある場合のみ日本はアメリカ合衆國と開戰を餘儀なくされるだらう。併しそれについては日本は勿論先づドイツと協議をするだらう。

(4) 松岡はドイツがアメリカ合衆國に對して宣戰布告をするとは信じて居ない併し萬一それが起つた場合には、彼は我々が太平洋に於て如何なる行動をもとらない中に日本の立場を明かにする余裕を與へられる事を希望する。

(5) 日本は樞軸國に對し日本の義務を厳正に遂行するだらう。

(6) 松岡はヒットラー及リッペンドロップ兩者から彼等はアメリカ合衆國との戦争を欲しないと言はれてゐた。

(7) 彼等は又日本に於ける反アメリカ運動を阻止する爲に提言した。

(8) 彼等三人共平和に對する希望を述べた。併し彼等は英國が降伏する迄は平和の可能性はないと思つて居た。

(9) ヒットラーは個人的には好印象を松岡に與へた。そして松岡はヒットラーを天才と批評した。彼は松岡と會談中終始心算深く落着いて居つた。

そして彼の特質と一變に考へられて居る激し勿い特性を示さなかつた。4
(10) リッペンドロップは英國が天晴れな戦闘をしてゐるのを賞讃した、そして

彼は防禦の兎地から英國は開戦當時よりも現在の方が強いといふ事を述べた。彼は英帝國を滅亡させるべきでないといふ意見を述べた。

(11) ヒットラーは止むを得ない場合に於てのみ英國に侵入するだらう、そして航空機と潜水艦とに依り勝利を得る事を充分に期待して居た。

(12) 松岡は英國がドイツとイタリーとの間に 打ち込む事が出来得るとは信じなかつた。ヒットラーとムッソリーニとが互に個人的に屈服し合つ

(16)

ソヴェット聯邦がドイツへの糧食等の供給を甚しく減らさない限り、ドイツは充分準備出来て居てもロシアを侵略しないであらう。

(15)

松岡は支那に於ける戦争の終結を熱望した。そして若しアメリカの大統領が蒋介石に合理的な公平な平和條件の受諾を拒絶するならばアメリカは援助を中止すると言へば戦争の終結が望まれるだらうと考えた。けれども日本人は仲裁を受け容れないだらう。そして和平は西國間の直接交渉に依るより外

(14) (13)

日本はモスコと結合をつけるか或はソヴェット聯邦との紛争を起すか選擇は自由であつた。

ある限りイタリーは廣範圍に亘りドイツの支配下にあつたからである、併しドイツ人はイタリー人に對し見下げたり、見下りて話したりしてはならぬと激へられて居た。ムツソリーニは最近の敗北に失望を示さなかつた。そして彼は間もなく現回出来ると確信して居つた。

ソヴェットの要求が過大なため松岡とモロトフとの會談は殆ど進捗を示さなかつた。

(17)

ドイツがロシアを攻撃するかも知れぬといふ風説を公にしたのは、ソワイ
ストを恐怖させて糧食の供給を断らせざる爲であると松岡は言へた。
松岡は大流領及びハル氏が彼を信するを希望した。シュタインハルトは
その後田心深く松岡に對して前述の諸點を讀み明かせた。そして松岡はそ
れを彼が云つた事の正確な記録であると承認した。

日本に於ける十年と題する前アメリカ合衆國大使グルー
の日記の抜萃 三八一頁—三八四頁

not used

Document 206-B (82)

JAPAN ADOPTS A WATCHFUL WAITING POLICY
TOWARD RUSSIA

June 26, 1941

We learn that on June 24 the Soviet Ambassador did ask the Foreign Minister as to Japan's attitude in the Soviet-German war and was told that the policy of Japan had not yet been formulated. This policy, said Matsuoka, would be largely influenced by a determination as to where the responsibility for the outbreak of war lay, and he added that the fundamental policy of Japan was based on the Axis. Japan must therefore determine whether Soviet-Japanese relations could now be brought into line with this fundamental policy of Japan.

It is clear that when Japan joined the Axis, it was done on the assumption that the close association of Germany with Soviet Russia would continue and that this basic pro-Axis policy has been destroyed by the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. At least in theory. We shall see.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 396

not used

By doc No. 206 E (2)

辯護側文書 第二〇六號 五 八二

日本ソ聯に對し警戒的待 方針を採る
一九四一（昭和十六）年六月二十六日

六月二十四日ソ聯大使が獨ソ間に關する日本の態度に付外務大臣に尋ねたところ日本の方針は未だ正式に決定してゐない旨の答辯を得たといふことを我々は知つてゐる。

松岡は、此の方針は戦争勃發に對する責任如何の決定により大きな影響を受けるであらうと語り且つ日本の根本方針は樞軸に基礎を置いてゐると附言した。従つて今や日本は、日ソ關係を此の日本の根本方針に一致せしめ得べきや否やを決しなければならぬ

日本が樞軸に加盟した時は獨ソ間に緊密な友好關係が續くであらうといふ假定の上に立つてなされたこと、並びに此の基本的親樞軸方針は獨ソ間の動靜に依り無効に歸したことは明らかである。少くとも現驗的には、我々は注視してゐよう

前米國大使ダリーの日記 昭和十年拔萃 第三九六頁

VICHY YIELDS THE INDO-CHINA BASES TO JAPAN

July 25, 1941

We now learn that the official spokesman in Vichy announced on the 24th that a request had been presented by Japan to occupy bases at strategic points in Indo-China; he said that negotiations were going on both at Vichy and Hanoi and that there had been no ultimatum from Japan nor any German pressure. He added that arrangements would be made within the scope of the Franco-Japanese agreement of August 30, 1940, and that no inconvenience in temporarily extending the military agreement with Japan was seen so long as there was to be no change in French sovereignty over Indo-China and so long as no territorial demands were made by Japan.

When a correspondent asked the Vichy spokesman whether such a decision would not be inconsistent with the announced policy of France to defend her empire against all powers, he replied that the French Government had been obliged to come to this decision as the result of events in Syria. Replying to a question as to whether the assistance of the United States in preserving the status quo in Indo-China had been requested by France, the spokesman was evidently primed for the question because he said at once that France had not bothered to make any further request to the United States at this time since no satisfaction had been received when American assistance in Indo-China had been asked by France in 1940. In this case the spokesman did not take refuge in his usual procedure of saying that he must consult his superiors when some delicate point is brought up.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 405 and 406

辯護圖書證二〇六五（八七）

ヴィシー政府印度支那の基地を日本に與ふ
昭和十六年七月二十五日

昨二十四日ヴィシーに於て政府スポークスマンは日本が印度支那に於る軍事據點を占領したいとの要求を出したことを知つた。右スポークスマンは又交渉はヴィシー及河内兩地に於て進められて居り又日本から最後通牒も來なければ獨逸の壓迫も未だないと語つて居る。更に協定は昭和十五年八月三十日の佛日協約の範圍内に於て取極めらるべく又佛蘭西の印度支那に對する宗主權に變化を及ぼすが如きものに非る限り且又日本が領土上の要求を爲さざる限り日本との軍事協定を一時擴大したところで支障はあるまいとも附言して居る。

そんな風に決めては列強に對し自國防衛を公言した佛蘭西の政策と一致しないではないかとのヴィシースポークスマンに對する一通信員の質問に對してスポークスマンは佛蘭西政府はシリア事件の結果に鑑み此の決定に立到らざるを得なかつたのであると答へて居る。佛蘭西は印度支那の

not used

A FLICKER OF HOPE FOR JAPANESE-
AMERICAN PEACE

July 27, 1941

This Sunday morning there came an exceedingly important telegram from the Acting Secretary reporting an equally important proposal which the President had made to Admiral Nomura with a view to settling the whole situation in the Far East and avoiding the rapid deterioration of Japanese-American relations as the direct result of Japan's aggressive policies and measures in this part of the world. I shall not at present record the details of this proposal in view of their ultraconfidential nature, but they offer to Japan a reasonable way out of her own alleged difficulties and the alleged encirclement measures of the A B C D powers which she maintains are threatening her own security.

On reading that telegram I thanked my stars that I had remained in Tokyo and had not gone to Karuizawa because it seemed to me of the utmost importance that I should immediately not only make sure that Admiral Toyoda had clearly understood the full purport of the proposal but that I should also exert every ounce of my own influence to secure its acceptance. I said once before in the diary that I had not gone home this summer because a moment might come when such influence could be exerted and this seemed to me to be precisely the sort of juncture which I then had in mind. I therefore immediately telephoned to the Foreign Minister at his private house and asked for an appointment although it was a Sunday morning. I saw him at 11:30 at his official residence and in a long talk made on my own initiative and responsibility the strongest appeal of which I was capable and perhaps the strongest representations that I have ever made.

I told the Department what I had done and said that although I had exceeded all authority I felt after careful thought that three considerations justified my step: (1) the prime importance that Admiral Toyoda should completely and accurately understand the President's proposal, (2) the importance.

of the time element, which made it impossible for me to ask for authority from Washington in advance, and (3) my belief that the President would wish nothing to be left undone to ensure that maximum consideration should be given to his proposal and that the Japanese Government should fully recognize its far-reaching and enlightened import because upon its rejection or acceptance might depend the future peace of the Pacific. To my astonishment Admiral Toyoda said that he had not received the President's proposal, communicated to Admiral Nomura three days ago, on the 24th, and Toyoda confirmed this after leaving me for some five minutes obviously to telephone to the Foreign Office. Two days later we learned from Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, that on the day of his conversation with the President Admiral Nomura had sent only a very brief telegram to Tokyo and that after my talk with Toyoda he had immediately instructed Nomura to submit a comprehensive report without delay.

Two days later I received a very pleasant message from Sumner Welles stating that he regarded my action at this time as of the greatest assistance and value and that both the President and he himself had approved of what I had done. I can't say that I am over-optimistic as to favorable results, but I told Admiral Toyoda in our talk that he was now presented with an opportunity to take a step of the highest statesmanship and with a way of solving the appalling situation which faced him at the outset of his ministry; I said in fact that he now had an opportunity to go down in history as one of Japan's greatest statesmen. Whether Japan accepts or not, the President's step places the United States in an unassailable position from the point of view of history and someday history will record this step in full. If the Japanese fail to avail themselves of it, their own position in history will not be enviable. On the 30th I sent another telegram to the Department making some further suggestions on the foregoing subject.

In my recent conversations with Admiral Toyoda it seems to me significant that the only thing which really stirred him up were the allusions which I made to the belief existing in our country that German pressure is responsible for Japan's present policies, and in each case the Minister emphatically denied that Germany now exerts any influence in Japan whatsoever. One of my colleagues, incidentally, had previously told me that Matsuoka himself had confirmed to him the story that he had telegraphed to von Ribbentrop to ask if there were any basis for the reports that Germany was about to attack Soviet Russia, that he had received from von Ribbentrop a categorical denial, and that forty-eight hours later Germany's invasion of Soviet Russia had occurred. Once again it is abundantly clear that the Japanese are getting fed up with the Germans, who have obviously, as usual, overplayed their hand.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 411-413

not used

Dof Doo No 2062(25)

日米和平への一沫の希望

一九四一年七月廿九日

本日開朝、國務長官代理より、大統領が野村提督に、極東の全事態を解決しい日本の極東に於ける侵略的政策並に手段の直接の結果としての日米關係の急速な悪化を回避せんとしてなした重要な提案を報ずる極めて重要な電報が到着した。私は此の提案の機密性に備ふて、今その詳細を記録することとはしないが、これは日本に對し、日本が陷つてゐると自稱する困難と、日本自身の安全を脅かすものと主張する4300諸國の包圍策から脱け出る合理的な方途を提案したものである。

この電報を一讀して私は松井澤に赴かず東京に残つてゐた事を運命に感謝した。何となれば重田提督がこの提案の全的な主旨を明瞭に理解したかを直ちに確めるのみならず、その提案が確實に受諾されるやう私の全力を傾ける事が最も重要であると思はれたからである。私は嘗て私の日記に、このやうに力をつすべき時が来るやも知れぬから今夏は歸國しなかつたと記したが、その時に心の中に考へてゐたその重大時機が今正にやつて來

Ref. Hor # 206 E (7)

たやうに思はれた。そこで私は即時外相の私宅に電話をかけ、日曜の朝ではあつたけれど、會見を申し込んだのである。私は彼に官邸で十一時半に會つた。そして長時間の會談中に、私の發意と責任に於て私のなし得る最も強い調子で彼に訴へ、又恐らく今迄の中の最も強力な提議をしたのであつた。

私は私のなした事を國務省に報告し、且つ私の経験を述べる事をしたけれども熱意の後次の三つの點に鑑みて私のとつた道が正しいと感ぜられる旨述べた。

(一) 豊田提督が完全に且つ正確に大統領の提案を理解する事が第一義的に重要である事、(二) ワシントンに前以てさうする限を要求する事が不可能な事、(三) 臨時閣が大切だつた事、(四) 大統領は、彼の提案に及不限の考慮が拂はれるため、又太平洋の將來の平和はこの提案が拒否されるか受諾されるかにかかつてゐるが故に日本政府をして充分その重大な又先見的な意義を認識させるためにはあらゆる手段を講ずることを欲すると私が信じた事。驚いた事に、豊田提督は三日前、即ち二十四日野村提督に傳達された大統領の提

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案を受けとつてゐないと言つた。そして五六分の間明らかに外務省に電話する爲に私を待たせてをいた後に、これを確認したのであつた。二日の後外務省アメリカ局長寺崎から野村大使が大統領との會見當日東京に極く簡單な電報を送つたのみである事、及び私との會見後野田が直ちに野村へ即時綜合的な報告を提出するやう訓電したとの事を知つた。

二日後、私はサムナー・ウエルズから、此の場合の私の行動が最も大きな助けとなり價値あるものと認めたこと、大統領が彼自身が私のなした事に賛成である旨を述べた喜ばしい電報を受けとつた。私は良好な結果が得られるものと大いに樂觀してゐるとはいひ得ないが、しかし私は會談中野田大使に、今や彼は最大の政治的手腕を發揮する機運と、大臣就任早々彼が直面した恐るべき事柄を解決する手段とに恵まれてゐるのだと告げた。實に私は彼が日本最大の政治家として歴史に記録されるべき機會を與へられてゐると言つたのである。日本が受諾しようとしなからうと、大統領の持つた措置は合衆國を歴史上非難され得ない地位に置いたものであり、いつの日か歴史はこの措置を全面的に記録するであらう。若しも日本人がこ

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の措置を利用しなかつたなら、彼等の歴史上の立場は望ましくもないものとなるだらう。三十日に私は前述の問題についての更に進んだ案を述べた別の電報を國務省に送つた。

豊田捷雄との最近の諸言談に於て本當に彼を興奮させた唯一のことは、日本の現在の政策がドイツの壓迫によるものだとの信念が米國にあると彼に述べた事であつて、私には甚だ深い學に思はれたのである。その度毎に大臣はドイツは現在日本に何等の影響をも與へてゐないと言つて私の言を強く否定した。

序でながら、外交國仲間の一人在以前私に話したことがある。それは、松岡がフォン・リッペントロツプにドイツがソ聯を攻撃せんとしゐるとの情報に根據があるか否かを電報で問ひたゞした事、彼がフォン・リッペントロツプから絶對否定の返事を受けつた事、及びその四十八時間の後にドイツはソ聯に侵入を開始したといふ事を松岡がその人に確言した、といふのである。又しても、日本がドイツの藥籠中のもとなつてゐる事は極めて明らかである。ドイツは例の如く明らかに上手に立廻つたのである。

「在日十年」と題する前米國大使グルーの日記からの抜萃

四二一頁カラ四二三頁迄

Withdrawn

JAPAN'S PEACE OFFER TO CHINA

September 22, 1941

I called on Foreign Minister Toyoda this afternoon at his request. After reading from a document in Japanese which was then translated into English, he made substantially the following oral statement:

1. The suggestion that the President meet with Prince Konoyo was contained by implication in the message received by the President from the Prime Minister.

2. The Japanese Government had intended that the proposed meeting should discuss the questions at issue between the two countries requiring agreement, and that subsequently through normal diplomatic channels the details for executing the understanding reached at the meeting should be worked out. The Government of the United States, however, had adopted the view that the problems which had emerged from the preliminary and informal conversations should be agreed on in advance of the meeting.

3. The Foreign Minister had explained that in his statement made to me on September 4 he had replied to all of the questions raised by the Government of the United States and that his statement of September 4 had widened rather than reduced the field of the negotiations which the Japanese Government is willing to cover.

4. The Foreign Minister then gave me the basic terms of peace which Japan is prepared to offer China, to be communicated to the Secretary of State. The Minister emphasized that these terms should not be regarded as a new proposal but as related and supplementary to his statement to me of September 4 when he confirmed that the Japanese Government still desired to seek the good offices of the President in bringing the conflict with China to an end.

5. Admiral Toyoda told me that great internal changes had occurred during the past month as a result of the publicity that the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister had received abroad and as a result of the published reports and references on radio broadcasts

abroad in regard to the conversations in progress between Japan and the United States. Thanks to the efforts of the Japanese Government, public opinion in Japan and the Japanese press in the main are not aware of the developments referred to above, but the publicity abroad is known to certain groups in Japan and has increased the activities of those elements in Japan who are opposed to an understanding with the United States.

6. The Government of Japan will attempt to guard against any incidents or special occurrences in connection with the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis and will allow this anniversary to be celebrated by private organizations. However, should a considerable lapse of time occur following the anniversary without any sign as to the attitude of the United States, the groups referred to above who are against an understanding with the United States and who are informed of the Japanese-American conversations might find it possible to inflame public opinion in Japan and thus make it very difficult for these talks to continue.

7. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that the Japanese Government is still awaiting the American answer to the various points set forth by him in his statement of September 4. He expressed his belief that in that statement the Japanese Government had with complete frankness revealed to the American Government its intentions and desires.

In reply to the Minister's question whether any further information had been received from Washington, I conveyed to him the substance of the Department's cable of September 20, which had been decoded immediately before my call on the Minister. Admiral Toyoda was especially struck by the Secretary's remark to the Japanese Ambassador that the Government of the United States fully shared the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten matters. The Minister expressed the thought that although the desire of the United States Government to confer with other governments in regard to the suggested agreement was clearly recognized, the element of delay which would be involved in such consultations might have a most unfortunate effect.

With reference to the lack of concern felt by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington regarding the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis, Admiral Toyoda expressed the view that Admiral Nomura was not in close enough touch with the situation in Japan to perceive the dangers. I told the Minister that I was surprised that he had not conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington his own concern on this point.

With reference to the terms of peace between Japan and China, I told the Minister that I wished to avoid any comment until the Government of the United States had had a chance to examine these terms but that for purposes of clarification I would like to know the exact meaning of the words "existing agreements and usages" mentioned in point three. The Minister in reply stated that these words must be understood as written; however, he referred in this connection to the presence in China of American marines merely by way of an illustration of the phrase in question.

I promised the Minister that I would immediately communicate to the Secretary his statement given above; likewise the proposed terms of peace between Japan and China which he had handed to me. But I added that in view of the communications between the Governments of Japan and the United States I could not be optimistic that a decision on these important matters could be reached before the 27th of September.

Text of basic Japanese terms of peace with China,
handed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1941

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Co-operative defense between Japan and China.

Co-operation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing Communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China affair will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affair, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic co-operation.

(a) There shall be economic co-operation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchukuo.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 432-435

辯護側文書第二〇六——一九七

一九四一年九月廿二日

余は田外務大臣の申出に應じ本日午後同氏を訪問した。彼は日本語の文書を読み上げ次いでそれを英語に翻譯した上で概ね左の如き口頭説明を行つた。

一、大統領と近衛公との面會に關する提案は大統領が首相から受取つた書信中に略に示された。

二、日本政府の意圖は、右會見に於て兩國間の係争問題で意見の一致を要する事柄に付討議し、午後正常な外交手段を通じて右會見で瞭解された事項を實行する爲細目の計畫を立てる、といふことにあつた。然し米國政府は、豫備的且私的會談より生ずる問題に付ては右會見に先立つて意見の一致を見なければならぬと云ふ意見であつた。

三、外務大臣は、九月四日の余に對する聲明書に於て米國政府より提起された問題の總てに付て回答をしてあること、九月四日の彼の聲明書は日本政府が進んで商議せんとする交渉の範圍を擴げこそすれ狭めるものではな

つたといふ事を説明した。

其次いで外務大臣は、日本が中國に提案せんとする基本的和平條件を國務長官に傳達する様余に示した。同大臣はこれ等の條件は新しい提案と見るべきではなく九月四日の彼の聲明書に關聯し且補足的に述べられたものであることを強調した。尙其の聲明書に於て、彼は日本政府が今尙中國との戦ひを終結せしめる爲大統領の斡旋方を望んでゐることを確信したのである。

其豐田提督は余に對し大統領と日本首相との會見説が廣く知れ渡つたこと、並びに日米兩國間に進行中の會談に關する發表及海外放送に依る論及の結果、過去一ヶ月の間に國內的に大きな變化が起つた旨を告げた。概ね右に述べた本件の發展狀況を知つてゐない。併し國外に於て周知されてゐることは日本の「一部の人間」には判つてゐるし又その爲米國との和解に反對する日本の一部の連中の活動は増大して來た。

又日本政府は九月廿七日の同國の樞軸固守の記念祭に關聯し、如何なる事件、或は特殊な變事の惹起せぬ様警戒せんとして居り、私的團體が此の記念祭を祝することを許すであらう。然し乍ら記念祭後、米國の態度

に如何なる徵候も認められずに荏苒相當の日を過ごすならば、米國との諒解成立に反對して居り、又日米會談の報道を受けてある上述の諸國体は日本國內の輿論をたゞつけることを可能と見、斯くして會談経緯を困難ならしむるかも知れない。

又豊田提督は九月四日の彼の聲明書に於て自己の提示した諸項目に對する米國の回答を日本政府は依然待ちもつてゐることを指摘した。日本政府としてはあの聲明書で全く腹藏なくその意圖竝に希望を米國政府に吐露したものであると云ふ信念を彼は披瀝した。

ワシントンから其の後何か報道を入手したかどうか、と云ふ大臣の質問に答へて余は大臣訪問の直前に解讀した九月二十日附國務省電文の内容を傳達した。豊田提督は「米國政府も日本政府と全く御同様交渉の急遽進展を希望するものである。」と日本大使に述べた國務卿所見に特に慨然としてゐた。大臣は「示唆された協定に關して他國政府と談合したと米國政府の希望は明らかに認められるが、その様な相談に必然的に含まれる遲滞と云ふ要素は非常に不幸な效果となつて現はれはしまいか」と云ふ彼の憂慮を披瀝した。

ワシントン駐在日大使が、日本の樞軸堅持九月廿七日記念日に關し、關心を抱いてゐない點に付ては豐田海軍大將は所信を披瀝して、野村海軍大將は日本の國情と緊密な關係を保つてゐないので危險を感知してゐない旨述べた。余は同大臣がこの點に關する大臣自身の關心をワシントン駐在日大使に傳へてゐないのを驚く旨同大臣に告げた。

日本中國間の和平條件に付ては、合衆國政府がこれら諸條件を検討する機會を得るまでは如何なる批評も差控へ度く又要點第三に記してある「現在の諸協定並びに慣例」といふ言葉の正確な意味を知りこれを明らかにし余は同大臣に告げた。同大臣は

これらの言葉は文字通りに解すべきものと答へたが、これに關聯して、問題となつてゐる句の單なる一例證として米國海兵隊の中國駐在に言及した。余は同大臣の上記の談話並に同大臣が余に手交した日本中國間の和平條件提案を直ちに國務長官に傳達すべき旨約した。然し余は更に日本及び合衆國兩政府間の聯絡狀況に鑑み、これら重要案件の決定が九月廿七日以前に到達し得ることは樂觀出來の旨述べた。

Def. Doc. # 206-E(97)

一九四一年九月二十二日日本外務大臣が米朝大使に手交せる日本の對中國
和平基本條件の正文

一、近隣友好

二、主權並に領土保全の尊重

三、日華協同防衛

兩國の安全を脅かす虞れある共產主義的及び其他擾亂運動の防止及び中
國の秩序維持を目的とする日本中國間の協同

辯護側文書 二〇六一五（一九七）

現行の協定慣例に従ひ上記目的の爲、必要期間、支那領土の一定地域に日本
の陸海軍部隊を駐屯させる事

四 日本軍隊の撤退

支那事變遂行の爲支那に派遣された日本軍は該事變解決の曉は支那より
撤兵する事。但し第三項に該當する軍隊は除く。

五 経済上の提携

(1) 日支間の経済提携をなし、その主たる目的として、支那の国防上必要
なる物資の開発利用をはかること

(2) 前項は支那に於ける第三國による如何なる経済活動も、それ等が公平
な基本原則に基いて遂行される限り、何等拘束を受けることを意味する
ものではない事

六 蔣介石政権及び汪兆銘政府の合同

七 領土合併なし

八 賠償なし

Def. Doc. #206-E(97)

九
洲
國
承
認

「在日十年」と題する前アメリカ大使グルーの自説よりと
の抄萃
（四三二頁より四三五頁迄）
の抄萃
二四三二頁

Def. Doc. #206-F(97)

not used

Defense Document 206-B (112)

GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE TOJO CABINET

October 29, 1941

The following items gathered by members of another country's mission to Tokyo are believed to be a fairly accurate account of the reactions of the German community here to the present situation.

The Germans are not enthusiastic about the new cabinet, which disappointed the hopes of a definitely interventionist Government, which they had formed on the resignation of Prince Konoye. Their feelings were cooled still further by the arrest of two Germans immediately the new cabinet had taken office.

In the event of war between the U. S. and Germany, the local Germans from the Ambassador down are uncertain of Japan's reactions. They regard the Japanese as untrustworthy opportunists.

* * * * *

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 463 and 464

not used

Def Doc. # 204-E(113)

辯護書第二〇六 E (一一二)

真 條 内 閣に對する獨逸人の反動

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月二十九日

他國の使節達に依つて寄せ集められた以下の記述は現狀勢に對する當地

獨逸人社會の反動をかなり正確に記したものと信ぜられる

獨逸人は新内閣に對し好感を持つてゐないをして之の事は近衛公爵の辭

任に際して組織せられた判然とした干涉主義の政府を失望せしめた。

獨逸人の氣持は新内閣組織直後に二名の獨逸人が拘引されたことによつて

更に冷却なものとなつた

獨逸大使を始め一般の獨逸人に至るまで米獨開戦となつた場合の日本の

反動に對し確信が持てないのである、彼等は日本人を信賴出来ない便乗主

義者と思つてゐるのである

グルー米國大使の日記

在日十年よりの抜萃

四六三頁—四六四頁

not used

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN REPORTS TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

(Substance)



(Paraphrase of original text prepared by the Department of State)

Tokyo, November 3, 1941

The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles as follows:

He cites a leading article from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi of November 1 (reported in telegram No. 1729 of that date), adding that a banner headline declaring "Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis" introduced a dispatch from New York with a summary of a statement the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to The New York Times regarding the need of ending the United States-Japanese economic war. Both the article and the Nichi Nichi editorial are believed to be close reflections of Japanese sentiments at present.

The Ambassador refers to his various telegraphic reports during several months past analyzing the factors affecting policy in Japan and says he has nothing to add thereto nor any substantial revision to make thereof. In his opinion, a conclusive estimate may be had of Japan's position through the application to the existing situation and the immediate future of the following points:

(a) It is not possible for Japan to dissociate either Japan or the conflict with China from the war in Europe and its fluctuations.

(b) In Japan political thought ranges from medieval to liberal ideas and public opinion is thus a variable quantity. The impact of events and conditions beyond Japan may determine at any given time which school of thought shall predominate. (In the democracies, on the other hand, owing to a homogeneous body of principles which influence and direct foreign policy and because methods instead of principles are more likely to cause differences of opinion, public opinion is formed differently.) For example, in Japan the pro-Axis elements gained power following last year's German victories in

Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory was created by Germany's failure to invade the British Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate elements; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance had misled Japan.

(c) An attempt to correct the error of 1940 may be found in the efforts to adjust Japanese relations with the United States and thereby to lead the way to conclusion of peace with China, made by Prince Konoye and promised by the Tojo cabinet. If this attempt fails, and if success continues to favor German arms, a final, closer Axis alignment may be expected.

(d) The Embassy in Japan has never been convinced by the theory that Japan's collapse as a militaristic power would shortly result from the depletion and the eventual exhaustion of Japan's financial and economic resources, as propounded by many leading American economists. Such forecasts were unconsciously based upon the assumption that a dominant consideration would be Japan's retention of the capitalistic system. The outcome they predicted has not transpired, although it is true that the greater part of Japan's commerce has been lost, Japanese industrial production has been drastically curtailed, and Japan's national resources have been depleted. Instead, there has been a drastic prosecution of the process to integrate Japan's national economy, lacking which there might well have occurred the predicted collapse of Japan. What has happened to date therefore does not support the view that continuation of trade embargoes and imposition of a blockade (proposed by some) can best avert war in the Far East.

The Ambassador mentions his telegram No. 327, September 12, 1940 (which reported the "golden opportunity" seen by Japanese Army circles for expansion as a consequence of German triumphs in Europe). He sent this telegram under circumstances and at a time when it appeared unwise and futile for the United States to adopt conciliatory measures. The strong policy recommended in the telegram was subsequently adopted by the United States.

This policy, together with the impact of world political events upon Japan, brought the Japanese Government to the point of seeking conciliation with the United States. If these efforts fail, the Ambassador foresees a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan once more back to the former Japanese position or even farther. This would lead to what he has described as an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri to make Japan impervious to economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to foreign pressure. It is realized by observers who feel Japanese national temper and psychology from day to day that, beyond peradventure, this contingency not only is possible but is probable.

If the fiber and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind, the view that war probably would be averted, though there might be some risk of war, by progressively imposing drastic economic measures is an uncertain and dangerous hypothesis upon which to base considered United States policy and measures. War would not be averted by such a course if it is taken, in the opinion of the Embassy. However, each view is only opinion, and, accordingly, to postulate the correctness of either one and to erect a definitive policy thereon would, in the belief of the Embassy, be contrary to American national interests. It would mean putting the cart before the horse. The primary point to be decided apparently involves the question whether war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies, and needs in the case of failure of the first line of national defense, namely, diplomacy, since it would be possible only on the basis of such a decision for the Roosevelt administration to follow a course which would be divested as much as possible of elements of uncertainty, speculation, and opinion. The Ambassador does not doubt that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to be, already has been debated fully and adopted, because the sands are running fast.

The Ambassador emphasizes that, in the above discussion of this grave, momentous subject, he is out of touch with the intentions and thoughts of the administration therein, and he does not at all mean to imply

that Washington is pursuing an undeliberated policy. Nor does he intend to advocate for a single moment any "appeasement" of Japan by the United States or recession in the slightest degree by the United States Government from the fundamental principles laid down as a basis for the conduct and adjustment of international relations, American relations with Japan included. There should be no compromise with principles, though methods may be flexible. The Ambassador's purpose is only to ensure against the United States becoming involved in war with Japan because of any possible misconception of Japan's capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. While national sanity dictates against such action, Japanese sanity cannot be measured by American standards of logic.

The Ambassador sees no need for much anxiety respecting the bellicose tone and substance at present of the Japanese press (which in the past several years has attacked the United States intensely in recurrent waves), but he points out the shortsightedness of underestimating Japan's obvious preparations to implement an alternative program in the event the peace program fails. He adds that similarly it would be shortsighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber rattling, merely intended to give moral support to the high pressure diplomacy of Japan. Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 467-470

辯護圖書類二〇六一五(一一四)號

國務長官ヘノ駐日大使報告

(大要)

(國務省作製原文ノ釋註)

東京一九四一年十一月三日



ハル國務長官並ビニウエルス國務次官ニ對スル大使ノ報告ハ左ノ通りデ
アル。

彼ハ十一月一日付東京日日新聞ノ社説ヲ引用シ(同日付第一七二九號電
報ニ掲載報告サル)更ニ是ニ附ケ加ヘテ帝國今ヤ最大危機ニ直面セント
ス。ト宣明セル大見出しノモトニ紐育發電報ヲ掲載シ日米經濟戰ヲ終結
セシムル必要ニ就キ日本大使館ガ紐育タイムズ紙ニ對シ發表シタト傳ヘ
ラレル聲明書ノ要略ヲ傳ヘタ。右記事及ビ前述ノ日々新聞ノ社説モ何レ
モ現在ノ日本人ノ感情ヲ細カシ反映シタモノト考ヘラレル。大使ハ日本
ノ政策ヲ左右スル諸因子ノ分析解明ニ關スル其ノ過去數ヶ月間ノ電信報
告ニ言及シ是等ニ就イテハ最早何ラ附ケ加ヘルコトモナク、亦夫ニ就イ

テノ實質的改定ノ要モナイト云ツテキル。彼ノ意見ニヨレバ現在及近キ
 將來ノ情勢ニ就イテ以下ノ諸點ヲ起用シ併察スレバ日本ノ立場ニ關シテ
 結論的ナ判斷ヲ下シ得ルトイフノデアアル。
 (イ) 日本ニトツテハ日本自身乃至ハ日支事變ヲ歐洲戰及ビソノ推移ヨリ
 切り離シテ考ヘルコトハ出來ナイ。
 (ロ) 日本ニ於ケル政治思想構成範圍ハ中世紀的思想ヨリ自由主義的思想
 ニ至ル迄ヲ包含スルモノデアリ其ノ結果輿論ハ可變多岐デアアル。日本
 國外ニ於ケル諸事件乃至諸條件ノ變ラズ衡點ガ主導性ヲ有スル思想傾
 向ヲ如何ナル時機ニ於テモ決定シ得ルノデアアル。(他方、民主主義諸
 國家ニ在ツテハ外交政策ヲ左右シ且指導スル諸原理ノ同質一体ナルニ
 基ツキ且亦原理ヨリハムシロ其ノ方法論ガ意見ノ差異ヲ生ズル原因ナ
 ルガ故ニ異ツタ輿論ガ形成サレルノデアアル。)
 例ヲ舉ゲレバ日本ニ在ツテハ去年ノ西歐ニ於ケル獨逸ノ勝利ニ伴ヒ、
 親植植歐洲ノ獨逸ガ優勢トナツタノデアアル。其後、獨逸ノ英本土侵入
 失敗ニヨリ獨逸ノ究極的勝利ニ對シ日本側ハ疑ヒヲ懷クニ至リ斯カル
 要素ガ穩健派ノ勢力ヲ助長スルコトトナツタ。而シテ最後ニ獨逸ノ對
 ソ侵攻ハ獨逸ノ間ノ和平維持ノ期待ヲ全ク裏切り日本人ハ三國同盟締結

派目シテ指導ヲ誤レルモノデアルト悟ルニ至ツタノデアアル。

(ハ) 一九四〇年ニ犯セル誤リヲ矯正セントノ試ミハ日米關係ヲ調整シ以テ

支那トノ和平獨立ヘ導カントスル近衛公ノ努力、且東條內閣ニヨリ約束サレタスカル努力ノ中ニ見出サレル。若シ斯カル試ミニシテ失敗ニ終リ引續キ獨逸ノ武力ガ成功ヲ收メルコトガアレバ決定的ニシテヨリ緊密ナル樞軸線ノ展開ガ豫想サレ得ル。

(ニ) 軍國主義勢力トシテノ日本ノ崩壊ハ近キ將來ニ於テ日本ノ財政、經濟資源ノ消耗及ビ宛局的瀾溺ノ結果招來サレルトスル多數米國經濟學者提唱ノ見解ニ付イテハ駐日大使館ハ今以テ決シテ首肯シ得ナイモノガアル。斯カル瀾溺ハ無意識的ニ日本ガ資本主義制度ヲ保持スルナラバト

イフコトヲ其ノ最モ有力ナ理由ノ一トナス假定ニ基クモノデアアル。成程日不ハ其ノ通商ノ大部分ヲ失ヒ其ノ産業生産ヲ極端ニ切詰メ且其ノ

國家資源ヲ消耗ハシタガ未ダニ彼ラノ豫想セル如キ結果ハ來シテキナイソレ所カ日本ハ其ノ國家經濟統合措置ヲ徹底的ニ實施中デアリ右措置ヲ不辭セザレバ或ハ日本モ豫見サレタル如ク崩壊シタカモ知レナイノデアアル斯クシテ見レバ今迄ノ所起リシ事實ハ貿易禁止措置ノ實施並ビニ封鎖ノ實施(少數提議者アリ)ガ極東ニ於ケル戰爭回避ノ最上策ナリトスル見

解ヲ證據立テルモノデハナイ。

大使ハ一九四〇年九月十二日付第八二七號電報ニ言及シテキル。一本電ハ歐洲ニ於ケル獨逸ノ勝利ノ結果トシテ日本軍部ノ所謂擴張政策、絶好ノ機會ニ就キ報ゼルモノデアアル。一本電ハ和解的手段ノ採用ガ合衆國ニトリ不得策且無益ト思ハレタヤウナ時期ニ於イテ且其ノ様ナ狀勢ノモトニ於テ發セラレタモノデアアル。本電ニ勸告セル如キ強力ナル政策ハ後ニ合衆國ニヨリ採用サレタモノデアアル。本政策並ビニ世界ノ政治的諸事件ノ日本ニ與ヘタル衝突トニヨリ日本政府ハ合衆國ニ對シ嚴重ノ要求メントスルニ至ツタノデアアル。右勢力ガ水泡ニ歸スルコトガアレバ日本ハ再ビ以前ノ立場ニ立歸ラハ更ニ過激ナル立場ヘ立戻ル趨勢ニ在リト大使ハ豫見シテキル。彼ノ言葉ヲ借りテ云ヘバ此ノ結果日本ハ全力ヲ擧ゲテ生キルカ死ヌカノ手ヲ打ツニ至ルベク外國ノ壓力ニ屈スルヨリハムシロ現實ニ其ノ國民傳來ノ腹切リヲ指シテ迄モ外部ノ經濟的禁輸措置ヲ無視スル態度ニ出ルコトト考ヘラレル。斯カル危險ノ偶發性ハ單ニ可能トイフニ止ラズ幾ヒナクアリ得ベキコトデアルトイフノガ日々日本國民ノ氣質及ビ心理ヲ觀察スルモノノ認メル所トナツテキル。

若シ日本國民ノ素實、氣性ヲ念頭ニオケバ漸進的ニ經濟的措置ヲ強化スルコトニヨリ多少ノ戰爭ノ危險ヲ留スコトハアツテモ恐ラクハ夫ヲ回避シ得ルト爲ス見解ハイカニモ不確定且危險ニシテ斯カル假定ヲ基礎トシテ米國ノ政策並ビニ措置ヲ考究スルコトハ出來ナイ。大使館トシテハ斯カル方針ガ採用サレタトシテモ決シテ戰爭ヲ回避シ得ナイト考ヘル。然シナガラ各人ノ見解モ結局ハ意見ニ過ギナイノデアル。從ツテ一方ノ意見ヲ正ト假定シ其ノ上ニ立ツテ決定的ナル政策ヲ打ち建テルコトハ米國ノ國家的利益ニ反スルモノデアルト大使館ニ於テハ信ズル。是ハ正ニ本末顛倒ヲ意味スルモノデアル。先ヅ明ラカナ所主要眼目トシテハ國防ノ第一陣タル外交ガ失敗ニ歸シタ場合アメリカノ國家目的、政策及ビ其ノ欲求スル所ニ鑑ミテ尙モ對日戰ヲ持セズトナシ得ルカドウカト云フ問題ノ決定ヲ伴フ。斯カル決定ノ基礎ノ上ニ立ツテ始メテ、ルーズベルト政府トシテモ最大限ニ不明確ハ揣摩臆測、或ハ意見ト云ツタ要素ヲ除去セル政策ヲ實施シ得ルノデアル。本大使トシテハ時間的余裕ノ許サレヌ此ノ點ノコトヲ最早撤回不可能視サレルニシテモ斯カル決定ガ十分検討ノ上採用サレタモノデアアルコトヲ疑ハナイ。

此ノ深刻重大ナル問題ヲ論ゼルニ當リ大使ハ夫ニ關スル政府ノ意圖ヨリ考ヘニハ觸レテ居ラズ且暗ニ華府ニ於イテハ輕卒ニ政策ヲ實施シテキルルト云ハントスルモノデハ決シテ無イ旨強調シテキル。サレバトモ彼ハ一刻タリトモ米國ノ對日融和ヲ從通スルモノデモナク亦合衆國ガ其ノ對日關係ヲ包含メタ國際關係ノ指導及ビ調整ノ基盤トシテ決定セル根本原理ニ於テ僅デモ讓歩センコトヲ主張セントスルモノデモナイ。假令方法ニ柔軟性ヲ持クセヨウト原理ニ就イテハ絕對ニ妥協ハ許サルベキデナイ。大使ノ意圖スル所ハ日本ガ對米自發的戰爭ニ向ツテ漸進ハル力ノアルコトヲ或ハ暴露シテ米國ガ對日戰爭ノ途中ニ捲キ込マレルコトノナイヤウニ含シ細サントスルニ在ル。一方國民ノ理性ハ新カル行爲ニ對シテ反對ヲ命ジテモ日本側ノ理性ハアメリカ流ノ考ヘ方ヲ標準トシテハ測レナイモノガアル。

日本ノ新聞ノ現在ノ好戰的ナ論調並ビニ内容ニ關シテハ大使ハ夫程心配ノ要ヲ認メナイノデアアルガ（日本各紙トモ過去數年間ト云フモノハ寄セテハ打チ返ヘス處ノ如ク執拗ニ合衆國ヲ攻撃シテ來タ。）平和案決裂ノ點ニ於イテ殘サレタ計畫ヲ遂行スル爲ノ明ラカナル日本側ノ諸準備ヲ過少評價スルコトガ如何ニ近視的の見解ナルカヲ指摘シテキル。彼ハ更ニ

附加ヘテ米國ノ政策ガ若シモ日本側ノ準備ヲ無クナ軍國主義ノ妄動ニシ
テ單ニ日本ノ高壓外交ヲ道義的ニ掩護セントスルニ過ギナイト云フ信念
ニ基クナラバ是亦同様ニ目先ノ效カヌコトデアルト云ツテキル。米國ト
ノ武力闘争ヲ必要ナラシメル日本側ノ行動ハ何時デモ危險ヲ伴ヒツツ、
劇的突發ノ懼ガアル。

日十年間、

ト題スル前米國大使グルー氏日記
ヨリノ抜萃

四六七—四七〇頁

TOGO AND SHIGEMITSU LISTEN TO REASON

November 7, 1941

At the Soviet Embassy reception today, to celebrate their national holiday (they are the only diplomatic mission which now holds such receptions), I took occasion to make the strongest representations to every Japanese to whom I talked with regard to the Times and Advertiser editorial, mentioned above, listing seven points as a program for American "restitution" to Japan, and to point out what serious harm the editorial had done, especially at the moment of sending Kurusu to the United States to try to bring the current conversations to a successful conclusion. I spoke of the utter stupidity of creating such a hostile atmosphere here and such an unfortunate impression on the American public at a moment when constructive, not destructive, results were desired. I made it clear that it was not my intention to presume to interfere with the Japanese press but only to point out factually the inevitable effects in my country when such editorials, assumed to represent the views of the Japanese Government since the Times and Advertiser is known to be controlled by the Foreign Office, were reprinted in the United States.

Togo, the Foreign Minister, appeared to know nothing about the editorial and was sure that it had not been inspired by the Foreign Office, but he undertook to look into it and a few moments later he called Toshi Go, editor of the paper, over to him and told him what I had said. I also spoke to Toshi Go, who said that he alone was responsible for the editorial and had written it himself as indicating Japan's maximum demands which would undoubtedly be far beyond what the Government would ask for in the conversations. I told him that he could have no conception of the harm that he had done. Somebody else told me that Go had published the editorial as a protest against the secrecy under which the conversations were being held.

Shigemitsu,* with whom I talked, was thoroughly sympathetic and said that he would do his best to stop this sort of thing, while Matsumoto, head of Domei, promised me that there would be an immediate change in the tone and substance of the Japanese press, and he was as good as his word because the tone did immediately change for the better. I think I succeeded in stirring them all up considerably, so the gathering at the Soviet party was distinctly useful.

The next time I called on Togo I repeated these representations and he replied that while the Foreign Office had exerted no control over the Times and Advertiser up to the present, it was jolly well going to exert such control from now on. The editorial may or may not have been dictated by the Foreign Office, regardless of what Toshi Go said. One informant said that it had been so dictated, but if so, I think it was probably done by some subordinate official and without the knowledge of the Minister, who, I am convinced, knew nothing about it.

Perhaps I may have overemphasized the effect of the editorial on the American public, but my guess is that it made the front pages of the papers at home, as the radio commentators talked a good deal about it.

While on the subject of publicity I find pertinent and very interesting the same situation obtaining when James Gallatin (whose fascinating diary I am reading for the second time) was doing his best to bring England and the United States to peace prior to the Treaty of Ghent. He writes from London under date of April 21, 1814, to William H. Crawford, Secretary of War:

They [the English people] eagerly wish "the punishment of America." They do not even suspect that we had any just cause for war, and ascribe it solely to a premeditated concert with Bonaparte at a time when we thought him triumphant and their cause desperate. That such opinions should be almost universally entertained here by the great body of the people is not at all astonishing. To produce such an effect, and thereby render the American war popular, the Ministerial powers have had nothing more to do than to transcribe American Federal speeches and newspapers. If Pickens, Quincy, Strong, Hanson, &c. have not brought a majority of the American people to their

* Former Japanese Ambassador to London, who replaced Togo as Foreign Minister in April, 1943.

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* Former Japanese Ambassador to London, who replaced Togo as Foreign Minister in April, 1943.

side they have at least fully succeeded here, and had no difficulty in convincing all that part of the English community which derives its information from political journals that we had no cause of complaint [in the war of 1812] and acted only as allies of Bonaparte.

If we substitute for Pickering, Quincy, Strong, Hanson, et cetera, the names of some of our isolationists, the analogy is clear, for it is the speeches of those gentlemen that are splashed across the front pages of the Japanese press, and the Japanese people naturally assume that they represent the great majority of American public sentiment.

The President said today that the Government of the United States is giving consideration to the question of withdrawal of the American marine detachments now maintained ashore in China at Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 474-476

辯護圖書第二〇六一(二八)號

東郷及重光理ニ服ス

一九四一年十一月七日

ソ聯大使館ニ於ケル同國祭日祝賀「レセツブション」開催ノ機ニ當リ
（彼ラハ現在デハ此ノ種レセツブションヲ開催スル唯一ノ外交國デアル）
私ハ談話ヲ交ヘタルアラユル日本人ニ對シテ、七ヶ條ヨリ成ルアメリカ
ノ對日讓歩案ナルモノヲ揭ゲタル前述ノ「タイムズ&アドバタイザー」
紙社説ニ關シ、最モ嚴重ナルヲナシ、且特ニ現會談ヲ圓滿妥結ニ導
カンガ來栖來米國ニ特派セル際ノ事トテ本社説ノ及ボシタル深刻ナル惡
影響ヲ指摘セント試ミタ。私ハ、破壊的ニ非ズシテ實ニ建設的ナル成果
ガ要望サレテタルコノ時機ニ於テ、當地ニ敵對的零國氣ヲ醸成シ、且米
國人一般ニ對シテ思ハシカラヌ印象ヲ與ヘルコトハ正ニ愚劣極マル旨述
ベタ。私ハ厚カマシクモ日本ノ新聞ニ干涉ヲ試ミルガ如キ意ハ毛頭無キ
旨明ラカニスルト同時ニ、タゞ「タイムズ&アドバタイザー」紙ガ外務

省ノ統制下ニアルトサレテキル以上、日本政府ノ見解ヲ代辯スルモノト考ヘラレル。斯カル社説ガ米國ニ於イテ發表サレタ場合ニ、我國ニ必然的ニ齎スベキ影響ニ就キ事實上指摘セントシタマデアル。

東郷外相ハ其社説ニ就イテハ何ラ關知セザルモノノ様ニ思ハレタガ、右記事ガ外務省ノ指金ニヨルモノニ非ザルコトヲ確信シテキタ。彼ハ夫ヲ調査スルコトヲ約シ、^{當時}後同紙主筆卿^{トシ?}ト^{トシ?}喚問シ、私ノ言葉ヲ傳ヘタノデアル。私モ亦卿^{トシ?}ト面談シタガ、其際ニ彼ハ其ノ社説ニ付全責任ヲ有スル旨並ビニ、同記事ハ彼自身ノ筆ニ成ルモノニシテ、日本ノ最大限度ノ要求ヲ示セルモノナルコト、尤モ是トテ政府ガ日米會談ノ際ニナス要求ヲ遙ニ超エル程度ノモノデアルコトハ疑ヒナイ旨述べタ。私ハ彼ノ及ボセル惡影響ノ程ハ到底彼ノ考ヘ及ベナイモノナル旨述べタ。第三者ノ私ニ告ゲタ所ニヨレバ、卿ハ右會談ノ秘密主義ニ對スル抗議ノ意味デ此ノ社説ヲ公表シタトノ事デアル。

重光×トモ話シタガ、彼ハ全幅的ニ共鳴シ、最善ヲ盡シテ斯カル種ノ
×前駐英大使一九四三年四月東郷外相ノ後任トナル。

事ハ防止スベキ旨述べタ。一方、同盟ノ總裁タル松本ハ日本各紙ノ論調
内容ヲ即坐ニ變更スベキ旨約言シタガ、全ク其ノ約束ニ違ハズ、論調ハ
直チニ一變シ改善サレタ。私ハ彼ヲ全テ少カラズ動カスコトニ成功シ
タト思フ。從ツテソ聯側「レセツブション」ニ於ケル會同ハ著シク役立
ツタノデアル。

次同ニ東郷ヲ訪問ノ際ニモ私ハ右ニ述べタヤウナ意嚮ヲ繰リ返ヘシ表
明シタ。彼ハ是ニ對シ、現在迄ノ所外務省ハ「タイムズ」アドバタイザ
ー「紙」ニ何ラ統制ヲ試ミナシツタガ、是レカラハ斷然加ヘルベキ旨答ヘ
タ。卿トシノ言ニモ拘ラズ右意嚮ガ外務省ノ意嚮ヲ受ケタモノデアルカ
否カニ關シテハ何レトモ判斷ガツカヌ。

報告ヲ齎セル者ノ中ニモ是ヲ肯定セルモノガ一人アツタガ、假令事實サ
ウニセヨ、是ハ多分部下ガ外相ニ無斷デヤツタコトト思フ。外相ガ右ニ
就キ全然關知シナカッタコトヲ私ハ確信シテキル。

或ハ私ハ右社説ノ米國民衆ニ及ボセル影響ヲ強調シ過ギタ嫌ガアルカ
モ知レヌガ、私ノ想像デハ右社説ハ母國ノ新聞紙ノ第一面ニ大々的ニ報

セラレタコトト考ヘル。ラヂオノ批評家連中モ随分ト此ノ問題ヲ取り上
ゲテキタノヲ見テモ分ルト思フ。

今此ノ公表トイフ問題ニ就イテハ、私ハ嘗テJ・ギヤラティン(彼ノ
興味津々タル日記ヲ今繰リ返ヘシ讀ンデキル所ダガ)最善ヲ盡シテ英米
間ニ「セント」條約以前ニ平和ヲ齎サント努力セル際ト全ク同様ノ狀況ガ顯
成サレテキルノガ如何ニモ肯綮ニ當ルモノガアツテ興味深イト思フ。彼
ハ一八一四年四月廿一日付デ、倫敦ヨリ陸軍長官、ロバート・クロフオード
宛左ノ如ク書キ送ツテキル。

彼ラハ「英國民」々々米國ニシテ罷黜アラシコトミヲ切望シテキル。彼
等ニハ吾々が正當ナル戰争的アツテ戰フトハ到底考ヘラレズ、奈翁
ノ勝利ト彼等ノ運動ノ絶望的ナルヲ判斷セル時機ニ於テ、奈翁トノ協
同作戰ヲ前々カラ齎セルコトノ結果トノミ考ヘテキル。斯カル意見ガ
當地ニ遍ク受ケ容レラレテキルトシテモ決シテ驚クニ當ラナイ。斯カ
ル效果ヲ招來シ、以テ對米戰ニ關シ民心ヲ得ンガ爲ニハ、内閣當局者
ハ單ニ米國ノ聯合派諸演說ナリ新聞記事ナリヲ轉寫スレバ事足りタノ

デアル。假令ビツカリング、クインシー、ストロング、バンズン等ハ多徴米國民ノ人心ヲ獲得ルニ至ラナカツタトシテモ、當地ニ於イテハ少クトモ十二分ニ奏功シテ居リ、情報ヲ政治雜誌ノ類ニ求メル階層ノ英人全テニ對シ「一八一二年ノ戰役ニ際シテハ」吾々ニハ何ラ苦情ヲ持テ込ム種モナク、全ク奈翁ノ同盟國トシテ行動シテキルニ過ギナイ旨ヲ納得リセルノハ極メテ容易ナコトデアツタ。

若シ今吾々ガビカリング、クインシー、ストロング、ハンソン等ノ代リニ我國ノ孤立主義者ノ名前ヲ幾ツカ當嵌メテ見レバ、須推ハ明々白デアリ、日本各紙ノ第一面ニナハシヲ以テ掲ゲラレルノハ實ニ斯カル御仁ノ言葉デアツテ、日本國民ハニメテ當リ前ノ様ニ夫ガ、アメリカノ主要與國ヲ代表スルモノ様ニ考ヘ込デシマフノデアル。

北京、天津、上海等ノ支那陸上介地ニ現在派遣サレテキル米國海兵隊ノ接收問題ニ付、合衆國政府ハ考慮中ナル旨大統領ハ本日發表シタ。

「滯日」十年、ト題スル前駐日大使グルー氏日記ヨリノ拔萃

四七四頁四七六頁

CHURCHILL PLEDGES WAR WITHIN THE HOUR

November 11, 1941

Churchill has come out with the statement that "if the United States should be involved in a war with Japan, a British declaration of war would follow within the hour." It does one's heart good to hear such an unqualified statement by the British Prime Minister, leaving nothing whatever to Japan's imagination.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 473

not used

not used

Def Doc No. 206 E-120

辯護國文書第二百〇六號（百二十）

チャーチル速刻宣戦を盟ふ。

一九四一年十一月十一日

チャーチルは、若し米國にして日本との戦争に巻き込まれんか、英國の宣戦は、直ちに寸時を出でずして布告されるだらう、といふ聲明を公にした。斯かる英國首相による率直なる聲明を聞くと、日本が更に臆測する餘地が残らないので、聞く者が嬉しくなるのである

題して「在日中の十年間」といふ前米國大使グルーの日記よりの
抜萃。
第四七八頁より

